

THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND THE LEGITIMATION  
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS**

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The main research problem in the thesis is to scrutinise the main reasons for the JDP's rise to power, establishment and maintenance of its hegemony and in recent years gradual weakening of its legitimacy in the light of Jürgen Habermas' theory of legitimation crises. The analysis of the JDP rule will inevitably necessitate an investigation of the ways in which the Turkish economy has been integrated into the global economy. By using Jürgen Habermas' concept of 'requisite quantity' and 'moral identity' the thesis will try to analyse JDP's economic, welfare and judicial policies and argue that despite its initial popularity and rhetorical promises the JDP has recently lost most of its popularity in the eyes of people and is now facing a serious legitimation crisis. By analysing the discrepancies between what the JDP had promised in its initial years in terms of a long-lasting consensus and what it has delivered so far the thesis will situate JDP's crony capitalism and its attempts to use Islamism and Ottomanism to establish a new 'moral identity' within Habermasian and Weberian theoretical perspectives.

Keywords: Legitimation Crisis, Crony Capitalism, JDP's Welfare Policy, Rule of Law, Liberal Authoritarianism

## ÖZ

### ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ VE MEŞRUIYET KRİZİ

Yalım, Gözde  
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler  
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Bu tezin temel sorunsalı AKP'nin iktidara gelmesi, yerleşmesi, yükselmesi, hakimiyet kurduktan sonra son yıllarda giderek meşruiyetini yitirmesini Jürgen Habermas'ın meşruiyet krizi ve Max Weber'in betimsel meşruiyet anlayışı çerçevesinde irdelemektir. AKP iktidarının irdelenmesi kaçınılmaz olarak Türkiye ekonomisinin küresel ekonomi ile eklemlenmesi sürecini de dikkate almayı zorunlu hale getirmektedir. Bu tez Jürgen Habermas'ın 'requisite quantity' ve 'moral identity' kavramları kullanılarak AKP'nin ekonomi, toplumsal refah ve hukuk alanlarındaki politikalarını detaylı bir süzgeçten geçirerek partinin toplumdaki başlangıç yıllarındaki popülaritesini yitirdiği ve şimdi çok ciddi bir meşruiyet krizi ile yüz yüze kaldığı savunulacaktır. AKP'nin ortaya çıktığı ilk yıllarda verdiği sözler aracılığıyla geliştirdiği uzun soluklu uzlaşım ile sonraki yıllardaki icraatları arasındaki uçuruma odaklanacak olan bu tez, AKP'nin İslamcılık ve Osmanlıcılık söylemlerinin arkasında nasıl bir ahbap çavuş kapitalizmi geliştirdiği ni Habermasçı ve Weberci bir çerçevede irdeleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Meşruiyet Krizi, Ahbap-Çavuş Kapitalizmi, AKP'nin Sosyal Politikaları, Hukukun Üstünlüğü, Liberal Otoriterlik

To the loving memory of my dearest grand-mother, Sabahat esmeçi.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

### ABBREVIATIONS

ASKON - ANADOLU ASLANLARI İŞ ADAMLARI

DEHAP - DEMOKRATİK HALK PARTISI

DİSK - DEVRİMCI İŞÇİ SENDİKALARI KONFEDERASYONU

DISK-AR - DEVRİMCI İŞÇİ SENDİKALARI KONFEDERASYONU  
ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ

DSP - DEMOKRATİK SOL PARTİ

DYP - DOĞRU YOL PARTİSİ

FP - FELICITY PARTY

GATT - GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

GNP - GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

IFI - INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION

IMF - INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

HSYK - HAKİM VE SAVCILAR YÜKSEK KURULU

ISI - IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALISATION

JDP - JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

JP - JUSTICE PARTY

KHK - KANUN HÜKMÜNDE KARARNAME

MAI - MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

MP - MOTHERLAND PARTY

MÜSİAD - MÜSTAKİL SANAYİCİ VE İŞ ADAMLARI DERNEĞİ

NGO - NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

NOM - NATIONAL OUTLOOK MOVEMENT

NMP - NATIONAL MOVEMENT PARTY

NSC- NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL

NSP - NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

OECD - ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

PPL - PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW

SAL - STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOANS

SAP - STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICY

SODEV - SOSYAL DEMOKRASI VAKFI

TCC - TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS

TINA - THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE

TISK - TÜRKİYE İŞVEREN SENDİKALARI KONFEDERASYONU

TNC - TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

TOKİ - TOPLU KONUT IDARESİ

TPP - TRUE PATH PARTY

TUSKON - TÜRKİYE İŞ ADAMLARI VE SANAYİCİLER KONFEDERASYONU

TÜBİTAK - TÜRKİYE BİLİMSEL VE TEKNOLOJİK ARAŞTIRMA KURUMU

TÜMİSAD - TÜRK SANAYİCİ VE İŞ ADAMLARI DERNEĞİ

TÜRKONFED - TÜRK GİRİŞİM VE İŞ DÜNYASI KONFEDERASYONU

TÜRKİŞ - TÜRKİYE İŞÇİ SENDİKALARI KONFEDERASYONU

TÜSİAD - TURK SANAYICILERI VE İŞ INSANLARI DERNEĐI

VP - VIRTUE PARTY

WP - WELFARE PARTY

WTO - WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

YASED - ULUSLARARASI YATIRIMCILAR DERNEĐI

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Opinion polls carried out by MetroPOLL since February 2020 have shown a steady decline in the votes of the JDP and its coalition partner NMP (National Movement Party). The percentage of the people who said they would vote for the JDP if there was an election on next Sunday was 33.9 percent in February, 33.7 percent in March, 32.8 percent in April, 30,7 percent in May and 30.3 percent in June 2020 is clear indication of the gradual decline of the JDP popularity (Birgün 4.7.2020). On June 26 president Erdoğan's video chat with the university candidates received around 243 thousand dislike within a short time that voting was closed down by the authorities and this led to the emergence of a youth movement called 'size oy moy yok' (no votes or else for you). This attracted the wrath of the government in the form of a law in July 2020 restricting social media. Considering that only three years ago Erdoğan was elected as an executive president by receiving 52.5 percent of the votes in the presidential election in 2018 and his party had received 40.87 percent of the votes in June 2015 national elections one could easily argue that the JDP legitimacy was eroding.

This thesis aims to scrutinise the main reasons for the JDP's rise to power, establishment and maintenance of its hegemony and in recent years gradual weakening of its legitimacy. In doing so the thesis will attempt to see the usefulness of Jürgen Habermas' theory of legitimation crises and Max Weber's descriptive understanding of legitimacy. The analysis of the JDP rule will inevitably necessitate an investigation of the ways in which the Turkish economy has been articulated with global capitalism. By using Jürgen Habermas' concept of 'requisite quantity' and 'moral identity' and Weber's notion of authority and legitimacy the thesis will try to analyse JDP's economic, welfare and judicial policies and argue that despite its

initial popularity and rhetorical promises the JDP has recently lost most of its popularity in the eyes of people and is

now facing a serious legitimation crisis. By analysing the discrepancies between what the JDP had promised in its initial years in terms of a long-lasting consensus and what it has delivered so far the thesis will situate JDP's crony capitalism and its attempts to use Islamism and Ottomanism to establish a new 'moral identity' within Habermasian and Weberian theoretical perspectives.

Having come to power in 2002 the JDP has shaped the economy, society and politics in a particular way. Taking advantage of the existing fragile conditions in its early years the JDP regime has not only managed to obtain people's approval, and thus legitimacy, but also sustained this legitimacy for a long time. In order to understand the developmental trajectory of the JDP rule it becomes necessary to define what legitimacy is. Therefore, one of our sub-questions would revolve around the concept of legitimacy and the process of legitimation. A close survey of the literature on legitimacy reveals that this concept is strongly linked with the concept of hegemony. Consequently, this thesis will also raise the question of what is hegemony and how it is built in a given country. As our case study is Turkey in the 2000s, the issues of building legitimacy and hegemony inevitably directs us to socio-economic, political judicial policies of the JDP. In other words we are facing a number of inter-related sub questions that will be helpful for us to develop a holistic picture of the AKP's rise and decline.

As will be seen in the following pages the eighteen years of the JDP regime has brought Turkey face to face with a series of crises in economic, social, political and judicial spheres. For this reason, the thesis will look at the trajectory of JDP policies and show how the current state of crises have been generated. Obviously the scope of a master's thesis would not allow to deal with all aspects of the JDP policies in a satisfactory manner. Therefore, I will restrict my questions with the economy, social policy and the judicial system. While analysing these areas I will try to link them to the question of legitimation building and legitimation crisis.



Specifically I will raise the question of the usefulness of Habermas' concept of 'requisite quantities' in the rise and fall of the legitimacy of a regime. I will ask the following sub-question: to what extent the decisions of JDP regime have generated what Habermas calls the four possible tendencies of crises: economic crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation crisis, and motivation crisis? (Habermas 1988: 117).

By using his concept of 'requisite quantity' I will try to analyse JDP's economic, welfare and judicial policies and argue that despite its initial popularity and rhetorical promises the JDP has lost most of its popularity in the eyes of people and is now facing a serious legitimation crisis. The fact that the votes of JDP has declined from 52.5 percent in the presidential election of 2018 to 30 percent in June 2020 in public opinion polls is a clear indication of legitimacy crisis. In analysing the main reasons for this crisis of legitimacy, I will look at JDPs neo-liberal crony capitalism and show how it has failed to keep its promises of economic growth and equity in the country. I will also scrutinise the JDP policies about social justice, individual freedoms, human rights and the judicial system and argue that the 'rule of law' in the country has been seriously violated to such an extent that we can call the JDP regime as an illiberal democracy. In other words it will be attempted to show that the JDP rule has failed to resolve the economic and social crises. Thus, consequently it has been unable to produce what Habermas calls 'requisite quantities' of the demands of the populace which has led to a legitimation crisis.

It will be argued that the way the JDP rule has managed the economy coupled with the world economic crisis since 2008 has generated conditions for the emergence of legitimation crises. The JDP rhetoric and reality have differed so significantly that it has not been able to reproduce a strong legitimacy for its survival. A word of caution is necessary at this point about the JDP legitimacy. Time will show whether or not the loss of JDP popularity will lead to its demise and downfall, although signs are very strong since the COVID 19 and August 2020 currency crises. However one thing is very clear that, despite the use of the ideological tools of Islam and Ottomanism to construct a set of shared values and cultural attitudes, the JDP regime has not been able to keep its promises of equity, justice and welfare.

It will be shown that the rising prices, increasing taxes, high levels of unemployment, lack of personal freedom, freedom of speech etc. in the country have generated a certain level of disenchantment with the regime. The attempts by the regime to divert attention to other issues like the question of ‘survival’ (beka sorunu), and generate imagined enemies like the Kurds in Syria and Iraq have not been able to attract full support for the regime. The recent tension (August 2020) in the Eastern Mediterranean is another example of the JDP regime to divert attention away from serious economic social and political crises it is facing.

Since, the JDP has simply lost the control of the economy, which in turn has caused what Habermas calls a ‘rationality crisis’. It will be maintained that the measures taken by the JDP administration to overcome the economic crisis are the main reasons to call them as the bricks of the rationality crisis. Oppressive measures used by the JDP regime to quieten the populace in general and any opposition in particular have exacerbated the rationality crisis to such extent that a ‘legitimation crisis’ has emerged. As a consequence many people have lost trust and withdrawn their support from the regime as indicated by the recent public opinion polls referred above. The gradual disappearance of the three sine qua-non of legitimacy – the rule of law, the abidance of the laws by the rulers and the ruled and the approval of the authority of the ruler by the ruled through elections- is an indication of this legitimacy crisis and the dwindling charismatic features of the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is no longer capable of maintaining his and his JDP’s legitimacy in a Weberian sense. The populace is no longer ready to provide full support for the political and administrative system. A disequilibrium has emerged between the economic system and the socio-cultural system and the rationality crisis in Turkey has ‘converted into withdrawal of legitimation by way of a disorganization of the state apparatus’ (Habermas 1988: 46).

The main and sub research questions to be addressed in the thesis are:

#### Main research questions

- How and why the JDP has managed to come to power, maintained its power for a long time and how gradually its dominance has started to dwindle?
- What economic, social and political processes has the JDP used to build its long-term legitimacy and what factors have been conducive to its legitimisation crisis? When and what crucial factors have led to the erosion of JDP legitimacy?

#### Sub research questions

- To what extent the global dominance of neoliberalism provided a suitable environment for the rise and entrenchment of the JDP regime?
- To what extent financialisation of the Turkish economy and the ongoing world financial crisis since 2008 has contributed to the weakening of the JDP legitimacy?
- What kind of socio-economic, political and judicial problems have emerged during the JDP reign?

Having outlined the research problem, the thesis will proceed in the following order. The next chapter will focus on Habermas' theory of 'legitimation crisis' and attempt to show its usefulness in the rise and decline of the JDP's legitimacy. The third chapter will attempt to contextualise the rise and decline of the JDP in the global system of capitalism and the hegemonic position of neo-liberalism. It will be maintained that the liberal integration of Turkish economy and society into the global system had started well before the JDP's reign. Given the hegemony of neoliberalism, the experience of the JDP's rise to power and loss of legitimacy has to be explained within the context of Turkey's liberalisation process. It is crucial to provide a contextual background within which the JDP established itself, flourished and gradually has been losing its strength. We will be looking specifically at

country's transition from developmentalist import substitution policy to a free market-based export orientation policy. Export orientation of both industry and agriculture since the 1980s not only reflected the shift to post-Fordism but also meant that the developmentalist nature of state policies were simply replaced by free marketism. The role played by the military in the transition to neoliberalism would be scrutinised.

As the JDP's policies were built upon the liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s in which the state played a strong regulatory role, our analysis in the next part will focus on how the economy became internationalised in terms of production and finance. In other words, we will be highlighting the nature of the changes in the nature of the state that has adopted the role of a free-marketer rather than a nationalist one. It will be shown how financialisation has further increased the fragility of the economy to external shocks and crisis and thus jeopardised the legitimacy of the JDP governments in recent years.

Having explained the conditions within which the JDP emerged, the fourth chapter will attempt to analyse how the JDP came to power and how it developed its strength in its early years. The social and economic policies of the JDP will constitute the main focus of this chapter with the aim of highlighting how the party has managed to entrench its power and build its legitimacy. This chapter will start by analysing the politico-economic conditions that the JDP took advantage to come to power in 2002. Then it will provide a content analysis of the JDP party programme before coming to power. It will be shown that the JDP programme over and over again emphasised the importance of democracy, rule of law, secularism, human rights in general and individual rights and freedoms in particular. This will be followed by an account of the JDP policies in the 2002-2011 period in which the party managed to build a strong support base (legitimacy) by providing requisite quantities. Specific attention will be paid to legitimacy building activities of the JDP including the policies in the areas of health, social welfare and social assistance. The chapter will also concentrate on the JDP's efforts to transform the cultural boundaries of society through its education policies aiming to Islamise and Ottomanise the society.

The fifth chapter would provide an analysis of why, how and when the JDP's decline started, what indicators are there to show the eradication of the JDP legitimacy. It will be shown how the party lost the control of the economy, in what ways they went directly the opposite direction of what they had promised in their party programme. Specifically how the government gradually resorted to authoritarianism and how it failed to deliver the requisite quantities they promised, and how the rule of law was fundamentally undermined.

The conclusion chapter will pull out the main arguments of the thesis by linking Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis with the rise and erosion of the JDP legitimacy.



## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Introduction

There are many recent studies like Baykan's (2018), Doğan's (2020) and Petersen and Yanaşmayan's (2019) works that have attempted to explain the recent weakening of the power base of the JDP. They tend to focus on circumstantial factors such as the whimsical attitude of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or the internal cleavages within the Islamic movement such as the Gülenist Movement. While accepting the value of these and similar studies, this thesis attempts to go beyond them by claiming that the erosion of legitimacy of the JDP has to be explained in terms of specific ways the Turkish economy and society have been integrated into the global system. It will be argued that as an integral part of the global system the Turkish economy has not managed to escape from the repercussions of the recent world economic crisis. It will be argued that the JDP managed very well to overcome the 2001 economic crisis and in the process it generated the conditions which made the country feel the impact of the 2008-9 crisis quite deeply. It will be maintained that the intensified financialization of the economy and economic growth strategies based on foreign borrowing could only sustain the economy for only a certain period of time. While the increased privatisation, financialization policies enhanced the dependence of the country, it managed to keep business circles very happy. The eradication of the working class gains were counteracted by the implementation of World Bank designed and supported welfare policies and philanthropic activities organised on behalf of the JDP, thus the legitimacy of the JDP was maintained for a long time. While the weakening economy was kept on its feet, the JDP used Islamic bonds and Ottomanism to maintain its support base until very recently.

We will be arguing that economic crisis and legitimation crisis tendency in Turkey cannot be separated from the crises of capitalism in general. However, as the focus of the thesis is the rise and erosion of the JDP's legitimacy in Turkey, we will concentrate on the JDP policies and attempt to explain its erosion of legitimacy by using Habermas' "legitimation crisis" theory. In the process, when necessary, references would be made to the interrelationship between Turkey and global capitalism.

## **2.2 Habermas and Legitimation Crisis**

As a member of the Frankfurt School Habermas has made significant contributions to critical theory. Having analysed the historical evolution of capitalist society, he has simply moved away from a dogmatic analysis of state and society. Concentrating on the nature of the state, he is critical of the views that interpret the state as the tool of the dominant class. He is also critical of the liberal view that considers the state as an autonomous entity acting in the interests of everyone to reconcile the conflicting interests.

In his book *Toward a Rational Society* Habermas (1971) analyses how development of scientific knowledge, technology and industrialisation have created new forms of state and society relationship. These have been reflected in new forms of politics which can no longer be restricted to the domain of superstructure. The starting point for Habermas is the capitalist system with its crisis prone nature. The crises of capitalism originate from its incessant desire to grow and accumulate. In parallel with its desire for growth. Crises have emerged in different times and forms. Due to their inherent nature, capitalist crises periodically have been resolved at a particular time or postponed to reappear in the future (Habermas 1988: 42). Accumulation crisis of capitalism necessarily becomes societal crisis as it generates unemployment, bankruptcy, economic contraction etc. Habermas maintains that the crisis that



emerges in the economic system becomes socialized and influences socio-cultural system and its norms.

The crisis prone nature of contemporary capitalism forces the state to interfere in every aspect of life through its administrative and technical structures (Habermas 1971: 101-6). In elaborating capitalist crisis, Habermas builds upon Marx's view that capitalism is beset with crises that eventually will bring its downfall. For Habermas, the state has been instrumental in taming and postponing of the self-destruction of capitalism. The state has no power to stop economic crises generated by global capitalism but somehow manages to reduce its possible negative impacts on people through the provision of public goods and services such as education, health care, infrastructure, social security, etc.

The systemic requirement of capitalist societies consists of the countervailing demands of capital to accumulate and the people to have their needs met. This puts the power holders in a fairly difficult position to reconcile these contradictory demands. In a sense the state is forced to appear to be taking a Poulantzian relatively autonomous position between these two contradictory demands. The maintenance of state legitimacy depends on how successfully the state appears to be reconciling these contradictory demands of capital and society. This brings us to the question of what legitimacy is.

### **2.3 Habermas and Legitimacy**

Although legitimacy is one of the most significant issues and occupies a central place in politics and social and political theory (Beetham 2013, Crick 1993), there is no clear cut agreement on what it constitutes and what its sources are. Therefore, this makes international comparison rather difficult. Without an agreed meaning, it is difficult to produce a data set for cross-cultural analysis.

However, in most analysis of legitimacy, the emphasis is placed on the perception of citizens about whether or not power is used justly and rightfully. As such it has strong

relationship with how states are organised and how they operate. In this sense, the way Habermas tries to link three sub-systems in the maintenance of social integration can provide a fairly general framework to be utilised in different countries. At this point it is pertinent to explain what Habermas means by the three sub-systems and their role in the emergence of crisis tendencies.

In late or advanced capitalism the two main categories of crises (system crisis and identity crisis) may have their roots in economic, political and socio-cultural sub-systems.

For Habermas, there is a latent contradiction between the economic, political-administrative and socio-cultural sub-systems. The functional relations between these three constitutive elements of a capitalist society produce contradictions between them, which generate different forms of crisis tendencies. The economic sub-system may generate systemic economic crises while political sub-system would lead to the systemic rationality crisis and socio-cultural sub-system may create motivation crisis.

Table 2.1 Crisis Tendencies

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Economic System	Economic Crisis	--
Political System Crisis	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation
Socio-Cultura System Crisis	-	Motivation

Source: Habermas (1988: 45)

The main contradiction of capitalist society, social production and private appropriation, are behind these four possible crisis tendencies.

Economic Crisis Tendencies are explained in terms of the amount of capital and labour inputs into the system and in terms of the consumable values produced by the system (Habermas 1988: 45). Capitalist mode of production typically suffers from a crisis when the inputs are inadequate (not sufficient capital or labour). For him crisis in liberal capitalism emerges from the distribution of the output. In other words, when there is an inconformity between what is produced and what is consumed (sold), this generates a problem. For the capitalist system to reproduce itself, the cycle of production, consumption and production has to be maintained. If the cycle is broken by overproduction or underconsumption, the economic crisis tendency emerges. In case of the persistence of this tendency in advanced capitalism, the state may interfere in the economy but this may not alter the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

The state interference in advanced capitalism is limited to government finances thus does not stretch to the capitalist system as a whole, which suffers from the realisation problem. The state activity can only mediate for capitalism to overcome its crises, but it cannot resolve the accumulation crisis (Habermas 1988:46). The state attempts to organise and plan the activities of capital to overcome its crisis. Economic crisis tendency will lead to a social crisis and political struggles. The accumulation problem of capital generates unemployment, reduction of wages and other workers' rights. The inability of the system to deliver requisite quantities of material benefits for the masses may contribute to legitimisation crisis.

Political Crisis Tendencies that haunt capitalist system emerges when the system is not capable of generating a widespread mass loyalty. The public simply evaluates the 'sovereignly executed administrative decisions' (p.46). The realisation that the administrative system is not capable of meeting the imperatives necessitated by the economic system, leads to the emergence of a rationality crisis. When the administrative decisions fail to deliver sufficient rational decisions to resolve the problems, it also fails to attract requisite quantities of mass loyalty which in turn leads to the erosion of state legitimacy and legitimisation crisis. The rationality crisis is related to the failed state decisions to ensure the maintenance of the system and

thus is a 'displaced systemic crisis'. On the other hand legitimation crisis is an 'identity crisis' which does not pose a threat to the capitalist system, but poses a threat to the existing power holders (Habermas 1988: 46).

A rationality crisis means that the state has shown ineptness in its administrative capacity to take relevant decisions to run the economy out of crisis. This administrative deficit in turn would lead to a legitimacy deficit of not being able to institute the required normative structures. 'A legitimation deficit means that it is not possible by administrative means to maintain or establish effective normative structures to the extent required' (Habermas 1988: 47). In the process of capitalist development, the political system does not restrict its sphere of influence to the economic system but stretches it to the socio-cultural system as well (Habermas 1988:47). Organisational structures of capitalism based on science, technology and rational thinking inevitably weaken cultural traditions. The attempts of the state to manipulate the cultural system to serve its own agenda generates new boundary conditions that are alien to the existing socio-cultural system (Habermas 1988: 47-8).

**Socio-Cultural Crisis Tendencies** Habermas explains this tendency also in terms of inputs and output. Commodities in the market and collective goods provided by the state (such as public services, social security system, administrative rules, laws and regulations etc.) constitute the input. Furthermore, the crises that emerge as outputs in the other systems also enter as 'input disturbances in the socio-cultural system and translate into withdrawal of legitimation' (Habermas 1988: 48).

The crises output produced by economic and political systems may weaken the social integration in society. Societies are not in a position to make direct decisions about investments, policies, rules and regulations, thus there is no possibility of input crisis stemming from society. The crises that emerge at socio-cultural level are always output crises generated by the impacts of economic and political decisions. Changes in the political and economic systems are due to the efforts to build legitimacy, but they may lead to economic, rationality and legitimacy crises. The changes generated

in socio-cultural system in turn would lead to motivational crisis (Habermas 1988: 48). Legitimation crisis and motivation crisis are strongly interlinked in that societal transformation destroys people's trust in the system and they lose their motivation to support the system, and when this becomes generalised we witness a legitimation crisis.

He summarises the four crisis tendencies of capitalism as follows (Habermas 1988: 49)

‘It is a consequence of the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist system that, other factors being equal, either

-the economic system does not produce the requisite quantity of consumable values, or;

-the administrative system does not produce the requisite quantity of rational decisions, or;

-the legitimation system does not provide the requisite quantity of generalized motivations, or;

-the socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite quantity of action-motivating meaning’.

Habermas considers legitimation crisis as an identity crisis. Identity crisis refers to the time that the administrative institutions are no longer capable of performing their essential duties. The controllers of such institutions may still have the legal authority but citizens may not have confidence in either the institutions or their holders (Habermas 1988). In chapter five by referring to a research conducted by ADAMOR (2020) we will highlight the loss of confidence to the JDP government. The majority of respondents to the research specify in the last ten years that the conditions in following areas have worsened in Turkey: democracy, freedoms, equity, human rights, justice, social morals As far as Habermas is concerned, what is significant for

legitimacy is whether or not governing structures clearly show that they perform their duties and achieve their goals as they are supposed to do so. The failure in this would lead to people's loss of confidence in the system and its leaders. In other words legitimacy is the acceptance of the existing power and authority in the system by the citizens (Habermas 1984-b, 1988). The perception of the subjects is vital for the legitimacy of a political order, rulers and institutions. The engagements of political power holders in every sphere of life to maintain their dominance are acts of legitimacy building. When they are able to get people's approval, then they will be conceived as legitimate.

For him, in contemporary times politics is involved in attempting to get rid of the dysfunctions generated by the market and thus preventing the risks that may be threatening the system. In order to analyse the crisis tendencies of capitalism in contemporary societies, Habermas (1988) in his book 'Legitimation Crisis' first concentrates on liberal capitalism and highlights the wage labour and capital relationship as its prominent feature. Like Marx, he stresses the nature of exploitative relationship between capital and labour through surplus production and its appropriation by the capitalist class. However he does not refrain from asking few questions about the contemporary relevance of the views of Marx. He thinks that the fundamental question that needs to be answered is whether or not the logic of capitalist crisis has changed and is following a different path of development than taking the form of unstable accumulation.

In what ways have these been reflected in social struggles in society? In Legitimation Crisis he argues that the socio-cultural, the economic and the political-administrative sub-systems characterises advanced capitalism. The public sector and two distinctive private sectors make up the economic sector. The state controlled services and industries such as the armament industries constitute the backbone of the public sector. In advanced capitalism the first type of the private sector that competes in the so-called free market is fairly limited. It is the second type of the private sector, the oligopolistic sector with its hugely concentrated capital, that is that characterises advanced or organised capitalism (Habermas 1988: 34).

The importance of the Habermas' legitimation crisis is its usefulness in theorising about the structural conditions of the nation state and explaining legitimation crisis in terms of the interactions of the global influences and internal economic and socio-cultural conditions. Theorists like O'Connor (1989), Mandel (1989), Poulantzas (1976) and Harvey (2005, 2010 ) have emphasized that crises in the developing world emerges as a result of interactions between the global forces of capitalism and the internal factors of the nation states. Habermas' distinction between economic, political and socio-cultural sub systems serve the purpose of how to link global influences of capitalism with the internal class dynamics of a particular nation state. This enables us to explain why different countries, particularly those of the global south, experience crises in different ways and intensity. The structural conditions theorised by Habermas in terms of the distinction made between the three different sub-systems (economic, political and socio-cultural) can be used as a useful framework to analyse internal dynamics of any nation state. Although Habermas theorised about the legitimation crises in Western welfare states, my argument is that his theoretical distinction between economic, political and socio-cultural sub-systems opens up a venue for linking developments in the global economy and the socio-economic processes taking place within different countries. Although it has been developed by Habermas for the analysis of legitimation crisis in welfare capitalist societies, this framework is general enough to be used in any capitalist society, be it advanced or dependent. Therefore, it can be used in countries like Turkey to highlight the specific nature of state-society relations and explain the JDP's erosion of legitimation.

Like Marx, for Habermas capitalism is a socio-economic system of extended reproduction. Simply put, the main part of the profit from investment would be invested and the productive enterprise would expand. Such expansion is made possible by the introduction of new technologies and commodities in the market. This revolutionary feature of capitalism depends on the consumption of those commodities. Capitalism's maintenance and sustainability depends on the development of tastes for new commodities. As the taste develops for commodities,

people's expectations are also built up for these consumption items. Habermas in his books *Theory and Practice* (1974) and *Legitimation Crisis* (1988) maintains that, in capitalism the market is not always capable of providing goods to satisfy expectations, and consequently, to overcome this dysfunctional market feature becomes one of the essential duties of the government. This is because advanced capitalism has destroyed the traditional restraints on demand and consumption.

The state has to deal with the economic crises, regardless of their origins, be it transmitted from the global system or generated within the country. As market is inherently incapable of resolving the problems generated by the crises, it becomes the duty of the political-administrative system to manage the deficiency in the economic system. The state shoulders the burden of sorting out accumulation and stability problems which generate the system integration crisis. For Habermas, social integration and system integration are absolute necessities for the sustainability of legitimacy. To elucidate the relationship between them in his book *The Theory of Communicative Action* Habermas (1984-a) distinguishes between the lifeworld and the system. For him human beings are involved in interactions in two distinctive areas. The interactions within the social arena involves relations with family and society in general. This is what Habermas calls as the lifeworld. The second arena in which human beings interact with each other is the professional and administrative arena which Habermas calls as the system. There is a significant difference between interactions in the lifeworld and the system. In the lifeworld human beings interact with each other within the boundaries of some shared norms and meanings. The informal, social, family and cultural relations all are constitutive elements of the lifeworld. On the other hand the interactions within the professional and administrative arena refer to our relations with the institutional structures of society. Similar to the lifeworld, the institutional authority also operates within some patterned actions which are governed by the interests of money and power. By using money and power the system interferes in people's lifeworld in order to achieve its own strategic needs (Habermas 1984-a, 1988). The system itself consists of three



sub-systems: economic, politico-administrative and socio-cultural sub-systems. Habermas uses social system and society interchangeably.

The identity of a social system may be negatively influenced by the impacts of economic crises and the decisions of politico-administrative sub-system to address these crises. In order to understand how socio-economic crises may lead to legitimation crisis there is a need to distinguish between social integration and system integration (Habermas 1988: 3-4). Social integration refers to 'the systems of institutions in which speaking and acting subjects are socially related' (Habermas 1988: 4). In this sense social system is equal to symbolically structured life-world. What Habermas means by life-world is the 'the normative structures (values and institutions) of a society' about which there is a consensus (Habermas 1988: 5). Normative structures of a social system have a task of socialisation in society with the function of determining what the needs are and what behavioural patterns should be followed in society (Habermas 1988:11). The severity of interventions by the politico-administrative system is determinate in the weakening of social integration. When we analyse in the fourth and fifth chapters the way the JDP has interfered in the lifeworld of people through Islamisation policies, they have simply strongly distorted the established values and institutions of society. In order to follow its own agenda of crony capitalism the JDP has eroded the existing consensus in society and thus social integration.

For Habermas, system integration consists of the economy and institutionalised political system which are determinant in the society. System integration refers to the capacity of social systems to sustain themselves in spite of changing external environment. Social systems are considered to have their own goals of attaining self-regulation and protecting their own boundaries through the actions of the state. If the state is not capable of achieving the reproduction of the economy and society then it may face a crisis tendency. In considering the crisis tendencies in nation states, Habermas addresses the question of legitimation crisis by distinguishing between system integration which takes place within market relations and social integration which materialises within the life-world consisting of norms and values. In other

words the newly enforced socio-cultural norms by the state may not generate a consensus about them. This distinction made by Habermas enables him to address the crises tendencies that emerge from the integration of the system and the life-world without dissociating the two.

If the decisions of the political-administrative system are not capable of resolving the deficiencies created by the economic system, society bears the consequences in terms of rising prices, unemployment and hardship. Habermas indicates that the policies introduced and actions taken by the state may either be conducive to restoring society's integration or could have an alienating impact. The economic crisis a society faces often has its roots in the global economic system and thus it represents a systemic integration problem. On the other hand, the impact of the systemic crisis produces a problem of social integration. The social integration crisis reveals itself in the forms high levels of socio-economic inequalities and inadequate levels economic growth and standards of living. These unmet promises of capitalism are conducive to generating insecurity and high levels of unemployment (Habermas 1988: 19-20). For Habermas socio-economic inequalities and that has led to concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of people, who may have been rewarded by the state and thus occupying a privileged position, is a source of huge disenchantment in society. In other words the political-administrative system now faces a rationality crisis as its decisions have failed to resolve the economic crises. The intensity of the societal disenchantment as a result of rationality crises is a determining factor in the rise of a motivation crisis tendency in socio-cultural system, i.e. society (Habermas 1988:21-3). The emergence of a legitimation crisis depends on how badly the state manages the latent contradictions between the sub systems of capitalist society. Habermas contends that sustainability of legitimacy depends very much on the ability of the politico-administrative system to create 'meaning' (ideology planning) on a continuous level. Social engineering in socio-cultural sub-system through administrative planning may produce some unintended consequences as well as some form of consciousness. Disapproval of the distortion of life-world (through social engineering) by a significant section of society is

conducive to legitimation crisis due to its impact on societal divisions. With the significant function of guaranteeing order, life-world is politically very important (Habermas 1988: 5-10, 118).

For Habermas, socio-cultural system that provides boundary conditions for the integration of society and maintenance of society is very important. With the development of capitalism, pre-capitalist cultural attitudes gradually disappear, moral individualism generated by the development and entrenchment of capitalism causes the displacement of traditional beliefs, and with it the government faces the difficulty of finding mechanisms of legitimacy. In other words, the task of meeting the expectations falls upon the shoulders of the state. In the early stages of capitalism, the following elements of existing cultural traditions had played a regulatory function: various forms of privatism (familial, vocational and civil), fatalistic attitudes of lower classes, protestant ethic that denounced hedonism, and achievement oriented religious ethic of the middle class. The combined restraining impact of these cultural factors was highly influential in the maintenance of economic and political stability in early capitalism. Such restraints inherited from the past and acted as cultural boundary conditions for capitalism is no longer in existence in modern capitalism that has destroyed them, and is not capable of reproducing them (Habermas, 1988: 77). As the generation of inequalities is an inherent feature of capitalism, the state is forced to be involved in a permanent management of crisis. For Habermas, capitalism has four crisis tendencies: economic crises, motivation crisis, rationality crisis and legitimation. One of the main features of the four different crisis tendencies of capitalism is the capability of triggering each other. In other words, each of the economic crises, motivation crisis, rationality crisis and legitimation crisis may stir up the others.

In order to materialise its economic and political imperatives capitalism has tried to be determinant in shaping the socio-cultural sphere. Through what Habermas calls as instrumental or one-sided rationalisation, capitalism has permeated life-world through the mediation of state which has been quite effective in the processes of cultural reproduction and socialisation in society (Habermas 1984-a: 140). While

trying to alleviate the impacts of inequalities generated by capitalism, the state needs to operate with an ideological apparatus to ensure a continuous support from the masses. By using the power of ideology the state manages to distort the facts and thus hide the systemic problems. Governments can maintain their rule as long as they are capable of using the cultural apparatus to persuade the people to support them. In Habermasian theory the erosion of established values and their replacement by new ones, socio-cultural polarisation, and discordance with the norms are all considered indicators of lack of social integration in a society. When there is an absence of shared cultural attitudes in capitalism and the government cannot find necessary resources to please the people, then there is a danger of instability and legitimacy crisis. By developing individualism, greed, self-interest etc., capitalism in the long run destroys traditional values that it had used 'parasitically' in its early phases for its stability, and this in turn leads to loss of moral identity for individuals. Once pre-capitalist cultural tradition disappears, the possibility of providing social integration also disappears.

Habermas' notion of subjective aspect of crisis is very useful in understanding of how crisis is perceived in society. For him legitimation crisis emerges as a consequence of long-term structural factors and abrupt systemic shocks. When an economic crisis emerges in a country and threatens social integration, the way each individual perceives it is important. People would consider this crisis in terms of their own life and well-beings. This subjective dimension in turn will determine whether or not a person would withdraw her/his support from the government. In other words, what Habermas calls a rationality crisis has two complementary dimensions: the decisions taken by the political authority and their subjective interpretation by individuals (Habermas 1984a, 1988). In the words of Habermas, crisis 'does not simply impose itself from outside and does not remain external to the identity of the persons caught up in it' (Habermas 1988: 2). People's feelings about whether or not problems are vital for their own survival are vital in their subjective perceptions of the crisis. For Habermas, without the co-existence of subjective and objective dimensions, there cannot be a crisis of a socio-economic system. The objective

dimension refers to how the crisis manifests itself, while the subjective dimension is how this crisis is perceived by people (Habermas 1988: 1). Although it is possible to notice crises through their objective indicators, crises emerge only when the people who are influenced by them become aware of it. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions of the crisis (Habermas 1988: 2-3).

For Habermas, the structural problems generated by the economic policies pushed by the state in an economy controlled by the private sector and the state policies to ensure the subservience of the people through social inclusion measures are strongly related to each other. The structural changes brought by state policies also change the society's normative system. What is crucial is how the majority of people perceive such changes. As long as there is consensus on the structural changes, the crisis will not emerge. When people start to feel that the changes introduced constitute a threat to their social identity then, the crisis will emerge. Mass loyalty is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of legitimacy. The lack of mass loyalty is an indication of the erosion of social integration and the loss of motivation reflected in the decline of support for the newly introduced ideals, norms and practices by the state (Habermas 1988: 58).

For Habermas, there is a parallel relationship between the state intervention and the necessity of legitimation building policies at societal level. Intervention in the economy aims to ensure capital accumulation, while policies towards the society aim to maintain a consensus (Habermas 1988: 45-59). Yet these two aims to generate mass support are in contradiction with each other, because the expectations of the capitalist class for accumulation and the expectations of the middle and working classes for better living standards are of different nature. At societal level, the success of achieving mass loyalty had two restraining counter realities: the fiscal limitations of the state to provide requisite quantities of the consumption needs of the middle and working classes on the one hand, and the acceptance of the new cultural meanings, created by the state, by the majority on the other (Habermas 1988: 74-93).

Furthermore, for Habermas, economic crisis has implications for the capacity of society to maintain itself as a coherent entity. In the event of the motivation crisis in society that emerges as a consequence of state policies leading to a legitimation crisis, social integration might suffer from this. In other words, there will be a threat to society's capacity to perceive itself as coherent and unified entity and operate that way. To prevent this, the state employs various legitimation mechanisms. Habermas differentiates between two types of legitimation: ideological and material. For him in late capitalist societies, ideological legitimation of neoliberalism becomes exhausted due to inefficient and ineffective functioning of the market. This also paves the way to the erosion of the material legitimation due to highly unequal distribution of wealth in society.

Legitimation for Habermas involves the production of conditions that would encourage people to give their support to the existing state and institutions of society. He maintains that the state deliberately attempts to change the system of education for the purpose of generating new boundary conditions for the maintenance of the political system (Habermas 1988: 75-77). The state can either persuade or force people to obey the institutional boundary conditions. Although both force and persuasion are used for legitimacy, nonetheless the use of persuasion is an absolute must. The use of oppression for the obedience of the masses is a clear indication of a legitimation crisis. Unlike pre-capitalist societies, the power holders in capitalism cannot drive their legitimacy from myths (divine or traditional) but from the power of persuasion.

Habermas states that the state makes conscious manipulation efforts to 'compensate for legitimation deficit' created by its administrative decisions (Habermas 1988: 71). The state intervention in the economy due to the dysfunction of the market generates a 'legitimation gap'. Legitimation crisis will not emerge as long as the legitimation system established by the state manages to sustain the required 'mass loyalty'. The state interference is tantamount to denial of one of the main principles of neoliberalism that sees the state as the guarantor and protector of the free market. However, as the private sector is not interested in public welfare, the state becomes

involved in providing safety nets for the poor and marginalised. State interference is itself a reason for the loss of legitimacy in liberal economies. For Habermas, the state has to find other ways of maintaining its legitimacy.

Going beyond of Marxist theories of crisis, Habermas adopts what he calls a 'systems-theoretic concept of crisis' (Habermas 1988: 2). For him, when the structure of a social system is not capable resolving the problems that are harmful for its own reproduction, then it faces a crisis. By combining elements of Marxism and Parsonian functionalism, Habermas tries to show that social system crises are not accidental but structurally inherent (Habermas 1988:2). He considers crises as enduring disturbances which constitute a danger for system integration. Social integration in a society depends on what signs socio-cultural sub-system sends to the political system. These signs in turn supply motivation to the political system 'in the form of legitimation' (Habermas 1988: 48).

In the event of what Habermas calls as the normative structures (correctness/appropriateness) do not change very much and changes in the political system do not manage to satisfy what people consider the correct and appropriate policies, such as better living standards, equity, freedom etc., then legitimation crisis starts to emerge. For Habermas (1988: 72), there is a 'threshold of acceptability' of the changes in the socio-cultural system manipulated by administrative planning. These changes have an impact of transforming the 'deep-seated' norms and values of the people who may not be prepared to accept and participate in this normative transformation. Legitimation crisis emerges when the majority of people withdraw their support from the newly created normative basis of society.

When the decisions of the politico-administrative sub-system fail to generate the requisite quantity of generalised motivations (meanings that would motivate people's action) then a motivation crisis tendency emerges in the socio-cultural sub-system. In the event of the existence of insufficient creation of requisite quantities of economic value by the economic sub-system, rational administrative decisions by the political sub-system and meaning by the socio-cultural sub-system capitalism

would be exposed to crisis tendencies (Habermas 1988: 49). The crisis in sub-systems may be controlled for a while, but it will not simply go away but would be displaced and transformed into another sub-system.

For capitalist society to reproduce itself, the compliance with the rule of law is an absolute necessity. This a basic requirement of a capitalist democracy based on the principles of private ownership and free market. Freedom, justice and equality are the sine qua non of the maintenance of the capitalist, bourgeois system. In order to reproduce itself, the system has to convince the majority of people about its adherence to these principles, thus receive 'mass loyalty'. It is the failure to obtain mass loyalty that would generate the legitimation crisis tendency.

With capitalism the state systematically intervenes in many areas traditionally considered as private. With its administration, planning and controlling the areas like education, religion and economy, the state simply replaces the invisible hand of the market with its highly visible hands. Through this, many spheres of life become politicised. The unenviable double mission of the state places it into a very difficult position. While trying to strengthen the position of capitalist class, it has to pretend to be acting on behalf of everyone.

State interference in every sphere of life creates desire among the people to be consulted in decision making. For Habermas, participatory approach by the state increases its chances of securing mass loyalty. The lack of participatory approach generates an administrative deficit with a potential of leading to a crisis tendency (Habermas 1988:76, 137-39). Unless the increasing demands of the people as a consequence of state intervention are not met in requisite quantities, there may be a withdrawal of support for the government. The tendency of the state not to meet people's demands and resorting to non-democratic measures could lead to motivation crisis which would generate the erosion of mass loyalty (Habermas 1988:58). Habermas is fairly fluid about the timing of when the motivation crisis tendency will become a fully-fledged legitimation crisis. This fluidity is reflected in



his use of motivation crisis and legitimation crises interchangeably in his work. However, he maintains that the strength of the reactions to the decisions of the politico-administrative system is an indication of legitimation difficulties which may or may not lead to a legitimation crisis. He leaves it to the reader to decide on the timing of legitimation crisis by stating that ‘only a rigid socio-cultural system, incapable of being randomly functionalized for the needs of the administrative system, could explain a sharpening of legitimation difficulties into a legitimation crisis’ (Habermas 1988: 74).

To re-capitulate what Habermas has been saying about legitimacy crisis in capitalist societies, it is pertinent to say that Habermas was interested in showing the latent contradictions of capitalism by making use of a combination of historical materialism and system paradigm. This way, he was able to link the working of the capitalist system and internal dynamics of a society. By making a distinction between politico-administrative, economic and socio-cultural sub-systems, he has provided a methodological framework within which the interplay of politics, economic and cultural factors could be analysed in a nation state.

In my opinion, this framework could be utilised not only in the analysis of advanced capitalist societies but also in peripheral capitalist societies like Turkey. This framework provides us with significant insights as to why different peripheral capitalist societies experience capitalism differently and how they develop different reactions to the encroachment of state policies. Habermas' theory can be utilised as an analytical framework to scrutinise crisis tendencies in any country. This can be done by looking at specific interactions between the system as a whole and sub-systems that constitute it.

He uses the system paradigm in conjunction with what he calls as 'life-world' paradigm in an attempt to explain crisis tendencies in capitalist societies. Habermas treats rationality and legitimation crises as the two sides of the same coin. The failure of the politico-administrative system to resolve the problems generated by the

economic system to meet peoples' needs leads to a rationality crisis. The state finds itself in a precarious position, as it has to address two contradictory interests (those of capital and the people) at the same time. Habermas emphasizes the vitality of economic growth for avoiding both economic and rationality crises. However, the state also needs to drive people's approval (mass loyalty) at practical and moral levels through mass democracy.

For Habermas, there is an inherent tendency of capitalism to generate economic problems and the attempts by politico-administrative system to resolve them lead to a crisis situation. The state is capable of reducing the intensity of crises tendencies by following welfare policies and relying on mass democracy. Yet even then, there is a functional imperative of legitimating the newly created economic, political and social structures. This necessitates obtaining peoples' approval through rational-legal means. The failure to obtain mass consensus is indicative of loss of motivation and would empirically show itself as legitimation crisis (Habermas 1988). Strong legitimation and motivation crises do have the power of bringing the hitherto latent inherent crisis tendencies of the politico-administrative and economic sub-systems into the open. Habermas maintains that motivation crisis is the main factor that converts legitimation problems into a legitimation crisis. The discrepancy between the motivation created within the socio-cultural system and 'the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system and the occupational system' is highly conducive to a legitimation crisis (Habermas 1988: 75).

Motivation is a source of legitimation. The strength of motivation created in society by politico-administrative activities, depends on how successfully cultural traditions and norms are manipulated and integrated in society. The level of success in turn would determine the level of mass loyalty in society. Mass loyalty in turn is a significant indication of how much people are persuaded to accept particular interest pursued by the state as a general interest. What is vital for Habermas is that the most fundamental contradiction of capitalism, i.e. inequalities generated by private control of social wealth, has to be accepted by the majority. The politico-administrative

system uses every possible means to ensure a requisite level of acceptance. These measures could range from welfare policies to ideological impositions.

Although Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis was developed to scrutinise crisis tendencies in welfare capitalism a small number of studies have attempted to use elements of his theory in explaining legitimacy building and legitimacy crisis in developing countries. His theory of communicative action has been applied to population programmes in Nepal by Jacobson and Storey (2004). The population program supported by the USAID attempted to operationalise key elements of Habermas' work. The programme focused on the issue of how Habermas' theory could be used in building participatory development in communities in distress and how the state can form legitimacy building bonds with the people. Likewise Tong-Dao (2001) uses Habermas' theory of communicative action to analyse Chinese modernisation. He uses Habermas' concept of political culture in explaining how the state in China has been trying to build its legitimacy since 1978. Reyes (2010) also tries to use Habermas' work to show its applicability to developing countries. By concentrating on the way Habermas uses the concept of social integration he analysis some aspects of legitimation crisis in Guatemala. However these studies remain quite limited as they apply certain aspects of Habermas' work on their case studies. This thesis attempts to take a more comprehensive approach and applies Habermas' legitimation crisis in its totality to Turkey.

Being a Marxist, Habermas has attempted to analyse patterns of change and the dominant tendencies of contemporary capitalism. His methodology is mainly a qualitative one and thus is not amenable for developing quantitative criteria. In analysing a particular case like Turkey, one could try to find use some quantitative criteria such as the rate of economic growth and the election results. However, it would be quite difficult to specify exactly where the turning point for a legitimation crisis would be. To try to attribute a numerical value to tendencies would also be in contradiction to the spirit of Habermas' work which tries to discover some tendencies

of transformations in modern societies by concentrating on the interactions between economic, political and cultural sub-systems. Habermas uses concepts like the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ to indicate how the political system interferes in society to transform society’s socio-cultural fabric. It simply refers to attempts to indoctrinate society along the preferences of the power holders. We will see the relevance of this argument when we analyse the JDP’s efforts to Islamise the society in Turkey. Having discussed Habermas’ analysis of legitimation crisis in capitalism, in the next section I will try to show the usefulness of his work for the analysis of the JDP regime since 2002.

#### **2.4 Habermas and the JDP**

The link Habermas establishes between politico-administrative and socio-cultural sub-systems in explaining crisis tendencies in society would be used in the analysis of the way the JDP has shaped the economy and society in Turkey. It will be argued that unable to sustain a crisis free economic system in the country, the JDP has not been very successful to ensure a sustainable legitimacy through the utilisation of social welfare and charity based poverty reduction policies. It will also be attempted to show the relevance of Habermas’ endeavour to link the inherently crisis prone nature of capitalism and social integration of society through the mediation of the use of the state in the Turkish case by concentrating on the specific development path taken by the JDP regime.

Habermas’ notion of the importance of boundary conditions for the maintenance of social integration would also be used to elaborate on the JDP’s legitimation other building policies of trying to create an Islamic and Ottomanist culture.

The JDP regime has generated a form of legitimacy that has been feeding on religiosity, Ottomanism and the creation of the cult figure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (RTE) in Turkey. Habermas mainly talks about the legitimation crisis of welfare states which have developed fully fledged capitalism. In this system legitimation

crisis emerges as a result of insufficient 'requisite quantities'. His concept of requisite quantities is very good but insufficient on its own in the explanation of long term legitimacy of the JDP rule. Therefore, I will use his argument about the early phases of capitalism in conjunction with the notion of requisite quantities along with the Weberian idea of faith in the system.

Habermas' argument, introduced above, about capitalism's main feature of living parasitically on pre-capitalist cultural features in its early phases seems to be quite pertinent for the Turkish case. Turkish capitalist system exists on the periphery of the world capitalism in a Wallersteinian (1974) sense and still feeds parasitically on pre-capitalist features of Islam and Ottomanism. This in turn endangers the multidimensional nature of legitimacy. The three dimensions of power which are qualitatively different to each other must be met for the existence of legitimacy. First it has to give high priority to the rule of law and the established rules. Secondly, both the rulers and the ruled have to agree with the rules. Thirdly, the subordinate has to show its consent about the existing power relations. These three dimensions are not alternative to each other, as they all 'provide the subordinate with moral grounds for compliance or cooperation with the powerful' (Beetham 2013:16). However, what is significant in the existing power relations is the extent of the ability of power holders to develop mechanisms of persuading the subordinate about the rightness of their activities.

By using Habermas' concepts of legitimacy deficit and boundary conditions, the thesis will develop the argument that the JDP's deliberate efforts to manipulate society to cover and compensate for 'the legitimization deficit' created by its politico-administrative decisions about the economy, has led to a motivation crisis tendency in society. In the process of changing the boundary conditions in society, Habermas' observation that educational planning to generate consensus and motivation may generate unintended consequences would also be utilised in the analysis of the deepening cleavages between the Islamists and secularists in Turkey. In this context his notion of the 'threshold of acceptability' would be a valuable concept in the analysis of cultural transformation in Turkey.

Furthermore, his analysis of how the transformation of normative structures in society can have an impact on generating a cultural crisis would be instrumental in the analysis of how the JDP has changed the notions of what is correct and appropriate in Turkey. This would be used in the scrutiny of the JDP policies which have been based on discrimination and corruption in society. The thesis will also use Habermas' concepts of mass loyalty and respect for the rule of law for the sustainability of legitimacy. In this context it will be argued that the 'inflexible normative structures' created by the JDP through Islamisation, corruption, clientalism, etc. have led to the breakdown of rational-legal structures in Turkey. The transformation of the judicial, educational and cultural systems (boundary conditions) by the JDP to maintain its supremacy has led to the erosion of its legitimacy. In other words, by dealing with the JDP's economic, judicial and cultural policies we would be delving into what Habermas calls 'the limits of legitimation mechanisms'.

The thesis has a qualitative approach intending to analyse some tendencies in Turkish economy and politics. The scope of the thesis and time limitations would not allow me to produce measures to assess the level of legitimacy that would be meaningful. Some of the tendencies I intended to discover do not lend themselves for quantitative analysis as they are not observable, such as confidence in government or feeling of helplessness. In the light of Habermas' formulation of legitimacy crisis, I have tried to compile some approximate criteria to indicate crisis tendencies in society. These will be discussed and employed in chapter five.

The rule of law would be a useful criteria to use as an approximate factor in the analysis of crisis tendencies in society. Surveys, public opinion polls and media news and reports about the government's use of the law, electoral system, and the behaviours of the police, security forces, civil servants, judges and public prosecutors could provide some evidence to assess crisis tendencies. In other words, the perception of people about the effectiveness of the system would give some idea about the level of people's approval of the power holders. People's actions and social movements could also be used as proximate criteria for crises tendencies in society.

Protest movements like Cumhuriyet Mitingleri, Gezi, Tekel, HES and mining protests as well as reactions to legal and constitutional changes, election system and results would also be instrumental in talking about the crisis tendencies. Likewise, the indicators of political violence by the state and authoritarianisation, monopolisation of the media, control of media, closure of TV channels, imprisonment of journalists and human right violations can be some criteria for crisis tendencies. Finally, corruption, embezzlement of state resources, nepotism, crony capitalism, violation of meritocracy in public appointments and in the selection of the police forces, military and police cadets could be used as criteria of crisis tendencies.

The JDP policies that have enabled it to entrench its political power and reach a high level of legitimacy in the 2002-2012 period and the gradual erosion of its legitimacy since 2013 has taken place within the context of the global capitalism. In order to be able to evaluate the rise and decline of the JDP legitimacy in the light of Habermasian theory the next chapter will concentrate on the national and global conditions that provided a suitable environment for the rise of the JDP.





## CHAPTER 3

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM IN TURKEY

#### 3.1 Introduction

The rise and decline of the JDP has taken place within the context of the global hegemony of neo-liberalism. The JDP rule has consolidated neo-liberalism in the country by implementing it with Islamic tones. Emerging from the Islamic National Outlook Movement (NOM), the JDP has taken a strongly different path to the original ideology of NOM. It has used Islam to generate its own neoliberal crony capitalism. The transformation of the socio-economic structures in previous decades before the JDP's emergence is quite crucial in that the JDP took advantage of the existing crisis of the time to pave its own path, initially without a strong divergence from the already existent neo-liberalism. Considering the vitality of the socio-economic conditions in the country in the 1990s for the emergence of the JDP, it is pertinent to provide an account of the transition to neo-liberalism.

Two very significant developments seem to be prominent in the last three decades in Turkish history: series of economic and political crises and the rise of political Islam. Turkish economy and society were shaken by 1958-60, 1970-71, 1978-80, 1994 and 2000-1 economic crises and the military coup of 1980 and the threats of takeover by the army in 1997, April 2007 and August 2007. Despite the military's ostensible opposition political Islam has slowly but surely risen to power.

The JDP's first victory in 2002 and the impressive victory in 2007 with 47 percent of the votes indicated that the party had created a strong power base for itself. This chapter will attempt to argue that the rise of political Islam has become a robust force

in Turkish politics and reducing its rise to the failures of previous decades' power holders would be far from the reality.

This chapter will argue that the rise of political Islam cannot be satisfactorily explained without taking into consideration the specific way in which Turkey has been further articulated with international economy. The country's recent strong engagement with the international economy has unleashed rapid economic, political and structural transformations which have led to incessant economic and political crises, which in turn have prepared a suitable environment for political Islam to flourish.

The chapter will start with an analysis of the period prior to 1980 when a comprehensive liberalisation of the country started under the auspices of hegemonic drive of global capitalism. Such a fundamental shift from the previous developmentalist state policies meant new class formations and alliances and a gradual move away from some of the principles of Kemalism. An attempt will be made to analyse the reasons behind this shift and in doing so the problems of developmentalism and import substitution policy of industrialisation will be highlighted.

Secondly we will analyse the significance neo-liberalism in Turkey by specifically establishing some links with global capitalism and its ideology of transnational liberalism. This will mean a brief scrutiny of economic crises, post-developmentalism, flexible specialisation, internationalisation of capital, structural adjustment and privatisation. Such a scrutiny will be carried out in relationship to the question of what do all these mean for various socio-economic classes in Turkey, particularly for the traditional big business bourgeoisie and small scale businesses in Anatolia as well as the working classes. In what ways post-Fordist flexible specialisation has helped small Anatolian Tigers to prosper?

From a cursory reading of the works of Buğra (2002a, 2002b) and Doğan (2020) the relationship between religion, Anatolian small businesses and political Islam appear to be quite significant, thus it is necessary to pay some attention to it. Also, the

question of whether the repeated military interventions had any significance in the rise of political Islam seems to be vital to answer. Thus the role of the army in Turkish politics would constitute another aspect of the research that would be delved into.

The pluralistic parlance the JDP used in the 2002 and 2007 elections was quite influential in the party's victory. Concepts like equity, democracy, human rights, multiculturalism, liberalism and secularism occupied a prominent place in the party's programme and election campaigns. This was an obvious shift from their original National Outlook Movement (NOM) ideology. Thus the following question becomes an important one to answer: In what ways JDP's move towards a 'moderate Islam' can be related to the country's particular relation with international capitalism? The argument developed would be that with the weakening of the nationalistic state under the influence of neo-liberalism, conditions became ripe for the emergence of identity politics of ethnic, religious and nationalist nature. The Islamist bourgeoisie simply neglected its previous anti-Western parlance and used religion as a tool of populism to mobilise the poor, alienated and marginalised masses for its own class interest. Being pro-Western, pro-European Union, pro US and pro IMF, it also attracted the sympathies from a good number of the members of the middle and upper classes as well.

### **3.2 Stagflation and Gradual Death of Developmentalism**

The world economic crisis of the 1970 brought the end of Keynesian policies in advanced industrial societies and heralded the emergence of and neoliberal economic policies first in the USA and Britain during Reagan and Thatcher in the USA and the UK respectively (Pamuk 2018: 262). In an attempt to establish neoliberalism nationally and globally the emphasis was put on the reduction of impediments on international movement of capital and free international trade.

The end of the 1970s witnessed a Turkish economy which was characterised by stagflation to which import substitution policies of the previous decades and petrol crisis of the 1970s had contributed greatly. Shortages of foreign currency, dwindling exports, declining speed of economic growth, and debt crisis were behind the attempts to introduce alternative development strategies. Turkey's desire to make a rapid shift to export oriented industrialisation and obtain financial resources from international finance institutions and private banks in the west met a cold and firm reactions from the Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and the WB (Aydın 2005). The strong desire to take Turkish industrialisation one step further through a structural transformation was emphasised in the 4th Five Year Development Plan of 1978. The reaction of the IMF and the World Bank to this ambitious industrialisation policy took the form of a strong recommendation that Turkey should adopt policies which would ensure adjustment to the market (Derviş and Petri 1987). Turkish non-compliance with this led to her total isolation in August 1979 from the world financial markets as the IMF and other finance institutions refused to lend Turkey any money let alone to finance its industrialisation policies but to repay her debts and interests. Turkey's encounter with neoliberalism started with what is called the 24th January decisions in 1980 which aimed to find remedies for the late 1970s economic crisis. 24 January stabilisation policy package in 1980 was a document of reluctant surrender by Turkey who could not resist the IMF and World Bank imposition to liberalise the economy. At rhetorical level, it was claimed that the package was designed to steer clear the country out of trouble but in reality what the package aimed to do was institutionalise and entrench neo-liberalism in Turkey faithful to the spirit of post-Washington Consensus. The military coup of 1980 kept any powerful reaction to the standby agreements under control and prepared the ground for Turkey's rapid integration into the world economy. Neoliberalism was promoted with the support the military who took power in September 1980 and produced a highly authoritarian constitution under which the civilian rules operated since 1983.

The first standby agreement, which was considered as the death of Turkish policy-making (Wolff 1987: 105), simply centralised the decision making process about fiscal and monetary issues through bypassing the legislative functions of parliament. The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan reflected the strong influence of the World Bank in emphasising the priority given to establish a free market economy and using planning as a medium term tool for it (World Bank 1987: 23-24). The five Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) advanced to Turkey after the military coup in 1980 simply aimed to make a smooth transition from short term stabilisation policies to long term Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). This meant prioritisation of the reduction of the state and the entrenchment of free marketism in economy and society along the lines of post-Washington Consensus. Stabilisation of prices and solving foreign currency problems were the first steps in the thorny road to complete integration into the world capitalist economy.

The speedy measures introduced to boost exports ensured cutting back of the state leading to the deterioration of the levels of wages and farmers' income that had increased during the developmentalist period of 1950 and 1980, and thus accelerating the process of impoverishment (Nas and Okedon 1992; Arıcanlı and Rodrik 1990; Aydın 2005). The reliance on high interest rates to reduce the internal demand and encourage higher savings did not bring about the expected results but instead increased the price of capital borrowing reducing the competitiveness of the industrial sector. While state investment in industry virtually stopped in conjunction with the stipulations of international finance institutions like the IMF and the WB private capital preferred to be more active in financial and commercial sectors to the detriment of the productive sector. Despite this, the irony was that the export of commodities produced by the productive sector. The increase was not due to the restructuring of the economy through SAPs as claimed by the proponents of free market, but to the improvements in the unused capacity in existing industries. Furthermore, devaluation of the Turkish lira with the impact of cheapening exports played a significant role in the rise of export of manufactured goods. One other significant factor in the rise of the exports was the combined impact of reduction in

real wages and export tax rebates to reduce production costs (Pamuk 1981: 28-9, 2018: 271-74).

Giving huge subsidies and tax rebates Turkey concentrated its efforts to adjust the current industries rather than attempting to deepen industrialisation. Lacking the capacity to invest in research and development the Turkish bourgeoisie chose the easy option of going into partnership with foreign partners like General Electric, Unilever, General Motors and Toyota who brought the technology and produced largely for the internal market (Yalman 2001: 199). The preference of the private sector to become a junior partner of TNCs was the main reason for the enhancement of the Turkish industry capable of exporting manufactured goods.

Increasing exports of manufactured goods were accompanied by increased dependence on technology, machinery and semi-finished goods. In the 1980s in Turkey the impact of SAPs were not so much in industrialisation but in considerable improvements in infrastructural investment in telecommunication system and highways financed by internal and external borrowing. SAPs also failed to put an end to rent seeking mentality, one of its stated aims, as politicians subordinated the bureaucrats and misused their power to ignore the regulations concerning government tenders, import licenses, and urban land use. Patron-client relations in the distribution of rents showed significant ascendancy when the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) came to power and continued (Boratav, 1994, 1995; Yeldan 1994; Aydın 2005). As the mentality of rent-seeking grew exponentially, capital preferred to go into financial and commercial activities where quick profits were highly possible and the activities in the productive sector declined steadily. Some of the industrial capital moved to lending to the state, which needed to meet its debt obligations through further borrowing both from within the country and externally and joined the ranks of speculative rent seekers who benefited immensely from the exceptionally high interest rates throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

1984-89 period saw a significant but not complete liberalisation of the trade regime. Yet the remaining tariffs, a few newly introduced import levies to increase Extra

Budgetary Funds, export subsidies and multiple exchange rates were all criticised for its price distortions tendency towards import substitution (TÜSİAD 1986; World Bank 1988; Celasun 1990). However, in order to obey the GATT regulations and the IMF demands Turkey had no choice but to limit export subsidies in the early 1990s. This led some exporters to move into tourism and land speculation where quick returns were possible. Consequently diversified export industries based on high technology became highly neglected as efforts were being concentrated on producing commodities for export rather than for the internal market (Krueger and Aktan 1992: 154--167; Öniş 1992; Şenses 1990; 1994).

While the country was quite faithful to the main requirements of neoliberalism in terms of liberalisation of trade, international financial mobility and export orientation, the state's intervention into the economy still remained in place. Until the 2001 crisis the country experienced a political turmoil and instability. Particularly the 1990 witnessed a number of short-lived coalitions who were not capable of managing the economy. The fragility of the economy was intensified by a huge external debt and budget deficit. Building of the monetary and fiscal crisis during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s generated high levels of inflation. Full liberalisation of the capital account in 1989 added further tension to the fragility of the economy as foreign capital showed a high level of volatility as it came in and went out very rapidly with a sign of problem (Ekinçi 1998).

Finance capital flowing into Turkey was interested in speculative activities and would leave the country when there was a sign of a crisis. In other words, the liberalisation of capital account had the impact of increasing economic fragility in the country. Due to its overaccumulation, finance capital in the centres of the world economy needs to find outlets in other parts of the world. However, its desire to move to other areas is necessary but insufficient as the economic, political social, institutional and legal conditions of the countries that are interested in borrowing may not be conducive for investment or lending. To begin with trade and fiscal liberalisation and deregulation must be in place. Then, interest rates, openness of the economy, economic stability and labour costs may be other influential factors for

foreign capital to decide to come in. To significant extent these conditions became ripe before the JDP's ascendance to power in 2002.

### **3.3 Liberalisation and The Labour**

While in the economic sphere liberalism became the dominant guiding principle, in the sphere of politics authoritarianism prevailed. Following the military coup in 1980, the many institutional changes and regulations introduced by military rule in close cooperation with The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) were kept untouched by the following civilian governments and ensured the oppression of the working class. The highly authoritarian 1982 constitution prepared under the auspices of the army made sure that working class gains were eroded and the bargaining power of the working class was weakened vis a vis capital. The repression of the working class organisations like DİSK (The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions) and TÜRKİŞ (The Confederation of Turkish Workers) by the military under the pretext of a threat to democratic regime considerably strengthened the position of the Turkish bourgeoisie (Aydın 2005: 53-4). The newly created politico-legal structures ensured that both the working class and the intelligentsia were kept under strict control in order not to challenge the interest of the bourgeoisie. The 1961 constitution, which enabled the working class organisations to improve their collective bargaining power and receive support from the wider society, was considered to be tying the hands of the state vis a vis the militant demands of the working class. Thus its abolition meant the end of class based politics and re-establishment of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with the support of the army. Return to the civilian rule in 1983 did not change the essence of the authoritarian approach to politics as the military acted as Damocles' sword. The pacification of the working class during the Motherland Party rule in the 1980s was further enhanced by the Turkish industrial capital's move to capital intensive production (Yeldan 2001a). The working class' fear of losing their jobs was even further



exacerbated by the abandonment of employment creation policies in the Fifth Development Plan prepared under the watchful eyes of the World Bank. The developments in the 1980s clearly indicated that the state no longer pretended to act as an arbitrator between the workers and employers and it was not above social classes. As far as the bourgeoisie was concerned, the army played an emancipatory role, freeing the individuals from the domination of corporate powers like trade unions which aimed to undermine the state (Aydın 2005: 54). The authoritarian 1982 constitution produced under the military rule mainly eroded the democratic improvements that enlarged individual rights and freedoms brought the 1961 constitution (Özbudun 1991). The preponderance of lawlessness reaching the levels of a civil war and economic hardship in the late 1970s had enabled the military, with the backing of the media controlled by big capital groups, to justify its action in terms of establishing the law and order. As liberal individualists were quite convinced that socio-economic system that existed before the army's takeover in 1980 was responsible for the economic and political ills, it was easy for the them to claim that there was no alternative (Aydın 2005: 55). Under the auspices of the military the civilian governments from 1983 onwards started to implement the Structural Adjustment Policies as policies without any other options. The deified free market ideology was used to promote the futility of class-based politics. All the means available to the state were utilised to underplay class and class relations and herald the supremacy of the market and the bourgeoisie. While lip service was paid to democracy through emphasising procedural features of democracy no social class other than the bourgeoisie was allowed to get organised to pursue their interests (Boratav 1993). For instance by outlawing the DISK and replacing it with pro-government trade unions the state had reduced labour unions to organisations not being able to negotiate economic policies with the governments, but to negotiate for only better wages. On the other hand, the employers were put in a position to replace unionised workers with non-unionised workers through sub-contracting agreements. In short, repressive union laws stripped the workers of their power to negotiate the

issues of wages and social security and increased the vulnerability and susceptibility to unemployment during the 1980s.

In parallelism with the shift in the relationship between the state and the working class a significant shift has also been witnessed in the state-bourgeoisie relationship since the 1980s. The uneasy nature of this relationship revealed itself in the fact that the developmentalist state policies until the end of the 1970s made the bourgeoisie to treat the state with suspicion, thinking that it might danger its interests. The feeling was largely a product of the conjunctural factors, not a result of state's opposition to the interest of the bourgeoisie, as the Turkish state since the 1923 has always been the main supporter of the bourgeoisie. Since the 1980s the Turkish bourgeoisie became increasingly internationalised within the context of the hegemony of neoliberalism globally which has been accompanied by significant reduction of the state, preponderance of free international trade and unprecedented rise of TNCs. Since 1980, with a strong military backing the Turkish bourgeoisie has felt at ease to challenge the power of the state elites and to structure the state in order to strengthen its economic and political hegemony and 'to speed up Turkey's integration into the capitalist global economy'(Aydın 2005: 92). The lawlessness that prevailed in the country throughout the 1970s and made life unbearable for ordinary people, plus the incessant economic crises since the 1950s helped the bourgeoisie and the military justify their insistence on moving away from class politics as ways of out of crises (Yalman 2002). The envisaged new order based on authoritarian individualism and the free market principles that would ease up further articulation of the economy with global capitalist economy necessitated new forms of state intervention. Bourgeoisie's demands for liberalisation and plurality within the state and its new role within it found strong support from the Bretton Woods institutions. Liberalisation, democracy, democratisation and civil society became the new buzz words in the official parlance.

### **3.4 Democratisation, Pluralism, the Army and the Pacification of the Working Class**

Had the preaching for the virtues of liberalism and free market economy really meant consolidation of democracy and the expansion of civil society at the political front and abandonment of using the state resources for the promotion of class interest? Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (2000: 498-9) reached the conclusion that liberalisation has not aimed at promoting the expansion of civil society but was geared to the enhancement of the economic elites in Turkey since the military takeover until the end of the 1990s. The forces that controlled the state used public resources for their own legitimisation through populism. State resources were used generously in providing high levels of subsidies in agriculture prior to elections, new staff would be recruited for civil services, salaries of the public sector employees would be increased substantially to build support for power holders (Aydın 2005: 101). Funds for populist policies and other public expenditure were largely secured by extensive internal and external borrowings rather than effective policies to increase state revenues.

Although liberalisation policies have paved the way for the increases in the number of civil society organisations, the state has remained unresponsive to their grievances and has followed its own agenda (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000: 494). The oppressive political system generated by the September 1980 regime forced political classes to isolate themselves from the rest of society in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, despite strong demands from civil society organisations and the populace at large, the state remained indifferent by not taking any effective action to end corruption and increasing human rights violations. The harsh treatment of the working class organisations in an attempt to marginalise them and to cut their ties with political organisations still continues today. The threats of further unemployment and the limited possibilities of jobs in the formal sector have simply added to the intensification of the pacification of the working class already set in motion by the repressive wage policies.

While divisions within society continued to deepen and the state continued to ignore differing demands from the public, at the political sphere neoliberal project led to the proliferation of political parties with quite similar programmes and policy orientations. With the new authoritarian constitution and labour laws, trade unions were no longer allowed to be affiliated to any political parties, and the parties became controlled by their politically ambitious self-interested leaders ( Aydın 2005:102). Devoid of social bases, Turkish political parties competed with each other to be in the driving seat to administer neo-liberal policies approved by the Bretton Woods institutions and the military.

Although the army had returned to its barracks in 1983, its influence on Turkish politics had been ubiquitous even during the democratically elected governments. Seeing itself as the protector of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's republic, the army did not hesitate to intervene in politics whenever it feels the need. Upholding Kemalist principles had become a broad title that the military interpreted and used against any forces that threaten to erode its position be it from the left or from religious parties, which lead to the use of authoritarian measures to curtail their activities (Arat and Pamuk 2019: 60-63).

Main threats to the Republic may be seen to be coming from communism, Islamic fundamentalism or ethnic secessionism. The interventions by the military in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, claimed to be carried out for national security, have each time led to the curtailment of democracy, democratic and constitutional rights. The paradoxical nature of the 1980 intervention is evident from the fact that, while preaching for neo-liberalism at the economic front, the new regime changed the constitution, banned political parties and allowed only a few to participate in the 1983 elections, thus weakened the parliamentary democracy. As politicians had been banned from politics, political parties had been closed by the constitutional court operating with a constitution prepared under the auspices of the military, so politics could not operate freely. Operating within the institutional structures established under the influence of the military, political parties have not been able to respond to the wishes of their supporters (Arat and Pamuk 2019: 63-6). This gave the army the

excuse to blame political parties for not being able to run the economy and protect the country's unity and its main principle of secularism inherited from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The army has been quite tactful in not keeping the direct power in its hands. To give the impression that the army is acting for the benefit of the nation each time the military handed over the government to the civilians after making absolutely sure that its supremacy is maintained through newly introduced structural reforms (Aydın 2005: 103). The civilian rules that had come to power after the 1960 and 1980 coups and the 1971 and 1997 ultimatum were left with very limited alternatives but to operate within the political terms set by the military. Since 1980, economic and political liberalisation policies implemented under the watchful eyes of the Bretton Woods institutions and the EU, have not managed to materialise the desired results. SAPs of the Washington Consensus and 'enabling institutional structures' of the post-Washington Consensus had not brought about strong economic development, political stability, democracy and improved human rights records by the 2001 crisis and it seemed that Turkey had a long way to go in this direction.

### **3.5 Crises and Turkey's Neo-Liberal integration into Global Capitalism**

In the introduction, we emphasized the fact that the capitalist system suffers from cyclical crises. Since the Second World War, capitalist system has increasingly become globalised and internationalised. The implication of this is that no country can escape from the serious crises that the capitalist system experiences. However, the intensity of the crisis felt by different countries to large extent would be determined by the specific socio-economic structures of the countries and the specific nature of its integration with the global system. Being increasingly integrated into the capitalist system, Turkey has not escaped from the effects of the global crises. On the other hand the country has experienced some crises of its own making. It is possible to list the socio-economic crises since 1980s as follows: 1980 political, the 1980-81 economic crisis, 1983 bankers crisis, 1988 stock market crisis,

1994 economic crises, 1998 textile crisis, November and February 2001 crises (Aydin 2005: 106) , 2008 financial crises, 2018 and 2020 currency crises and the current crisis exacerbated by the Covid-19. It is instructive to notice that the intensity of each new crisis overtakes the previous ones.

The JDP come to power after the two crises experienced in 2001. Although the outgoing coalition government headed by Bülent Ecevit had put into action the ‘Transition to Strong Economy Program’ the government was not capable of staying in power due to the severity of the crisis. In order to be able to explain the regularity of the economic crises in Turkey, it is vital to go beyond simple reasoning like inept politicians, corruptions or cronyism, corporate misguidance of the government and situate it within the long term processes of country’s integration with the global capitalist system. The changes put into motion in close cooperation with the IMF and the WB have emphasized the virtues of the neoliberal market economy.

The 1970s saw the gradual abandonment of Keynesian policies whose long lasting impacts on the economy were exacerbated by the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s economy to such an extent that it reached a breaking point (Aydin 2005;Yeldan 2001a). The attempts to reduce the state involvement in the economy and to establish neo-liberal economic and political system as a solution to economic and political crises have actually deepened the crises in the country (Boratav 2001).The reduction of the state has eaten into the social aspects of the state which has tried to privatise many things including the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), health system, education system, to reduce public spending by severely limiting agricultural subsidies to the extent to endanger food security. The financial needs of the preferred post-Fordist export-oriented development strategy since the 1980s has forced Turkey to recourse to short-term borrowing with guaranteed high returns to lenders. Overabundance of financial capital, in the centres of the capitalist system, interested in financial speculation and its willingness to invest abroad coincided with Turkey’s attempt to liberalise in the 1980s.

Marois (2012), Arrighi (1995) and Hoogvelt (2001) comment on financialisation to emphasize that financial capital plays a vital role in the intensification of the integration of the global south into the international economy. The accumulation of financial capital takes it into the global south where it exacerbates the already fragile conditions by causing the local currency to appreciate in a short period of time (Aydın 2005; Yeldan 2001a). Repayment obligations of the money borrowed and the interest inevitably increase current account deficits. The problem of for capital fleeing the country with a slight possibility of an economic problem presents itself as another mammoth problem for the indebted country to resolve. In order to prevent foreign capital fleeing, the devaluation of the local currency is implemented but this places extra burden on the already troublesome economy. Infant banking sector suffers most from the fragility created in the country due to the volatility of the capital market. The most significant impact of the exodus of the foreign capital is the emergence of a serious economic crisis.

Turkey is one of the few 'emerging markets' that international financial capital has found attractive investment outlet. The inflow of finance capital into Turkey as a result of liberalisation policies since 1980 has increased the fragility of the economy which had already been suffering from structural weaknesses (Aydın 2005; Boratav 2001; Yeldan 2001a). The series of crises since the 1980s in Turkey are mainly due to the post-Fordist accumulation regime which relied heavily on the state to provide the necessary conditions for the free flow of international capital. The liberation of the capital account gave a free hand to private capital as well to seek finances from abroad which required state guarantees (Ekinci 1996, 1998; Cömert and Yeldan 2019). The rapidly increasing debt burden discussed in chapter five created huge difficulties for the state budget. The allocation of a huge part of the national income for debt servicing was bound to create rationality crisis in Habermasian sense.

It has become increasingly difficult for the state to run public financing properly. Having privatised al SEEs, the state has been left with mainly taxation as a source of income. Mainly relying on the taxes from wage earners and the salaried people not on high income earners who somehow manage to escape taxation the state has been

issuing shares, bond and other valuable papers in the financial markets to raise money from the internal and external sources (Yeldan 2001a). Unless the state offers high interest rates, it cannot attract short-term foreign financial capital (Demiröz and Erdem 2019). The liberalisation of the financial accounts in 1989 had been welcomed by international finance capital searching for new short-term capital investment possibilities. The 1990s and 2000s were the boom period in global capitalism where its centres hugely accumulated capital and were in need of outlets for investment for further accumulation (Brenner 2002). Emerging market countries were a suitable target for international finance capital as their development strategies were based on the availability of capital inflows (Kiely 2016a: 61-80, 2016b). As far as Turkey was concerned, borrowing since the 1980s with high real interest rates, and being devoid of the capacity to earn sufficient export income were conducive to serious fiscal and financial problems of long-term nature (Yeldan 2001a; Kiely 2016a:75-6, 2016b). IFIs such as the IMF and the WB have been interested in ensuring that friendly conditions for the operation of international finance capital are in place (Boas and McNeill 2003). Countries in financial difficulties are advised, encouraged and sometimes forced to reform their institutional structures to allow free movement of capital which would include the liberalisation of the insurance and banking sectors (Pauly 2005). This was the case for Turkey when the country was led to provide several letters of intent to show the direction of the institutional transformation of the country which have proved to be generating conditions for increasing fragility of the economy (Boratav 2012; Orhangazi 2019).

What has been presented here indicates the prominence of the structural conditions in the economic crisis prior to the emergence of the JDP in Turkey, was not the result of the ‘mismanagement’ of the state as claimed by the IFIs and their local supporters. Turkey’s increased vulnerability to the activities of finance capital is strongly related to the abandonment of developmentalism, a legacy of Kemalist etatism and adoption of neo-liberalism. The etatist developmentalist policies that required a significant role of the state in running the economy was discredited by arguments that import substitution was a main burden on the state and thus was the culprit for the



backwardness of the country as the state resources were wasted in obsolete industries run with an inflated number of unnecessary personnel. The protagonists of the free marketism proposed that a shift to a market based export oriented industry would bring efficiency, as the resources would be used rationally, and this in turn would bring to the country the much needed comparative advantage (Krueger and Turan 1993: 356; Celasun 1991; Derviş and Petri 1987; Rodrik 1990b; World Bank 1988). However, what was not stated by the advocates of neoliberalism was the possibility of increasing dependence on speculative foreign capital whose inflows and outflows at will would generate a long-term structural weakness of the economy. It became clear that a strict adherence to the IMF and WB imposed SAPs were far from achieving their stated aims (Boratav et al 1994; Boratav et al 2000; Yentürk 2001). In other words, integration with the capitalist system through liberalisation not only had not enabled Turkey to overcome its foreign currency crisis but also had increased its dependency on external sources for both capital needs and for the imports of technology and semi-finished goods for the export oriented industry.

The main aim of liberalisation is the accumulation of private capital and thus the policies recommended to developing countries and adopted by them, like in the case of Turkey, ensuring ways of enriching private sector by the use of the state and the public funds. The post-Fordist accumulation regime, with its emphasis on export orientated industrialisation and free commodity trade, was not conducive to promotion of savings and investment. Furthermore in order to encourage exports, the new policy of export subsidisation put a huge burden on the already struggling budget account. This compounded with tax evasion by big businesses in adding to the difficulties of the state who had already been struggling with meeting its debt servicing. The state was caught in a catch 22 situation in the period between 1980 and 1988: in order to meet the debt servicing and budgetary requirements it resorted to short-term borrowing and short-term borrowing resulted in the need for further borrowing (Aydın 2005: 113).

The introduction of neoliberalism in 1980 in its first decade had not proved the positive expectations of the WB and business organisations as macro-economic

problems were still the norm. Economy was still stagnated and high inflation rates remained constantly. In other words the World Bank's optimistic vision of 'adjustment with growth' targets had not materialised. The country was adjusted to the accumulation needs of capital but rapid economic growth was not at the site ((Akat 1994; Anand et al 1990; Boratav 1990; Rodrik 1990a, 1991).

The state found itself trapped between the need to attract foreign capital by offering high interest rates and losing its credibility in international circles due to its huge foreign debts and inability to meet the debt obligations. As long as foreign capital was convinced that it could obtain high returns within a short period of time it did not hesitate to come to the country. But once high returns were in danger or there was a possibility of the country to default in its debt obligations foreign finance capital left the country very quickly. The policy of extensive borrowing with high interest rates, which led to the three consecutive crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001 was preferred for political expediency as the government were trying to keep their promises to the IFIs and at the same time pleasing the bourgeoisie that had also become heavily involved in financial activities (Yentürk 2001).

### **3.6 1998 and 1999 Letters of Intent-Anti Inflation Policy Programme**

The loss of creditworthiness alarmed the government as the sustainability of the system was in danger due to increased fragility. Upon the recommendation of the IMF two letters of intents were sent in 1998 and 1999 respectively outlining a proposed structural reform that gave high priority to privatisation of the industry, agriculture and the banking system, budget and complete overhauling of social security system. It was hoped that this disinflationary austerity programme which contained monetary and fiscal measures would have an inflation reduction impact by 2002 by seriously reducing public spending. With the envisaged single digit inflation rate it was hoped to bring stability to the economy (Yeldan 2001 a: 167-88; 2001b: 2-3).

The 2000 anti-inflationary programme combined monetary and fiscal measures with reforms aiming structural transformation without actually indicating how such comprehensive measures would be put into action (Boratav 2001: 105). However the letters of intents were quite effective to get the green light from the IMF and consequently the reinstated credit worthiness of the country became instrumental in attracting huge sums of speculative foreign capital which in turn increased the fragility of the country of its highest level since 1996 to 145 in the fragility index in 2000 (Yeldan 2001b). It was this fragility that led to the exodus of the ‘hot money’ from the country very quickly in 2000. In response to this quickly introduced macro-economic stabilisation and disinflation measures in the forms of devaluation and interest rates increases to limit the internal demand and increasing could not prevent the arrival of the two severe crises in 2001 (Boratav 2001; Yeldan 2001b).

### **3.7 Conclusion**

It is clear from the above arguments that one significant denominator stands out in the crises since 1990: the liberalisation of the economy, particularly those of the capital account and exchange regime. They have instigated rapid capital movements which were followed by short periods of deceitful economic growth in the wake of capital inflows and sudden reversals following capital outflows. This in turn has generated a vicious circle of capital inflows, economic growth, loss of confidence in the economy due to increased indebtedness, outflow of capital and crisis. In the aftermath of the 2001 crisis the country was suffering from a huge instability which unfolded itself in the forms of increasing imports, flight of capital, crisis of confidence, huge public debts, large number of bankruptcies by small and medium sized firms, rapidly increasing rates of crime, inflation, poverty and unemployment contraction of productive sector, inflated public sector, cronyism and rent-seeking mentality (Cömert and Yeldan 2019). Having provided an account of the country’s transition from developmentalist import substitution policy to a free market-based export orientation policy, it became quite clear that the state had played a central role

in the determination of the nature of the relationship between the global capitalism and the national economy and society. It was shown that in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s the state's role in the establishment and entrenchment of neoliberalism was absolutely crucial. It was under such economic, social and political crises conditions that the Islamic party JDP came to power by taking advantage of the helplessness created by the inability of all political parties that had been around for long to produce solutions to the problems.

The fact that the JDP surged to power without any difficulty in its first attempt in 2001 within 14 months of its establishment is a strong indication of the previous power holders had entirely lost their legitimacy. Therefore there was a mammoth task of obtaining the trust of people for a more stable economy and society. The next chapter concentrates on how the JDP took the opportunity to establish itself by gaining the approval and the trust of the people. Its legitimacy building process in the first decade of its rule was helped by the boom period that the world economy was experiencing. The chapter four will show the intricacies of the JDP legitimacy building mechanisms and how they were instrumental in the further integration of the country into the global system through a crony capitalism.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE RISE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND ITS LEGITIMACY BUILDING**

Chapter three analysed the Turkish economy's neo-liberal integration into the global capitalist system. The crisis prone nature of liberalisation and gradual financialisation of the economy had provided a suitable environment for the rise and entrenchment of the JDP as an Islamic party. In this chapter, we aim to analyse the rise and development of the JDP first by looking at its organic roots in the National Outlook Movement (NOM). Secondly, an attempt would be made to show how and to what extent the JDP had moved away from the main tenets of the NOM by specifically looking at the party program. Then, the chapter would provide a detailed analysis of the mechanisms used for building its legitimacy. The analysis in this section would proceed in terms of Habermas' distinction between the economic, politico-organisational and socio-cultural sub-systems.

#### **4.1 The Roots of the JDP**

The JDP is a refined version of the NOM designed to take into consideration the political and economic vicissitudes of the time to achieve its long-term objective of establishing an Islamic society. However, the JDP was extremely careful about not experiencing the fate of the previous Islamic parties which had been closed down for their anti-secularism. The JDP leadership were well aware of the perils of the open advocacy of an Islamic state. Islamic movement before the JDP had learnt through experience how sensitive the Army and Kemalist establishment were about political Islam. Both Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the NOM movement, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been arrested in 1994 and 1998 respectively for their anti-secularism. Also, Islamic parties like National Order Party (NOP, 1971), Welfare

Party (WP, 1998) and Virtue Party (VP, 2001) were closed down for their anti-secularism.

The continuous harassment of the NOM by the state which culminated in the closure of the WP strengthened the hands of the traditionalist (led by Recai Kutan) and modernist (led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) versions of the NOM who saw that a pro-western stand would give Islamic movement a breathing space. Attempts by some individuals within the newly established Virtue Party (VP- Fazilet Partisi) not to be close to the WP led to all sorts of disenchantment among the supporters of the Political Islam. The reformists within the VP simply pushed aside the cultural issues and gave priority to economic progress and development based on technology. Moving away from some of the main tenets of the Political Islam and attempting to Islamise the state and society slowly without attracting the wrath of the Kemalist state and the army became the motto of the JDP which split from the VP (Buğra 2002b; Heper 2005). The JDP view that the defence of democracy, secularism and human rights as the only way to come to power represented a significant move away from the original NOM which openly opposed the secularist regime and society. In order to gain public support, the party deemed it necessary to give the impression of distancing themselves from Erbakan's anti-secularism. The breakaway reformist party, which came to power within 14 months of its establishment in 2001 under the leadership of first Abdullah Gül and then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, specifically declared that it was going to be an Islamic conservative democratic party which would not challenge the system, but be a part of the system. This sudden change from the ideological commitment to anti-secularism has been interpreted as an act of political expediency to come to power (Aydin 2005). It is interesting to note that the JDP has continued its pro-western and secularist parlance regardless of the criticism of hypocrisy.

Since its emergence the Islamic JDP has been subject of much debate (Atacan 2005; Atasoy, 2005; Coşar 2004; Heper 2005; Öniş 2001, 2003, 2007; Shankland 2007; Taşkın 2008; Toprak 2005; Yavuz 2003, 2006; Yıldırım, İnanç and Özler 2007). There had been some fears in the early 2000s that the JDP essentially was not loyal

to the democratic principles, and it used the political power and the democratic system to further its own purpose and it would not hesitate to stifle democracy when it no longer needed it. Erdoğan was blamed for hypocrisy on the account of the speeches he made while being the mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s when he denounced the Kemalist ideology and stated that democracy was to be used as tool to establish Shari'a (Jenkins 2003: 52).

Despite all these concerns, the JDP's new version of political Islam managed to win the elections in 2002 and 2007 with the highest votes to come to power on its own. The JDP owed its success not only to the economic and political turbulences of the previous decades but also to the legacy of the Islamist movement it inherited and to the social democratic discourse it used in its early years. With the inherited Islamist legacy that had been using the language of recognition since the 1970s, it managed to get the support of the Anatolian Islamic business class who had close connections with the NOM movement (Gülalp 2001; Öniş and Rubin 2003; Aydın 2005; Kaya 2015; Bermek 2019). With its tactful emphasis in the party programme and election rallies on the issues of poverty, inequality, domination and marginality it managed to get the support of the poor and the downtrodden as well as people of all categories.

The JDP, a splinter group from Islamist NOM, came to power by claiming to strive for a long-lasting social consensus by being faithful to the main principles of the Republic, and respecting fundamental liberties and rights guaranteed by the constitution (Atasoy 2005; Öniş 2012). The JDP programme over and over again emphasised the importance of equity, justice, secularism, rule of law, human rights, democracy in general and individual rights and freedoms in particular. The recurrent economic crises and the inability of existing political parties to resolve them was the main factor in the JDP's surge to power in 2002. It took advantage of the failures of many coalition governments of the 1990s to respond the demands of people for improved standards of living and a secure future (Atasoy 2005; Bermek 2019).

By using a social democratic parlance, the JDP was able to attract the interests of the marginalised and disadvantaged urban and rural poor that had been neglected by the

previous secularist governments (Öniş 2007). To weaken the strength of the military and not to provoke secularists, the party strove to take the necessary democratic measures to pave the way for the accession to the European Union. Meeting the Copenhagen Criteria meant serious changes in the legal system that would ensure a move away from the military tutelage (Aydın 2005; Cizre and Yeldan 2005).

JDP's advocacy of democracy, pluralism and human rights was in tandem not only with the Islamic and secular business interests represented by MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD respectively, but also was in harmony with the demands of the EU, the USA and the IFIs. The JDP regime continued to adhere to the neoliberal macroeconomic strategies of the previous decade that aimed to ensure free movement of capital and introduce measures faithful to the spirit of the Washington Consensus. The JDP regime continued to implement the IMF recommended policies which aimed to shape the institutional and fiscal structures of the state in order to regulate the economy along the lines of the Post-Washington Consensus (Cizre and Yeldan 2005). The policies of the Transition to Strong Economy, faithful to the recommendations of the IMF, were instrumental in getting the support of business classes, while the reforms to democratise the country obtained the support of liberal elites. A close reading of the party programme of the JDP reveals that it has moved beyond the language of recognition and have raised class issues in a disguised form.

## **4.2 Justice and Development Party Programme**

In its Party Programme before the 2002 elections, the JDP claimed that it had the political will 'to start an economic development move, to correct the defects in income distribution, to eliminate poverty and resentments in society'. The party programme emphasized that their motto was to unify the country by embracing all, and ensuring a societal peace and trust between citizens and institutions (AKP 2002: 5). The programme maintained that JDP's competent staff were capable of realising Turkey's potential to become a pioneer of novelty, development, peace, serenity and welfare domestically, regionally and globally (AKP 2002: 5). The JDP programme



stated that the motto of 'unless everyone is free, no one is free' was one of the party's fundamental principles (AKP 2002: 9). Having placed individual at the epicentre of all policies, the party considers that ensuring democratisation and provisioning and protection of basic human rights and freedoms are amongst its fundamental duties. Party programme continues with a shopping list of all the desirable qualities emphasizing that it will be the champion of unity within the Republic, secularism, democracy, lawfulness, freedom of belief and equal opportunities (AKP 2002:7). The party has pledged that it would fight against societal degeneration, irregularities, self-interest (sordidness), nepotism, inequalities, racism, partisanship and despotism (AKP 2002: 8). It has promised that it would resolve country's chronic problems by mobilising human and physical resources to become a productive and constantly growing country. Raising peoples' welfare by eliminating hugely unequal income distribution (AKP 2002: 8). The party also promised to follow a participatory policy in public administration by including citizens and civil society organisations. Such policies would be implemented with the vision of complete transparency and accountability in every sphere of public life (AKP 2002:9). The programme has declared that 'freedoms are the foundations of democracy' and 'no individual or institutional oppression is acceptable' (AKP 2002: 13)

The JDP pledged that it would cooperate with civil society organisations that operate in the field of human rights and establish strong links between state institutions and voluntary organisations. The party placed high value to the views of these organisations in pinpointing human right violations, developing solutions to problems, providing education on human rights and monitoring the activities of security forces (AKP 2002:14). The party programme promised that freedoms of thought and expression would be built on the basis of international standards, and differences of views and opinions would be tread as wealth.

The party claimed that it saw religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as an inalienable condition of democracy as well as the guarantor of religious and conscience freedom (AKP 2002:14). The JDP rejected the idea of sacred religious values and ethnicity being used as political materials. It maintained that using religion as an instrument to gain economic and other benefits and putting pressure on people who might think and live differently was unacceptable. It stated that 'the rights of all citizens to communicate and disseminate their views freely' was 'fundamental. Free media' was 'an inalienable component of contemporary democracy' AKP 2002: 15). The party programme claimed that the JDP would make sure that any existing restrictions on media's freedom of expression and all prohibitions and punishments that were not compatible with democratic social organizations would be abolished. The party would also protect the freedom of written and visual media meticulously and would not allow monopolisation in this field. (p15). The JDP programme claimed that freedom to seek justice and the right to a fair trial would be ensured and mechanisms of pursuing justice by everyone would be simplified (AKP 2002: 15).

The JDP gave assurances that no discrimination would be made in providing public services citizens. It would have the administrative vision of eliminating the existing crisis of trust between citizens and the state and state institutions (AKP 2002:16). It promised that internal party democracy would be developed by ascertaining that individual and minority views were respected (AKP 2002: 17). 'Politics would be freed from being used as an instrument of rent seeking' (AKP 2002: 18). The JDP pledged that the declared wealth of everybody elected to the parliament would be announced transparently to the public knowledge and scrutiny. The JDP maintained the necessity for political parties to democratise their internal structures and to be transparent (AKP 2002: 19). The JDP declared the primacy of the rule of law was fundamental in any democratic society. It claimed that in a lawful state where democracy owed its existence to the law, it was absolutely vital to respect universal principles of law, to keep the venues open for seeking justice, to be equal in front of

the law, to protect individual rights and freedoms and to ensure that the state is bound to the law. The realisation of these values was only possible by the existence of a constitution, laws and an independent judiciary (AKP 2002: 20). For the JDP programme a transparent and corruption-free social order was only possible as long as the judiciary worked properly (AKP 2002: 21). The JDP promised to prepare a new constitution that would be in line with universal standards in terms of basic rights and freedoms, be faithful to the main features of the Republic. In the new constitution the relationship between the legislative, executive and judiciary would be clearly specified and the principle of the separation of powers would be implemented by utmost sensitivity in order to ensure checks and balances. The necessary arrangements would be made to ensure that the parliament is effective, independent and productive in legislation and auditing (AKP 2002:22). The claim made by the JDP about legislation is educational in that it stated that the party was determined that collective will would replace individual will not only within the party but also within the parliament and society. Within this context the party programme made a highly desirable democratic statement that the laws passed would not be as a decision of the parliamentary majority but a product of the collective will of society. Consequently the proposed laws by the party would be a product of consultation with civil society organisations (AKP 2002:22). The binding principles of the constitution and laws would be applied meticulously to everyone. The pledges made about the judicial system included that the independence of judges would be totally ensured and judge's immunity would be protected. JDP promised to speed up all legal processes in the light of party's adopted motto that 'late justice is injustice' (AKP 2002:23). Another interesting promise was that democratic country experiences would be taken as a criteria in the re-organisation of the rules concerning the appointment of High Court Members, independence of courts, professional criteria and the organs responsible for governing elections (AKP 2002: 24).

The party emphasized pluralism and maintained that the majority should respect the rights and freedoms of minorities and under no circumstances it should question them. It stated that minority views and the right to be in opposition should be secured

by the constitution. The party adopted a Permanent and Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy based on market economy to the exclusion of the state which should only have a regulatory function. The JDP believed in market economy to the exclusion of the state economic enterprises (AKP 2002: 33). The state should have the role of economic regulator that would ensure a healthy flow of knowledge and information that would ensure the establishment of a privatised rational economy (AKP 2002: 32). The JDP saw privatisation as a means for the establishment of a more rational economy in which the state has the role of a regulatory controller (AKP 2002: 34). It believed in the betterment of international competitiveness through structural transformation of the economy with minimal cost. In this endeavour the state should cooperate willingly with foreign capital that would transfer knowledge and experience to the country (AKP 2002: 34). Even a cursory look at the shopping list including all the desirable things ranging individual freedoms to human rights, to transparency and accountability to democratisation and the separation of powers within democracy, meritocracy, independence of the judiciary and so on, shows us why the JDP has been losing its political support. Some of these issues will be tackled in the next chapters in the analysis of how the JDP has failed to deliver the requisite quantities to maintain its hegemony.

The JDP has continued to keep class politics as hidden in their agenda while capitalising on the massive disenchantment with rising poverty and unemployment in their election campaigns in both 2002 and 2007. The fact that Islamists were quite careful prior to the elections in 2002 to respect democratic institutions and produce rational ideas in political discussions, raised their popularity, thus their legitimacy in Habermasian sense, among the hitherto marginalised sections of society who had been extremely disenchanted with all previous political parties who had not managed to run the country to their satisfaction.

Since the inception of neo-liberal policies in 1980, increases in the already high rates of poverty and unemployment had become rampant but was enhanced with the existing crisis. During the three decades prior to the 2002 elections the failures of many coalition governments to improve the living standards for the majority, plus

widespread corruption and ineptness led to strong mistrust among the poor, the marginal and some sections of the middle and upper classes for the already tried politicians and political parties (Cizre and Yeldan (2005). The newly established JDP became the first choice for the 34 percent of the voters who had lost trust in inept and corrupt politicians and sought vengeance on them (Aydın 2005: 198). The three ruling parties, who kept bickering with each other and were not capable of stopping the recession, unemployment and political stalemate, could not pass the required ten per cent threshold to be represented in the parliament.

It seems essential to reiterate that the rise of Political Islam cannot be elucidated by either the inherent contradictions of modernity and secularism or the JDP's appeal to the poor. As we have done in chapter three, it is necessary to take into consideration the enabling conditions provided by the specific way in which Turkey has been further integrated with the international capitalist system. This specific integration has unleashed rapid economic, political and structural transformations which have led to incessant economic and political crises, which in turn have prepared a suitable environment for political Islam to flourish.

Although the JDP claims to be a centre conservative party, its slow and patient penetration of the state and society is often interpreted as working slowly to get rid of secularism in the long run. Within the first decade of its rule, the JDP, using all the means available to them and most importantly the state apparatus, have managed to build a strong political support base and legitimacy (Aydın 2005; Cizre and Yeldan 2005; Bermek 2019).

### **4.3 JDP's Legitimacy Building**

In analysing the JDP's legitimacy building process and the crisis tendencies, we are going to use Habermas' distinction between economic, politico-organisational and socio-cultural sub-systems. However, it must be emphasized that this distinction made for didactical purposes may not be as clear cut as it is presented for the analysis

of concrete cases. This is because of the interconnectedness of social, political and economic processes as they have bearings on each other. As will be explained below, the JDP's politico organisational decisions about health care and social security system do have implications for the economy and society. For instance its introduction of comprehensive health care system has had implications for the private health sector investors (economic sub-system) as well as the health expenditure of people of all classes (socio-cultural sub-system). Likewise the emphasis on Islamic culture, obedience, loyalty and docility at societal level has significant implications for the Islamic capital that uses unorganised flexible labour force in their workplaces and for the political power in need of support. Similarly educational reforms have both politico-organisational and socio-cultural aspects. As we pointed out in chapter two, in fact, Habermas had pointed out this by stating that crisis tendencies in sub-systems may trigger each other.

#### **4.3.1 Economic Sub-system**

In the period of 2002-2007 the JDP's strong adherence to the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank in continuing with the Transition to Strong Economy Programme and in the implementation of the second generation neoliberal reforms coupled with its prioritising of the reforms necessitated by the harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire* of the EU were very vital for the interests of the business groups in Turkey. In addition to the secured support of the capitalist interests, the JDP managed to address poverty issue along the lines recommended by the World Bank and increase its popularity amongst the poor and the destitute. The positive atmosphere of the global economy provided a good base for considerably rapid economic growth stimulated by the abundantly available global finance capital. In parallelism with the rising support base of and thus legitimacy of the JDP, the debt-driven growth also generated exacerbated current account deficits.

The JDP was helped by the boom period in the global economy and thus it did not face any crisis between 2002 and 2008 in a Habermasian sense. While not experiencing the four types of Habermasian crisis, namely economic crisis, rationality crisis, motivation crisis and legitimation crisis, during this period the JDP was involved in a serious process of legitimation building. The JDP took strong measures to increase the ‘requisite quantities’ so that what Habermas calls the three sub-systems (economic, political-administrative and socio-cultural) would not generate the four types of crises, listed above, which have the nature of triggering each other. The JDP’s economic growth policies, though based on borrowing from the international financial markets and to a certain extent from the domestic capital market, had shown some mixed results in its early years. For instance the average rate of economic growth increased from 4.3 percent in the 1989-1997 period to 7 percent in the 2003-2007 period. The change from the -0.5 percent in the 1998-2002 period to 7 percent in the 2003-2007 period was a colossal jump (Boratav 2009: 469, Table-1).

Table 4.1 Distributional Indicators between 1998 and 2012

	<i>Industry Real Wages</i>	<i>Industry Labour Productivity</i>	<i>Unemployment (restricted definition) %</i>	<i>Unemployment (comprehensive definition) %</i>
1998	100	100	6.9	8.5
1999	119	92.4	7.7	10.7
2001	101.6	90.6	8.4	12.3
2002	91	98.5	10.3	14
2007	89.8	121.1	10.3	16.6
2009	84	118	14	20.6
2010	82.6	124.1	11.9	15.9
2011	86.2	131.7	9.8	15.9
2012	92.8	132.6	9.2	15.4

Source: Boratav (2013)

Although economic growth showed significant improvement, this was not reflected very much in the lives of the working class whose productivity increases in the industrial sector was not commensurate with the wage levels. As it is clear from the table above, while the labour productivity in industry increased from 98.5 in 2002 to 132 in 2012, the real wages in industry had remain more or less the same showing a meagre increase from 91 in 2002 to 92.8 in 2012. A similar observation can be made about the level of unemployment which remained more or less the same. Obviously this economic performance was not very conducive to legitimacy building in a Habermasian sense. However, at least during the 2002 -2007 period the country had not faced any real economic crisis.

The JDP's strict adherence to the standby agreements signed with the IMF was very much in line with the demands of the Turkish capitalist classes. Good relations with various fractions of capital was necessary for economic and thus political stability. The signing of a new standby agreement in 2005 by the JDP government to cover the 2005-2008 period had pleased the business interests in the country (Boratav 2009; Ekzen 2009). Such an alliance with capitalist interests has significantly contributed to the JDP's legitimacy. Particularly, already in place, the alliance with the Anatolian small and medium Islamist capitalists became further intensified.

Furthermore, the preferred growth model based on external demand also pleased the IMF and the World Bank. In the composition of the average economic growth in the 2003-2007 period, the growth rates in industry (8.3 percent) and services (7.3 percent) were the highest while agriculture only had a meagre (0.3 percent) growth. Foreign trade showed a colossal 135 percent increase compared with the 1998-2002 period, as the total volume of foreign trade increased from 116.6 billion dollars in 2003 to 277.3 billion dollars in 2007 (Ekzen 2009: 479-81).

In the last two decades, Turkey's socio-economic transformation and capital accumulation have been shaped by the priorities of the religious-conservative fraction of the bourgeoisie (Durak 2011; Tugal 2009). The JDP's externally driven economic growth policies were the continuation of the neo-liberal policies set in



motion in the 1980s, which gradually eliminated the developmentalist policies between 1930s and 1980s. However, the way the JDP followed the externally driven economic policies had a significant slant to please the Islamist Anatolian small and medium sized business interests.

The JDP's ascendance to power and the emergence of post-Fordism globally provided the most suitable environment for the Islamist Anatolian small to medium businesses which have entered into sub-contracting arrangements with flexible firms to supply them with labour intensive products such as textiles and shoes (Durak 2011). Particularly since the 1980s Islamic small Anatolian firms in internal cities, such as Kayseri, Gaziantep and Konya, have been quite active in establishing sub-contractual arrangements with foreign companies using flexible strategies and relying on cheap and easily available non-unionised labour (Durak 2011). Mainly export oriented businesses in these towns fit in well with post-Fordism, as the economy as a whole becomes informalised (Portes, Castells and Benton 1989). This is a deliberate strategy to create a fragmented labour force by employing undeclared and unprotected labour in small units of production or through home working arrangements.

It may appear to be paradoxical to say that while the JDP formed alliances with business classes in the process of legitimacy building and at the same time worsened the conditions for the working class. In order to overcome this paradox we need to scrutinise the legitimacy mechanisms the JDP used to strengthen its legitimacy and power bases among the poor, destitute, and the labouring classes. By using Habermas' category of politico-administrative and socio-cultural subsystems, it will be possible to highlight the legitimacy tools utilised by the JDP.

#### **4.3.2 Politico-Administrative Sub-system**

The JDP's increasing political support was mainly due to its activities in the field of social policy and Islamic related philanthropic activities. In the following sections

we will critically analyse the JDP's socio-cultural activities to build its popularity and legitimacy.

#### **4.3.2.1 Health Care, Legitimation and Requisite Quantities**

Health care reforms have been significant for the JDP for two purposes: On the one hand, it is a legitimacy building tool in Habermasian sense. By expanding the size of the privately owned health care services, it has been possible for the JDP to provide visible evidence of easier access to health services by the people. In the first few years of the mushrooming of private health care facilities, as shown in table 3.2, the cost of health care was mainly shouldered by the state, not by the people (Yılmaz 2017). In a sense this was a rational decision as far as legitimacy building was concerned. On the other hand, private health care services were given massive state support to establish and entrench themselves (Bilaloğlu 2015). In treating the health care system as a commodity, the JDP style neoliberalism transformed the existing health system fundamentally and utilised private management techniques in the public sector health services providing institutions.

Table 4.2 Number of Hospitals, in Terms of Ownership of Hospitals, 2002–2015

Years	Public	University	Private	Other	Total
2002	774	50	271	61	1,156
2006	767	56	331	49	1,203
2007	848	56	375	48	1,317
2008	847	57	400	46	1,350
2009	834	59	450	46	1,389
2010	843	62	489	45	1,439
2011	840	65	503	45	1,453
2012	832	65	541	45	1,483
2013	854	69	550	44	1,517
2014	866	69	556	37	1,528
2015	865	70	562	36	1,533

Source: Yılmaz (2017: 207, Table 8.1)

The JDP's Health Transformation Programme (HTP) which started in 2003, was in fact coincided with the second wave of health liberalisation processes of neoliberalism. For Price et. al (1999) the WTO produced and WB supported second wave of health reforms drove their inspiration not from the necessities of the health sector but from the economic and ideological factors of neoliberalism. In search of both economic gains and political legitimacy, the JDP's HTP did produce fairly positive results in its first decade, which not only contributed to economic growth and accumulation, thus avoiding a Habermasian economic crisis, but also pleased the public by delivering 'requisite quantities' of health services, which in turn strengthened the legitimacy base of the party. The majority consent given to the party

and its leader Erdoğan in the elections was also reflective of the Weberian idea of the faith in the system and Beetham's notion of the agreement by the ruler and the ruled on the rightness of the power and authority.

The legitimacy building HTP necessitated significant changes in what Habermas calls political-administrative system which has had repercussions in the organisation, provision, usage, financing and costs of the health system. In order to be able to provide a better picture of the dual function of the HTP it is pertinent to provide a brief account of what has been involved in it. In 2004 the pilot family health system was introduced to replace sağlık ocakları (health clinics) and their numbers reached to 7772 in 2018, employing 23,992 doctors (Ministry of Health 2020). It is claimed that with the introduction of the family health centres, access to health services has become much easier and people have been happy with their introduction (Atun et al 2013). Furthermore both the JDP and neoliberal authors like Atun et al (2013) have praised the HTP for its comprehensiveness, elimination of inequalities in health access, increasing the allocation of more financial resources, improving health indicators in the country, and the betterment of the organisations the improvement of the health infrastructure. Analysing the impact of the HTP on public satisfaction Uğur and Tirgil (2018) state that, on the whole people are happy with the availability of the services and with the treatment of the patients by the health staff, but are concerned about increasing individual contribution to the cost of visits and medication.

While the JDP managed to slow down the emergence of an economic crisis in its first five years, at the same time it managed to establish a huge JDP clientele business community in the health sector (Yılmaz 2017: 204). Before the HTP there was virtually no connection between the state and private hospitals and the state hospitals dominated the system. In 2005 as a first step into HTP the JDP started a public private partnership model. Private construction companies were invited to build large complexes of city hospitals (şehir hastaneleri) with the hope of reducing state expenditures on health services (Yılmaz 2017: 200-3). In return companies were given the right to run non-medical services for 49 years.

Having integrated private hospitals into the public insurance plans in 2005, the JDP gradually allowed private hospitals to provide health services via the state insurance system. In contrast to claims that the HTP has brought equality in health service provision, the extra charges the private sector makes in addition to what they would get from the social security organisation SGK has in fact generated an inequality in health access (Belek 2012). In its early years until 2011 the JDP draw considerable support and thus legitimacy for its rule. The health sector enabled the JDP to provide requisite quantities (meeting people's health needs) but at the same time led to the restructuring the system along neoliberal lines.

It is clear from the arguments above that the JDP has used the health service as an important factor not only in the process of neoliberal privatisation of the health sector but also for building its political support. The HTP was a significant tool in the hands of the JDP to expand its already strong political power base inherited from NOM movement in the forms of religious networks and political alliances. The fact that the HTP eased up the health access difficulties of at least one third of the population who had remained outside any health insurance cover provided by the state and had to pay for their health care needs (World Bank 2005: vi) was an example of legitimacy strengthening mechanism described by Habermas.

By adopting a social security system in financing the health system, the JDP managed to reduce household expenditures on health from 19.8 percent in 2002 to 15.4 percent in 2012. Such a significant drop has emerged as a result of combining SSK, Bağkur and Emekli Sandığı under one social insurance institution (SGK). It is claimed that with this, individual contributions to health services have become equalised. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage of the people who had health security increased from 67 percent to 85 percent (Korucu and Oksay 2018: 296-7).

#### **4.3.2.2 Changes in the Social Security System**

Transformations in the social security system and linking it to the health system is another area from which the JDP sought to strengthen its political base. The reality that the state is the only organisation which could offer an institutionalised support and solidarity through social policy led the JDP to change the social security system and link it to the health system in order to reap political benefits and at the same time to unify the dispersed system for administrative efficiency.

Before the 2006 social policy reform, there existed three different social security systems serving civil servants, wage earners, and the self-employed. Typically this reform was in fact masterminded by the IMF's SAP imposed on the country through the stipulations of the 19th standby agreement (Erdoğan 2009: 661-2). The linking of the social security reform with the health system was a positive point as far as the JDP legitimisation was concerned. Many people working in the countryside, in the informal sector, and self-employment who previously had no social insurance, obtained some state support as a result of the social policy reforms in Turkey.

The 2008 Social Security Reform included general health insurance and old age insurance as the main components. In the health insurance component the contribution to be made by the state and the ease of access to health system were positive legitimacy building aspects. The Prime Ministry Office declared that the social security reforms were designed to embrace the population as a whole with the main purpose of reducing poverty and thus preventing inequalities and social unrest in the society (Başbakanlık 2005: 39). The following four aspects of the social security system were designed to materialise the above stated aims. A fairly comprehensive pension system to unify all types of employees under one roof. The second component was a universal and inclusive health system. The third element was designed with the purpose of unifying social services and social assistance. The last item was the establishment of a comprehensive social insurance institution to gather all separate schemes under one administration.

The social Security Institution Law number 5520 promulgated in May 2006 combined the authorities of Social Security Institution (SSK), Social Security Organisation for Artisans and the Self-employed (Bağ-Kur) and the State Pension Fund (Emekli Sandığı). Furthermore, the law number 5510 passed in October 2008 rationalised the general health insurance and retirement insurance by combining them under the jurisdiction of Social Security and General Health Insurance Law. The third component of the reform, the unification of social assistance and services, was put into effect after the establishment of the Ministry of Family and Social Services in 2011. One legitimacy building positive aspect of the Law 5510 was that it brought some form of social security for the hitherto uncovered social groups like agricultural workers, domestic workers, drivers etc. Furthermore, with this law, social security coverage of some categories of people like interns, trainees, detainees, students etc. were slightly improved. Another positive legitimacy building provisions of the law number 5510 was the coverage it brought about the work place accidents and occupational diseases for the self-employed. Furthermore, the law also brought improvements in the terms of invalidity pensions as well as full health coverage for everyone paying health premium.

The 2006 and 2008 reform laws were introduced not only as tools of legitimacy building but also to be in line with the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank. In tandem with the WB's notion of social inclusion, the newly created Social Security Institution had provisions for all sections of society, especially those formally excluded by the old system (Uğur and Tirgil 2018). However, it must be stated that there are critics like Erdoğan (2009), who argued that the reform laws were far from embracing all sections of society and in fact they curtailed the benefits of the members of the old system.

The JDP's social security reform concentrated on three significant areas: the pension scheme, health insurance and social assistance. In pursuing these areas, the party gave priority to ensure people's support. However, offering a universal health system and providing pensions for everyone was going to stretch the state budget (Buğra and Keyder 2006). In the early 2000s concerned with the fiscal constraints, the JDP

attempted to direct some of the burden to market forces and some of them to charitable organisations. It also at the same time introduced institutional changes to be in the driving seat of the social assistance distribution.

Another significant legitimacy building mechanism was the provision of cheap housing built by TOKI which had been involved in mass housing and urban transformation projects. TOKI's activities had a double function for the JDP: on the one hand the provision of cheap housing policy was a strong legitimacy tool, and on the other hand it was a mechanism of contributing to JDP's crony capitalism. This was clear from the announcement made by Murat Kurum, the Minister of Environment and Urbanisation, that in 17 years since 2003, the JDP government had paid 106.9 billion TL to following building contractors for TOKI building contracts: Cengiz İnşaat, Limak Grup, Kolin Grubu, Çalık Holding, Kalyon Grubu, Sancak Grubu, Torunlar Grup, Rönesans Şirketi. This has led Sevda Erden Kılıç, a Republican Peoples Party parliamentarian, to accuse the JDP for misusing its power to enrich the companies which are known for their close connections with the JDP (Gazete Patika 2020, 7th of August).

TOKI's portfolio of construction includes the following: as of September 2019 it has produced 727,252 social housing projects, 1,055 schools, 19 universities, 189 student dormitories, 42 libraries, 198 public services buildings, 266 hospitals, 96 health centres, 19 stadiums, 928 commercial centres, 704 mosques and 14,351 social facility buildings (TOKI 2020).

#### **4.3.2.3 Social Assistance, Islam and Philanthropy in the Service of Legitimacy**

With the financial help of the World Bank (WB) in conjunction with its Social Risk Mitigation Project, the JDP reorganised the functions of the already existing 'Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity' (established in 1982) to serve its policy of strengthening its power base. In order to strengthen its power



base, the JDP has attempted to form some alliances with the unemployed, the poor and the destitute through the use of municipalities and the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity and civil society organisations (Özdemir 2020).

The conditional cash transfer component of the WB's mitigation project was used by the party to distribute money to poor families through cash payments to pregnant women, pre-school children and school attending children up to the age of eight grade and various forms of educational grants and scholarships. The JDP's use of targeted cash assistance has generated a strong political support, thus a legitimacy base for the party. 463 million dollars allocated for social assistance and solidarity programme was used by the JDP central and local administration in 2003 alone to finance the 'Green Card' programme, to be used as emergency relief paid in cash, and in the form of medicine, clothing, food and coal (Keyder and Buğra 2006: 222-3). The JDP used the green card scheme very well in building its support base. By increasing the number of green card holders to 14.5 million in 2007 and including outpatient and medication expenses in the scheme in 2005, the amount of money spent on the green card scheme increased by 18 times in the period of 2000-2007 (Erus and Aktakke 2012).

In addition to the social funds allocated for poverty alleviation, the JDP also supported micro credit schemes with a double purpose. On the one hand it wanted to appear to be helping the poor and encouraging productive activities, on the other hand it wanted to pass the responsibility to NGOs and the borrowers. The party seems to be successful in both aims of building legitimacy and following a poverty alleviation programme inspired by neoliberalism (Adaman and Bulut 2007; Tömen and Sarvan 2015). The JDP has done well in organising the financing of the social assistance scheme by devolving its responsibility to municipal governments, which in turn have mobilised local charitable donations. A collaborative approach has been the case between the state, municipalities, Islamic capital and civil society organisations in the provision of social assistance to the poor and needy (Buğra and Keyder 2006; Özdemir and Özdemir-Yucesan 2008).

The two way relationship established between the JDP and the Islamic charitable and capitalist institutions has been guided by mutual self-interests. The JDP has provided the Islamic capital and charitable organisations opportunities to enhance their economic strength and in return for this, the Islamic capital and philanthropic organisations with their direct contacts with the people have contributed to the JDP's legitimacy building and political power. The JDP's charity brokerage has relied heavily on invoking Islamic ethics and norms of solidarity in helping the needy and the destitute.

Often local businessmen have used their donations to form close connections with the JDP regime and thus to be in apposition to expect favours in their dealings with the state (Buğra and Keyder 2006: 224). In other words, thanks to the social assistance scheme, while the JDP increased its popularity amongst the poor and the destitute, the party's local business supporters have managed to strengthen their political and economic positions. Murat Belge's comment about the poor and the JDP's real intentions in the provision of social care is quite interesting. He says that continuity of poverty would give the ruler the opportunity to intensify the dependency ties with the poor through social assistance (Belge 2008, cited in Türközü 2009).

In reforming the social security system, the JDP was well aware of the problems posed by the old system which had led to 'social exclusion'. They hoped that by targeting to reduce social exclusion and at the same time re-organising the state welfare institutions to serve their style of neoliberalism, they would increase their popularity among certain categories of people. An estimated 23 million people receiving social aid from the state between 2003 and 2013 explains why the JDP has had huge election successes (Özdemir 2020: 12). The results of the elections in 2007, 2011 and 2015 were reflective of increasing JDP support and legitimacy. The fact that 63.8 % of the JDP voters are from the low and middle-low income groups (KONDA 2011) is a proof of the success of the party in its first decade of rule in terms of Habermasian legitimacy building.

However, critics like Köse and Bahçe (2009: 496) argue that the JDP has transformed the state from being an all-embracing protective state to an ordinary philanthropist. While the state philanthropy has replaced the traditional welfare state, it has used charity discriminately. 'The JDP has simply placed itself at the zenith of a new welfare network consisting of institutions close to itself, state mechanisms which utilises unusual resource transfer methods and local administrations under its dominance' (Köse and Bahçe 2009: 496). It seems that The General Directorate of Social Solidarity and Help, established by the JDP in 2004, has played a pivotal role in the organisation and distribution of social help funds by Islamist and conservative charity organisations. These organisations distributed funds in the name of the JDP only to JDP clientele (Köse and Bahçe 2009). The real function of anti-poverty policies is to ensure that the contradictions and tensions generated by neoliberalism are stabilised (Cammack 2004). Such remedy to the dislocations generated by neoliberal policies has also been instrumental in legitimacy building by the implementing states. The JDP governments have used a variety of policies to that effect.

The JDP's welfare policies has had a two pronged results: it has enhanced its political support base quite considerably, and it has to a certain extent contained class conflict in Habermasian sense. By blunting the sharp ends of social tension in the society through social policy and charity, the JDP has formed alliances with some sections of society, and this in turn has prevented disenchantments in society and thus averted a rationality crisis for a long time.

### **4.3.3 Socio-cultural Sub-system**

In terms of Habermasian analysis, administrative rules, regulations, public services and social security system scrutinised in the above section are all inputs for the socio-cultural system. Their sufficient or insufficient quantities are contributing factors in the emergence or non-emergence of socio-cultural crises tendencies. The JDP rule has attempted to provide requisite quantities of the above mentioned inputs

to prevent a socio-cultural tendency which might lead to a motivation crisis. It appears that the transformation of health and social security system has given the JDP some credits to avoid or at least for a period of time to contribute to the prevention of a motivation crisis. However, it must be pointed out that administrative rules, regulations, public services and social security system as inputs are necessary but insufficient on their own to avoid a rationality crisis. First of all, these policies have to be delivering what they promise. A cursory analysis of the literature indicates that there are contradictory views about their effectiveness (cf Belge 2008 cited in Türközü; 2009 Buğra and Keyder 2006; Özdemir and Özdemir-Yucesan 2008; Köse and Bahçe 2009). Secondly, their impacts have to be compounded by other policies concerning economic growth, income distribution, democracy, human rights, etc.

The high level of support given to the JDP until recently is an indication that the JDP has managed to prevent a motivation crisis in society. Not only the JDP's economic and politico-administrative decisions but also social engineering have played a significant role in this. In Habermasian sense, the JDP's 'ideology planning' in socio-economic sub-system has contributed to the maintenance of a certain level of social integration until recently. The JDP interference into people's 'life-world' has managed to attract the approval of some sections of society without creating a serious negative reaction to it. The analysis below will highlight some of the most effective mechanisms used by the JDP to alter the normative structures and boundary conditions of society.

#### **4.3.3.1 Development of Cultural Hegemony**

The JDP inherited the Welfare Party's cultural networks of face to face relations used to develop a cultural hegemony emphasizing Islamic common values. The Anatolian Islamic bourgeoisie has been instrumental in the generation and maintenance of the common values that promote docility, obedience and stability (Durak 2011: 24). Neoliberal Islamist power block has used Sunni Islam as a strong reference point in building its legitimacy (Durak 2011: 25-26). Since the beginning, the JDP regime's

intense efforts to establish a cultural hegemony were not restricted to the political sphere, as the Anatolian Islamic bourgeoisie also used a specific labour control regime to create a conservative pious, docile, obedient, unorganised and dependent labour force.

The distinction made by Tugal between 'civil society' and 'political society' is quite useful in the analysis of how the JDP and Islamic capital have utilised religion and culture to 'mobilise and politicise millions of people' (Tugal 2009: 8). For him the JDP has built upon the legacy of Islamists before them who failed to link civil society networks to political society. Civil society is defined as a totality of networks that governs people's everyday life, their relationship with each other and with the economy and the state. The JDP that controls the political society by having the authority to rule and ensure the unity, has been successful in linking the two by focusing on pious people. The party has assigned a specific role to the Islamic capital to mediate between the party and Islamic oriented needy and the destitute.

Face to face relations used by many actors including ethnic elites, the leaders of religious communities, members of political parties and local activists of Islamic NGOs in building local networks have been extremely vital for the reproduction of the cultural hegemony as a significant basis of the legitimation of neoliberal accumulation regime (Durak 2011: 24-26; Sayari 2011). The emphasis was placed on 'the revival of traditional cultural values' and the creation of a disciplined and voluntarily collaborative working class who would feel that they share the same 'common world view' (Doğan and Durak 2013: 224-5).

The provision of informal social security by the employers, who are responsible for insecure flexible employment in the first place through efficient local informal networks, have been an extremely useful mechanism of manipulating workers into passive submission. The workers are persuaded to believe that the employers and they share a common world view which places a high premium on faith, fate, gratitude and patience (Doğan and Durak 2013: 225). The created cultural hegemony is maintained and 'legitimised by divine references' (Doğan and Durak (2013: 225).

Everyday work experiences are enmeshed with religious rituals observed both by the employers and employees creating the feelings that they share the same faith, beliefs and culture. It is clear that work, religion, belief, nationalism and informal social welfare have been used very shrewdly by the conservative-pious employers, to create a common culture within which the workers feel grateful to their employers for providing work and social help. This is exactly what Habermas (1988:2) means by subjective perception of individuals in providing or withdrawing support for the powerful, be it an individual or a political system.

Through the strengthening of the 'hegemonic culture' and manipulating 'social relations', employers in Anatolian cities like Konya and Kayseri have been able to ensure the assent and subservience of their employees. In the businesses in Anatolian cities face to face interactions and informal networks have been instrumental in worker recruitments and in the resolution of workplace problems (Doğan and Durak 2013: 227). The informal relationship between the workers and employers reaches a hegemonic proportion as the workers perceive the employers as their source of livelihoods and protectors who share a 'common world' of conservatism and piety (Doğan and Durak 2013: 228-30).

The values of conservative piety couched in terms of Sunni Islam play the function of enhancing togetherness and hiding inequalities and class relations and legitimising the existing power relations (Doğan and Durak 2013: 230-2). With their subservient positions and perceptions the pious-conservative labouring classes of Anatolia have been a source of not only surplus creation but also an instrument of the creation of 'a religious conservative social hegemony' (Doğan and Durak 2013: 231). They have been actively working as volunteers for Islamic parties and thus contributing to the building of hegemony (Doğan and Durak 2013 231-2). It is clear from the above analysis that not only the neoliberal accumulation regime but also the AKP legitimacy has used obedience and consent as their building blocks. Apart from Islamic values, ethnic, fellow countrymen and kin group community networks have been utilised to establish a cultural hegemony of Islamic bourgeoisie and the AKP (Durak 2011; Doğan and Durak 2013).

The fact that the JDP established a very strong organisation not just at the party level but also at neighbourhood level with some dedicated and motivated individuals was fairly instrumental in the persuasion of people to lend their support to the party (Şentürk 2008). The strong and active party organisation has generated a strong feeling of loyalty in party members, especially young people who have been well paid. Party's strong connections with Islamic schools (Imam Hatip Okulları) also provided a large pool of male and female volunteers who had ambitions for the future and felt that those ambitions could be better served through dedication to the party (Çaha and Guida 2011). The JDP gave high premium to face-to-face relations with people and used these people not only during election times but other times as well. The JDP was lucky to inherit the previous Islamist parties' local level organisations with large numbers of dedicated activists which were involved in a network of grassroots people, Islamic orders (tarikats) and conservative business interests. The party mobilised young and enthusiastic party members to pay visits particularly to the homes of the poor and the destitute. The party not only wanted people's votes from these visits but also was interested in making sure to contribute to their devotion to an Islamic way of life (Şentürk 2008; Çaha and Guida 2011; Durak 2011; Durak and Doğan 2013).

The JDP's ascendance also is indebted to its alliance with Fethullah Gülen and his supporters named after him as Gülenists. The close connections and cooperation between the JDP and the Gülenists until 2013 was contributory to the establishment of Islamic cultural hegemony. For this reason it is pertinent to explain who Fethullah Gülen and Gülenists are and the nature of their relationship to the JDP. The JDP's efforts to unify the votes of all Islamises and conservatives in order to be able to concentrate and monopolisation power was a significant factor in the alliance formed with the Gülenists. The Gülen movement called as Hizmet (service) or Cemaat (community) is an international faith-based political movement. The Gülenists are the followers of the writings and preaching of Fethullah Gülen who has given high premium to a set of values called Hizmet (service). Gülen claims to have devoted his life to the service of humanity by following a set of high esteemed values

including faith, respect, piety, love, passion and sincerity. He claims to be committed to the well-being of humanity. He has been highly critical of communism and atheism for eroding the traditional values and leading the youth to degeneration, and socio-political conflict (Doğan 2020: 42).

He claims to cherish self-development through purification mind and heart (Saritoprak and Griffith 2005). For him education is the main mechanism through which one could internalise these high values.

Many educational institutions established in many countries by the Gülenists claim their task to educate future generations who would believe in peaceful coexistence as opposed to racism, radicalism, violence and extremism. Gülen Movement has established a huge network of disciples locally organised to provide emotional and material help and support for each other (Doğan 2020: 42-44).

It must be stressed that here are different characterisations of Gülen and Gülenist Movement. While some idealise Gülen and his moral teachings, others call him a terrorist. This is because the Gülen Movement is involved in multi-faceted activities ranging from religion, nationalism, education, health care and media. As a religious movement it is interested in developing an Islamic culture in combination with Turkish nationalism. Unlike the rigid National Outlook Movement Gülenist believes that modern Islam is compatible with capitalism, democracy and Western ideas (Gülay 2007; Yavuz 1999, 2003, 2007; Fitzgerald 2017)

In order to achieve their common aims the Gülen movement and the JDP leadership had been in alliance even before the establishment of the JDP. Their common aim was the combat against the secularist forces within the state apparatus which in their belief had repressed and restrained Islam and Islamic way of life (Doğan 2020: v). The control of the state apparatus was mutually beneficial for the JDP and the Gülenists in that the JDP needed a mass political support while the Gülenists needed the JDP to expand its civil society and educational organisations without the secularist obstacles (Doğan 2020: vi).



While the alliance helped the JDP to achieve election victories in 2002, 2007 and 2011 it also was instrumental for the Gülenists to penetrate the army, the judiciary and the security forces. Once the two sides felt powerful enough without the other one conflict of interests started around 2012 with the MIT (National Intelligence Service) crisis. The JDP and Gülen were mutually supportive of each other in enhancing an Islamic way of life and in the struggle against the secularist forces. The Gülen Movement's local networks cooperated with those of the JDP's in enhancing their economic socio-cultural and political benefits.

It is clear from the above discussion that acting with the imperatives of capitalist accumulation the JDP has tried to shape the Habermasian socio-cultural sphere with the help of the Gülenists. The party has been involved in what Habermas calls as 'instrumental or one-sided rationalisation' and thus the JDP version of capitalism has permeated into the 'life-world' of the people. The JDP has used the power of ideology to hide the systemic problems. In the 2002-2010 period, the JDP has been able to use the cultural apparatus to persuade a high proportion of people to support the regime. The creation of shared cultural attitudes revolving around Islamic values has been one of the backbones of the JDP legitimacy. The JDP's relentless efforts to maintain people's support has not stopped even at the height of the economic crisis in October 2020. The speech Erdogan made in the meeting of the weak for the employees of mosques and religious institutions is highly instructive in Habermasian sense of attempting to produce new norms in support of social institutions. He said that 'the duty of the believer is not to be spoilt in times of abundance and to be patient in times of scarcity' (Birgün 7 October 2020). This is an engagement in what Habermas calls as a 'discursive will-formation' that would have a function of maintaining the legitimacy (Habermas 1988: 47-8).

#### **4.3.3.2 Ottomanism and Education in the Service of Moral Reform and Legitimacy**

Being aware of the inadequacy of social democratic parlance for a continuous power, the JDP strived to convince its supporters that the strengthening of the Islamic identity in every sphere of life was essential -cultural, educational and economic spheres (Çınar, 2013: 45). Erdoğan in many of his speeches emphasized that his party was under attack by the main opposition and this attack meant an attack on the ordinary devout people (Çınar 2013: 45).

The JDP's ethical conduct, in a Weberian sense, has been designed to achieve, what Gramsci calls, a moral reform. The party has transformed the institutional and cultural structures of society in an attempt to direct people's moral practices in order to ensure their consent and integrate them into its own project. In its attempts to ingrain its version of neoliberal Islamism with a tinge of Ottomanism, in addition to the social policy and philanthropy tools, the JDP has used an Ottomanist discourse and religious education system. This section will briefly look at the JDP's Ottomanist discourse and activities as well as education policy and argue that these policies have been like a double edged sword: on the one hand they have helped the party to generate a cohort of devout supporters, on the other hand they have led to cleavages in society conducive to a Habermasian cultural crisis.

Having led the Friday prayer in Hagia Sophia Grand Mosque (newly converted from the original Hagia Sophia Cathedral opened in 537 A.D) on 24th July 2020 the president Erdoğan was declared as the second conqueror of Istanbul by the Islamist media (Usman 2020). Although the party elites reject the claims that the JDP has imperial ambitions of becoming the leader of countries formerly under the Ottoman rule, the JDP's foreign policy has led many commentators like Bermek (2019), Kaya (2015) and Zencirci (2014) to call it 'neo-Ottomanism'. The date of re-opening the conversion, 24th of July 1923, is the date of Lausanne Treaty which is widely considered as the founding agreement of the secular Republic. This opening can easily be construed to be a revanchist symbolism against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

whose government had authorised the secular use of Hagia Sophia as a museum in 1934. The Hagia Sophia issue is only one of the many occasions that the JDP had used an Ottomanist discourse. Erdoğan in his many speeches to the public used the term ‘we are the grand children of the Ottomans’. In his speech to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on 15th December 2016, he openly specified that they were all the grand children of the Ottomans and should unite under one leadership to be reckoned with by the rest of the world. Again immediately after JDP’s land-slide victory in the 2011 elections, Erdoğan in his public speech stated that in the elections, not only Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Diyarbakır, but also Sarajevo, Beirut, Damascus, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip had won. ‘Not only Turkey, but also the Middle East, Caucuses, the Balkans and Europe have been victorious today’ (Hürriyet 11th June, 2011).

The JDP and Erdogan in particular are in a continuous effort to create an Ottoman and Islamic legacy in the country. The making of ‘religion’ as a compulsory course in Turkish state schools and the introduction of 4+4+4 system in education and the mushrooming of the Islamic Imam Hatip high schools are evidence for this cultural inclination. The 4+4+4 system was introduced in 2008 but became more entrenched after 2012. Accordingly, 5th grade students were obliged to take 140 hours of religious courses and 108 hours of science courses in a year. The 4+4+4 gave the JDP the opportunity to convert all state schools similar to Imam Hatip schools. The Islamisation and Ottomanization of the education system took a further twist with increasing the number of Quranic courses run by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) which recruited 947 thousand children in 2012. Furthermore, the JDP government offered tax rebates to anyone who would open Quranic courses. The campaign called ‘haydi çocuklar camiye’ (come on children, let’s go to the mosque) to lure children into the mosques by giving bicycles and quarter golds as rewards was another evidence of the JDP to ensure the hegemony of Islamic culture in the country (Yüce 2017). The determination of the JDP to raise religious generations (dindar nesiller) was very clear in the decisions of the 19th National Education Council held in December 2014. Following this meeting,

Religion was made a compulsory course for first year students and the Ottoman Language Course was made a compulsory for Imam Hatip and Social Sciences Secondary schools. Furthermore, Arabic Language course was put in the second year curriculum as an optional course beginning from the 2016-17 academic year (Yüce 2017).

The Directorate of Religious Affairs has been given immense financial help to play a significant role in the Islamisation of the society. For instance, its budget for 2021 has been increased from 11.5 billion TL to 12.9 billion TL, overtaking the budgets of seven Ministries including Foreign, Energy, Culture and Tourism, Industry, Environment and Urbanisation and Commerce. The JDP declared that the budget of Directorate of Religious Affairs would be increased to 13.9 billion TL and 14.8 billion TL in 2022 and 2023 respectively (T24, 2020, 10th October).

In January 2015 some JDP members of the parliament proposed that the 1922 law, which banned the use of the Ottoman symbol of the state Tuğra in public buildings, should be totally abolished. By reinstating the Tuğra through the approval the parliamentary constitutional committee, the JDP government brought back one of most important symbols of the Ottoman state and the Caliphate. Erdoğan's repeated reference to revive the Ottoman symbols has also found expression in his declaration in July 2016 to demolish Atatürk Cultural Centre and replace it with the historic Ottoman military barracks. In some state ceremonies he has made a special effort to display Ottoman symbols. For instance, during his visit the Azerbaijani leader İlham Aliyev was welcomed by people wearing the costumes and carrying the flags of the 16 historic Turkish states (Sputnik Türkiye 2015).

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

The advocacy of democracy, pluralism and human rights by the Islamic business interests and the JDP was not only important for their own interests but also in harmony with the demands of the EU, the USA and the IFIs. MUSIAD, TUSIAD

(Association of Turkish Businessmen -a secular business organisation of big capital) and the JDP has formed a power block in Poulantzian sense, and their common vested interest is behind their preaching for democracy, liberal economic order that had strong connections with global capitalism and pluralistic politics. In its party programme the JDP claimed to strive for a long-lasting social consensus without challenging the main pillars of Atatürk's republic and violating basic human rights and the constitutional nature of society. The JDP programme over and over again emphasised the importance of democracy, rule of law, secularism, human rights in general and individual rights and freedoms in particular. On the economic front, further integration with the world economy in accordance with the principles of free market economy and competitiveness was repeatedly emphasised throughout. The social welfare policies to support the needy and the destitute were also highlighted as important constituents of the Party's programme. A leading role was assigned to the private sector, NGOs and philanthropic civil society organisations. The skills with which the JDP presented itself as a conservative democratic party interested in resolving the current political stalemate and severe economic crisis was a significant determinant of the party's electoral success. The party programme had no element of intension to establish an Islamic state, but full of promises of social justice and equity. The JDP's fairly successful handling of the health care and social security reforms, social assistance and cultural hegemony building activities and the existence of a boom period in the global economy were helpful in the enhancement of the JDP support base and legitimacy in the 2002-2010 period.

As a conclusion to this chapter, we can say that what the JDP has been doing is to build and maintain its legitimacy by combining elements of Islamism, Ottomanism, primordial loyalism, clientalism and welfarism. The social engineering of the JDP has changed the fabrics of the socio-cultural system (Habermasian boundary conditions) to be subservient of its own style of crony capitalism. By establishing a cultural hegemony through entrenching Islamic values and the community of Islam in society and changing the organisational structures in society, such as education,

health, social security, etc., the JDP has prevented or postponed a motivational crisis tendency in society until very recently.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND REQUISITE QUANTITIES

The JDP's trajectory to authoritarianism has to be understood within the context of Turkey's deepening integration into globalised capitalism. The rise and fall of the JDP's legitimacy is directly related to the specific tensions and conflicts created by this integration. Despite its democratic, liberal and inclusive rhetorical discourse at the time of its coming to power in the 2002 elections, the JDP operated within the context of authoritarian political structures created under the tutelage of the military since 1980. What has happened in the last decade is the deepening and the consolidation of authoritarianism.

So far we have provided an analysis of the socio-economic mechanisms utilised by the JDP to obtain people's consent to its rule. To a significant extent the JDP was successful in this effort between 2002 and 2012 to build a fairly strong support and thus legitimacy. In this chapter we will attempt to show that this legitimacy has not been sustainable in recent years. In doing so we will use the Habermas' variety of criteria in defining legitimisation crisis. As explained in the theoretical chapter the state's use of oppressive measures as the first criteria of legitimisation crisis will be one of the focus of this chapter. In order to see the relevance of Habermas' second criteria for the rise of legitimisation crisis this chapter will also concentrate of the gradually increasing disenchantment with the state policies by the people. As we discussed in chapter two if the state policies in the politico-administrative system fail to deliver the requisite quantities dissatisfaction may emerge in society as a result of what Habermas calls a social integration crisis in the forms of inequalities, poverty and worsening living standards. In the following sections empirical evidence would be provided to highlight elements of legitimisation crisis tendency during the JDP rule.

One of the most significant criteria for the legitimacy is the supremacy of the rule of law. Abiding by the laws is a quintessential prerequisite of legitimacy for Habermas. We will argue that, particularly since 2012, the JDP's legitimacy has been eroding because of the emerging discrepancies between its deeds and promises due to the contradictory nature of its policies.

In reaction to the good news of the discovery of natural gas in the Black Sea by the president Erdoğan on 21st August 2020 quite a few people on television screens openly declared their mistrust to the JDP regime. Some even claimed that it was not true, but it was an exercise of agenda setting to divert attentions away from the seriousness of the current economic crisis (Sözcü 2020). This is a form of crisis of authority that depicts the existence of mistrust for the ruler or the ruling elite. Despite the use of state power and cultural institutions the dominant group is not able to ensure peoples consent and trust.

The JDP's high level of legitimacy - derived from the its self-defined conservative democracy cherishing a secular and democratic state based on the rule of law, considering secularism as a fundamental precondition for democracy and the main principle of social peace – has significantly been eroded in the last few years. This erosion has been mainly due to the way that the JDP has used its power both domestically and internationally since 2002. The evidence (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler 2015) suggests that in economic, political, judicial and social spheres the JDP regime has not been able to deliver what Habermas calls the 'requisite quantities'.

## **5.1 The JDP and the Requisite Quantities**

Although I think that Habermas' concept of four 'requisite quantities' has a strong explanatory power, in this section I will attempt to complement his view about the progressive displacement of pre-capitalist moral values by the development of



capitalism. I will do this by specifically concentrating on the ways in which the JDP has used Islamism and Ottomanism in its attempts of legitimacy creation. My contention is that, while Habermas' view on legitimation crisis has strong validity for fully fledged welfare capitalism, in peripheral states like Turkey, political authority may use its power not only to slow down and prevent the erosion of pre-capitalist moral values, but also actively construct new ones and thus drive legitimacy support from some sections of the society. The construction of a pre-capitalist notion of Ottomanism, Islamic, family values and the 'will of the nation' has been quite instrumental in legitimacy building by the JDP in the face all sorts of crises of economic and social nature. Operating with the assumption that the current crisis Turkey has been suffering is linked to the ways in which it has been incorporated into the international capitalist system, we will analyse the erosion of the JDP legitimacy in conjunction with it.

The 2008 crisis undermining the legitimacy of neo-liberal policies and the continuity of the crisis to the current day globally may have also been determinant at the beginning of the decline of JDP legitimacy. As the implosion of the global financial markets shook the world in 2008 (Altvater 2009: 75) the JDP government took it very lightly at the time. However, it seems that the optimism of the Prime Minister of the time, RTE, that the crisis would pass the country tangentially seemed to be unfounded (Aydın 2013) and the country entered into a deep spiral of economic crisis (Boratav 2019). There are also strong arguments about how neoliberal policies also lost their legitimacy since the 2008 economic crisis (Duménil and Lévy 2011), and thus, this has made a mockery of the 'end of history' claims of Fukuyama (1989) and the TINA (there is no alternative) argument. Capitalism currently is struggling globally to such an alarming extent that, according to a Bloomberg news item by Eric Martin (8 June 2020), World Bank expressed its worries about the current state of the world economy that has experienced the biggest per-capita output decline since 1870 in more than 90 percent of the countries which would have an impact of sending 70 to 100 million people into poverty. The same news item also reported

that advanced economies will shrink by 7 percent this year and the Euro Zone would shrink by 9.1 percent (Martin 2020).

The implosion of neoliberalism with the financial crisis in 2008, people like Duménil and Lévy (2011: 326) claimed that a new phase of capitalism was on the horizon. The survival of capital accumulation is an absolute necessity for neoliberalism that would not hesitate to use any mechanism at its disposal to maintain it, including the oppression of any opposition. The use of state power, the judiciary and the media are the main means utilised by neoliberalism to oppress and contain the opposition.

Obviously Turkey is not going to be able to escape from this general but very serious slump. Already in severe difficulties, the JDP government may further suffer from the erosion of its legitimacy. JDP's legitimacy decline is the combined result of the long lasting impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the mismanagement of the economy and social affairs. The JDP has not been able to deliver 'requisite quantities' of the sine qua non of legitimacy: consumable values, rational decisions and motivation actions. The JDP's recourse to increasingly authoritarian measures are strongly related to its failure to deliver the economic expectations of the populace. The main features of the economy will be analysed in the sections below to pinpoint the roots of JDP's inability to deliver what it had promised. Increasing disenchantment in society about hardships of economic, social and political nature has raised the JDP's wrath. The rising intolerance of the JDP to any opposition has reached such a colossal level that people's trust in the economic and legal system has declined considerably.

## **5.2 Gradual Withdrawal of Support and Loss of JDP Legitimacy**

In Habermasian theory there is a relationship between socio-cultural system, rationality crisis and legitimacy crisis. Citizens' 'withdrawal of legitimation' emerges when the problems in the economic system are transferred to the politico-administrative system. The ineffectiveness of government interventions in the

economic system would generate a rationality crisis, i.e. the inappropriate decisions made by the state, which might entice the reactions of the public in the form of motivation crisis. Habermas thinks that legitimization crisis is a conversion of rationality crisis (Habermas 1988: 46). What is crucial in this conversion is the will of the people who might not be happy with the economic decisions of the political administrative system. Such conversion represents a qualitative transformation in the socio-cultural system which unfolds in the form of increased demand for legitimacy (delivery of promises).

As explained in chapter two, the close relationship between rationality crisis, motivation crisis, legitimacy crisis and the socio-economic system that constitutes the backbone of Habermas' views is very illuminative in the saga of the JDP. In its early years of rule, the JDP was able to obtain peoples' approval through its language of pluralism promising development, equity, democracy and social justice and invoking integrative notions of Islamic common values and Ottomanism. However, in its recent years of rule the JDP's unresponsive or ineffective actions have led to a gradual withdrawal of public legitimation (support) from the politico-administrative system. The recurrent economic crisis in Turkey, caused by global influences and domestic transformations, has been weakening the pre-capitalist cultural elements used by the JDP as instruments of legitimacy formation and hegemony.

### **5.3 The JDP Practices Undermining its Legitimacy**

#### **5.3.1 Politico-Administrative and Economic Sub-system**

Most of the decisions taken by the political power holders are either directly about how to run the economy or indirectly affect the economic structure of society. Therefore, it seems pertinent to consider politico-organisational and economic sub-systems together in the analysis of the JDP rule. As we mentioned in chapter two, Habermas differentiates between sub-systems for didactic and explanatory purposes, but at the same time he reminds the reader about the interconnectedness of the three

subsystems. Furthermore, he is adamant that state decisions about the economy and politics should not be considered in isolation from the global economy and politics. Bearing this in mind, in the following sections we will look at the JDP's activities which have been undermining its legitimacy without forgetting the impacts of the global system.

### **5.3.1.1 The Eradication of the Rule of Law and Legal Crisis**

Neoliberalism was introduced in Turkey in 1980 under the auspices of the military rule which ensured the violation of the principle of the separation of the three powers through subordination of the legislative and judiciary to the executive. Taking a different course of action, the JDP promised in its election manifesto in 2002 that it would make every effort to consolidate the rule of law by entrenching the separation of powers: the judiciary, legislative and executive (AKP 2002: 20). However, the JDP changed its direction considerably during its reign. The election manifesto in 2018 played a very different tune, emphasizing the virtues of concentrating the decision making mechanisms in a single hand (AKP 2018). Although the manifesto was not openly admitting the advocacy of authoritarianism, the reality in 2020 is that the executive presidential system has become highly authoritarian. This is indicative of the fact that the party and its leadership have gradually abandoned their promises of democracy and pluralism. Even before the executive presidential system, Erdoğan had become highly vindictive towards the Kurds who withdrew their support for the JDP due to the collapse of the 'peace process'. In its ascendance to power and entrenchment of its legitimacy, the JDP had given the impression of being interested in resolving the Kurdish question. This was considered to be vital not only for attracting the Kurdish votes but also pleasing the EU on the issue of democratisation. With the worsening relations with the EU and the Kurdish politicians' strong opposition to Erdoğan's desire to be an executive president, the so-called peace process collapsed and the JDP policies towards the Kurdish party, the Peoples' Democracy Party, became very harsh and vengeful.

The systematic arrests and imprisonment of the Peoples' Democracy Party (PDP) democratically elected mayors and members of parliaments and the replacement of the mayors with JDP supported trustees (Kayyum) are good evidence of the JDP authoritarianism. The JDP's gradual movement towards authoritarianism is strongly linked to erosion of its legitimacy. However two factors that might have forced the JDP government to be careful about authoritarianisation are the weakening of the EU pressure on Turkey for democratisation and the weakness of the secularist forces in the country to stop the JDP. The negative attitude of the newly elected centre-right governments in Germany and France in the mid-2000s towards Turkey's full membership, played into the hands of the JDP which no longer felt the pressure to consolidate democracy (Pamuk 2018). Furthermore the fact that the secularist forces had failed to close down the JDP in 2007, and since then has not been powerful enough to challenge it, provided a ripe environment for the JDP to behave recklessly in the process of its gradual shift towards authoritarianisation. In parallel to its erosion of legitimacy it increased its authoritarianism since 2013. The weakening of the army's power through false accusations and false evidence by the Gülenist elements within the state also made a significant contribution to the JDP's trajectory of authoritarianisation.

The alliance between the JDP and the Gülenist movement in a sense was a marriage of convenience. In order to control the state both sides tolerated each other although ideologically they were in disagreement in that while the Gülenists believe in civic Islam, the JDP is characterised by political Islam (Doğan 2020). It was this ideological division within the state that eventually led to the 16 July 2016 coup attempt by the Gülenists who were being blamed for establishing a state within state by the president Erdoğan. The failed coup attempt by the Gülenist army officers in 2016 gave an excuse to the JDP regime to become more and more authoritarian. The claimed dangers to the country's unity and the possibility of a military takeover played into the hands of Erdoğan to get himself elected into the position of a single ruler in 2017. In the aftermath of the imprisonment of many generals and senior officers, the JDP government moved to eliminate the other checks and balances over

its power by controlling the judiciary, legislature and the executive. The 2010 constitutional referendum gave a free hand to the JDP and its powerful leader Erdoğan to introduce the necessary mechanisms to control the judiciary (Pamuk 2018: 280-1). In order to be able to influence legal decisions, on 11 July 2020 the JDP passed a new Law of Bar Association which abolishes one Bar per province rule and allows the establishment of many Bar Associations as long as they have sufficient members. Despite strong opposition from all existing 80 Bars and opposition parties, the JDP used its parliamentary majority to promulgate the law.

The JDP's democratisation project announced in its party manifesto in 2002 simply meant the elimination of the military-tutelage which had permeated to all high level state bureaucratic institutions such as high Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, Supreme Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court and the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. Through many legislative and constitutional changes, the JDP regime managed to get rid of the power and influence of the military but instituted an executive presidential system at the expense of the parliamentary system. Democratic credentials of the executive presidential system has been questioned by many people, including Akyüz and Hess (2018), who call it a 'hybrid regime' Petersen and Yanaşmayan (2019) call it a 'constitutional autocracy' and Guntiiio and Barbosa (2020) dub it as 'neo-Ottomanism'.

While using Islamism and Ottomanism as well as ethnic othering at the cultural front, it has also managed to use the parliament for the interest of capital and block the mechanisms of checks and balances. It has used decrees in the strength of law (KHK) since 2011 and powerful Presidential Decrees since 2016 to de-functionalise the parliament (Aydın 2019). By also controlling the judiciary through political appointments and by controlling the security forces, the JDP governments have seriously violated the main pillar of democracy: the separation of powers. It is now impossible to talk about the independence of the Judiciary in Turkey (Grigoriadis 2018; Aydın 2019; Petersen and Yanaşmayan 2019).

Another repressive activity of the JDP has been in the area of labour rights that had been achieved through long and harsh struggles. In 2003 the JDP had already prepared the ground work for the insecurity of labour by the New Labour Act Number 4857. The JDP not only has managed to reduce many of these rights but also introduced rules and regulation that had reduced labour to a state of insecure, flexible, cheap and reserve labour (Aydın 2019). By legalising subcontracted and part time work, the JDP had not only weakened the existing trade unions but also limited their future organisational capacities. These aims were also accompanied by the policies to keep real wages low through the anti-inflationary policies of the Central Bank. This was made possible in the aftermath of the 2010 constitutional changes which altered the clauses number 51, 53 and 54 which worsened the rights of trade unionisation, collective bargaining and strikes under the pretext of improving working conditions. The omnibus bills (torba yasalar) introduced in 2011 made significant changes to the laws of labour, unemployment security, civil service, social security and general health security simply curtailed the existing rights rather than improving them (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler 2015; Petersen and Yanaşmayan 2019). Aydın (2019) and Atay (2019) describe very vividly how the omnibus bills have been used by the JDP regime to transform the laws in education, health, crime, judiciary, legal proceedings, commerce, obligation, civil rights, domestic and international security, terrorism, etc. The JDP regime's attempts to introduce fundamental changes bode very well with the interests of dominant classes close to the JDP, but had a very detrimental impact on the labouring classes, the poor, certain ethnic groups and religious sects (Aydın 2019). The sense of justice was so much violated that it led the leader of the opposition party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, to organise a long 'Walk of Justice' that was participated by a large number of people. Other protests against the JDP misdoings include TEKEL strike, Gezi Resistance and Soma massacre protests (Yalman and Topal 2017; Topal 2018; Ercan and Oğuz 2014).

Crony capitalism, nepotism, corruption, money laundering and injustice have become quite widespread in the country. The constitutional changes, introduced by

the JDP regime in 2017 after its approval with the 51.4 percent of the votes in a referendum, now allow the parliament to choose the majority of the High Court Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). Having the absolute majority in the parliament, the JDP has become in a position to control the HSYK, thus the possibility of behaving arbitrarily, which is a feature of authoritarian regimes. The amendments on how a political party can be closed down passes the power from the chief prosecutor of the Appeals Court to the parliament. Again having an absolute majority in the parliament, the JDP now is in a position to decide which political party can stay open.

The JDP government has extended its executive power by leaps and bounds subordinating the other state institutions to the executive. In democracies the activities of the ruling party is checked by the opposition parties that can operate freely. Likewise an independent judicial system is a sine qua non of individual rights and personal freedoms. In other words the separation of the powers is an absolute necessity for ensuring the lawfulness of state activities. Without the separation of powers it may not be possible for individuals to find the state responsible for its damaging actions (Gözler 2018; Atay 2019). Despite the formal existence of parliamentary institutions, a constitution, a judicial system and procedural democracy, the elected government can subordinate all other powers to the power of the executive. This is a clear indication of authoritarianism.

In its early years of rule, with the backing of the EU, the JDP had managed to promote itself as a party interested in expanding human rights and individual freedoms. Increasingly the JDP regime has been restricting the rights of freedom of thought and freedom of speech. In recent years, particularly after the 17th December 2013, corruption and bribery allegations have become quite common. The intolerance by the JDP for any criticism and opposing views have been retaliated in the forms of harassment and arbitrary punishment to frighten people away from raising any oppositional views. The explosion of criminal cases for ‘insulting the president’ in Turkey is a case in point. According to the Freedom House (2019) there were more than 20,000 investigations and 6,000 prosecutions in 2017. It is ironic that many arrests and court charges follow suit either after a government official or



the pro JDP media make some allegations giving the impression as if there is a strong link between the government and the judiciary. The JDP regime strive very hard to present any societal opposition as illegitimate and foreign. Civil society organisations have been under strong pressure to reflect the JDP's points of views. In an attempt to control the society the JDP regime has restricted both the public and the private spheres and established a hegemony in the media by controlling the majority of newspapers and television canals in the country (Adaklı 2009a; 2009b). The curtailment of freedom in general and personal freedom in particular are reflected in Turkey's evaluation by the Freedom House (2020) which measures the level of freedoms in countries by calculating their score through taking into consideration the levels of political rights and personal liberties. Turkey scored 32 point out of 100 in 2020. In providing justifications for such a low level, the Freedom House claims that the President Recep Erdoğan's JDP used the excuse of the failed 2016 coup attempt to consolidate their authoritarian rule. Erdoğan's success in becoming an executive president through a constitutional change in 2017 resulted in further consolidation of his power. Since then a major crackdown on any opposition has consolidated authoritarianism in Turkey and thus, according to Freedom house Turkey with a score of 32 is not a free country (Freedom House 2020).

It is clear that the consolidation of the JDP regime has operated against the spirit of democracy which necessitates a balanced power sharing. Through the separation of power, democracies manage to restrain the whimsical attitudes of governments. Attempts to control the legislative, judiciary and executive inevitably reduce the credibility of democracy. Once this separation is encroached upon and violated then individual rights and freedoms may be in danger. The 2010 constitutional reforms have brought the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors under the control of the Ministry of Justice, which is a clear violation of the separation of powers, a sine qua non of democracy. With the 2010 constitutional changes by increasing the number of appointed members of the Constitutional Court, the reigning power has managed to influence the decisions made by the court. The fact that in post 2010 the Constitutional court regularly has resorted not to abolish some laws on the basis of

the discretion of the law makers has given the government wide range of authorities to introduce public reforms to enhance its own power basis (Gözler 2017; Atay 2019).

The judiciary has been seen by the JDP as a main hurdle preventing the executive to function freely. With the approval of the presidential system in 2017 Erdoğan has managed to achieve his long term ambitions of not only dominating the parliament and preventing the check mechanisms but also controlling the judiciary. In order to prevent discussions on laws to be promulgated, the JDP regime has been utilising the omnibus bill mechanism. . Despite the fact that decrees in the force of law can only be used in cases of emergency and in accordance with the regulations of the constitutional law, by hiding them in omnibus bills, the JDP regime has been simply sidestepping the parliamentary process of democratic discussions and adjudications. Through the KHKs and omnibus bills, the JDP has been able to captivate the public institutions and control their authorities, duties, structures, personnel and effective running. In accordance with these decrees the following independent public institutions lost their independence: the TÜBİTAK (Turkish Institution for Scientific Research), Telecommunication Institution, Higher Committee of Radio and Television, Energy Market Regulation Institution, Sugar Institution, Tobacco and Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Drinks Market Regulation Institute and Savings and Insurance Fund (Yıldırım 2017; Atay 2019)

There is strong evidence that the relationship between the legislative, judiciary and executive is being shaped according to the wishes of the JDP regime and its leader. In modern societies the aim of judiciary is to establish the ‘Rule of Law’ (hukukun üstünlüğü). According to Aydın (2019), JDP regime has created a judicial chaos in which three conflicting system of law seems to be in operation: existing domestic and international laws and procedures, JDPs lawless law and the rules of Shari’a. Having ‘established an absolute control over the judicial system from its education, employees, institutional organisation, to the immunity of judges and public prosecutors, the new judiciary is defined as the ‘JDP Judiciary’ (Aydın 2019). Within

this system the JDP regime does not hesitate to violate the rules and laws it has created. Aydın (2019) calls this ‘lawlessness of the law’.

### **5.3.1.2 Economic Sub-system**

The JDP followed the neo-liberal agenda of the previous governments quite strictly and had the cooperation of the organisations of the big and medium and small business interests, namely TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD (Sönmez 2013). In building its support base, the JDP rule in its early years attempted to serve the interests of various fractions of capital. This meant that the state power was used not just for the supremacy of big capital but also for the interests of small and medium sized Islamic capital groups operating mainly in Anatolia. Having come to power in 2002 the JDP regime continued to adhere to the neoliberal macroeconomic strategies of the previous decade that aimed to ensure free movement of capital and introduce measures faithful to the spirit of the post-Washington consensus. Institutional transformation was a priority with the aim of regulating the economy. The JDP regime continued to implement the IMF recommended policies which aimed to shape the institutional and fiscal structures of the state (Cizre and Yeldan 2005; Öniş 2012). JDP policies since 2002 have favoured the interests of capital rather than those of the labour and as such has transformed the legal structures accordingly. While using pre-capitalist cultural features to ensure the legitimacy of its governments, the JDP has made every effort to contain any opposition to its economic policies (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler 2015).

Since the 2001 financial crises the Turkish economy has not been able to break out from its dependence on hot money flows that have been used to alleviate her persistent current account deficits. Considered to be an exemplary implementer of neo-liberal policies until the 2008 world financial crises, the JDP regime started to stumble in the path of running the economy. As the carrier of the finance-led capitalism in Turkey since 2002, the JDP governments have taken significant measures to intensify financialisation of the economy by transforming state

institutions. Global hegemony of finance capital and the restructuring of the Turkish financial system to on a par with it have had significant implications for the way the economy and society were further integrated into the global system. During the JDP reign, the dependence of the national economy on financial flows has increased to such an extent that a sign of crisis in global financial system was immediately felt in the country (Cömert and Yeldan 2019). The Turkish economy has not been able to recover from the impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis and its vulnerability has gradually increased due to the emphasis on debt-driven growth prioritising the construction sector (Çeviker Gürakar 2018).

Having implemented a neo-liberal agenda with crony elements, the JDP has simply lost the control of the economy. Post-Fordist development model used by the JDP has simply led to fiscal and budgetary problems which in turn have intensified the dependence on external financing.

Table 5.1 Turkish Foreign Debt during the JDP Reign (in Billion \$)

	Public	Central Bank	Private	Total	Total Debt/GDP (%)
2002	64.533	22.003	43.066	129.601	54.8
2018	240.562	5.922	298.393	444.878	56.7
2002-2018 increase (%)	372.77	-73.08	692.87	343.26	

Source: Ministry of Treasury and Finance

Country's dependence on foreign borrowing is strongly related to the nature of the economy. The financial crises that have haunted Turkey since its liberalisation in 1980 has been mainly due to the post-Fordist development strategy that had been adopted. Its emphasis on export orientation has not been supported by a strong

domestic capital formation (Şenses 2012: 18-20). Capital needs of the economy was met by attracting foreign capital through high interest and low currency rate policies, which in turn have encouraged high levels of imports leading to trade deficits and capital account deficits. Short-term hot capital inflows into the country encouraged by high interest rates has been useful in meeting the balance of payments deficits for a while but at the same time has exacerbated the fragility of the economy and its vulnerability to crises (Yeldan and Yıldırım 2015; Cömert and Yeldan 2019). The table below indicates the relationship between imports and exports in the post-Fordist development strategy.

Table 5.2 Imports, Exports and Current Account Deficits

<b>Years</b>	<b>Exports</b>	<b>Imports</b>	<b>Foreign Trade Deficit</b>	<b>Current Deficit</b>	<b>Import/Export (%)</b>
<b>2001</b>	31.334	41.399	-10.064	-3.760	75,7
<b>2002</b>	36.059	51.553	-15.494	0.626	69,9
<b>2003</b>	47.252	69.339	-22.086	-7.554	68,1
<b>2004</b>	63.167	97.359	-34.372	-14.198	64,8
<b>2005</b>	73.476	116.774	-43.297	-20.980	62,9
<b>2006</b>	85.534	139.576	-54.041	-31.168	61,3
<b>2007</b>	107.271	170.062	-62.790	-36.949	63,1
<b>2008</b>	132.027	201.963	-69.936	-39.425	65,4
<b>2009</b>	102.142	140.928	-38.785	-11.358	72,5
<b>2010</b>	113.883	185.544	-71.661	-44.616	61,4
<b>2011</b>	134.906	240.841	-105.934	-74.402	56,0
<b>2012</b>	152.461	236.545	-84.083	-47.962	64,5
<b>2013</b>	151.802	251.661	-99.858	-63.621	60,3
<b>2014</b>	157.610	242.177	-84.566	-43.597	65,1
<b>2015</b>	143.838	207.234	-63.395	-32.118	69,4
<b>2016</b>	142.606	198.601	-55.995	-32.605	71,8

Source: TUIK

A number of factors have been influential in the enhancement of the fragility of the economy. First of all low saving rates makes the country dependent on external borrowing (Özsan, Özsan and Ata 2018). This is further exacerbated by import dependence of country's export –oriented industries which increases the need for high levels of foreign borrowing. The same is true for investments as there is limited amount of direct foreign investment (Pamuk 2018). The financial crises that have haunted Turkey since its liberalisation in 1980 have been mainly due to the post-Fordist development strategy that had been adopted since 1980. Its emphasis on export orientation has not been supported by a strong domestic capital formation. Capital needs of the economy have been met by attracting foreign capital through high interest, low currency rates policies, which in turn have encouraged high levels of imports leading to trade deficits and current account deficits (OECD 2018: 4; Pamuk 2018; Cömert and Yeldan 2019). Short-term hot capital inflows into the country has been useful in meeting the balance of payments deficits for a while but at the same time has exacerbated the fragility of the economy and its vulnerability to crises.

There are strong indications that the JDP regime has not been able to run the economy properly. According to a TÜİK announcement made in February 2020, the Turkish economy managed to show a meagre 0.9 percent economic growth while per capita national income declined from 12,480 \$ in 2012 to 9,127 \$ in 2019 (Hürriyet 2020). The economic contraction that started in 2012 simply speeded up after the 2016 coup attempt and the country has been facing a collapse of the Turkish Lira to such an extent that, with the help of the corona virus the US dollar reached a historical high level of 7.48 to the lira in September 2020 (Habertürk 2020). Already critically slowed down economic growth rates have turned negative with the Corona virus in recent months.

Despite the fact that the JDP had an anti-IMF parlance before coming to power, not only it continued with the IMF supported ' Transition to Strong Economy Programme' introduced by the outgoing coalition government in 2001, but also agreed to implement a new IMF programme in 2005. Until the 2008 global crisis,

the policies followed by the JDP were designed to strengthen the country's further articulation with the global economy and contribute to the entrenchment of neoliberalism. The implementation of a long-term stabilisation programme using contractionary monetary and financial measures had managed to convince international financial markets about country's stability. Consequently, foreign capital inflow into the country had led to a high level of economic growth averaging 6.8 percent annually until 2008. This relatively high growth rate was partly the result of global economic boom that allowed high mobility of capital globally from which Turkey had received a fair amount. However, the real sector did not benefit very much from the increasing financialisation of the Turkish economy (Yeldan and Yıldırım 2015). State policies has concentrated on fiscal and monetary measures to resolve the vicious circle of borrowing with high interest rates to cover balance of payments problems and high inflation rather than prioritising productive activities. This inevitably has worsened the existing debt-burden leading to an economic crisis. Unsustainable economic growth based on external borrowing increasingly led to budget deficits as interest rates were kept artificially high. (Yeldan and Yıldırım 2015).

#### **5.3.1.2.1 External Debt**

The post 2001 economic growth tendency started to slow down in 2005 and stagnated in 2007 due to the inability to meet current account deficits and a general slowdown of the global economy (Türel 2009: 9-13). However, by the end of 2009, global economy managed to recover from the shocks of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, thus the venue to borrow from the external sources opened up for Turkey which made a significant contribution to the sustainability of the JDP in power. Having contributed significantly to economic growth in the country and helping to sustain the JDP rule and elevate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the status of an executive presidency in June 2018, foreign capital started to flee the country when TL lost considerable value (11.6 percent) against other currencies between January and

August 2018 (Eğilmez 2018), aggravating country's economic problems and endangering the JDP's power. Since 2018 15 billion dollars leaving the country, compounding with the inability of the economy to earn adequate foreign currency, has generated a huge current account deficit that has been financed by the central bank reserves through currency swap deals (Sönmez 2020). While companies like the Swedish Telia sold its 24 percent of shares in Turkcell, Volkswagen pulled out of a plan to build a major car plant to build 40,000 cars in Turkey. Another area that foreign investments are moving out is stocks, shares and government bonds which have declined from 72.3 % in 2007 to less than 50% in May 2020 (Sönmez 2020).

During the reign of the JDP, the total foreign debt has increased from 129.6 billion dollars in 2002 to 444.8 billion dollars in 2018, showing a colossal 343.2 % increase. This simply indicates that whatever economic growth the country has achieved is mainly due to external borrowing. The increasing debt also indicates that the economy has not been managed very well to reduce the foreign debt. Commensurate with the rising foreign debts, the interest payments also has increased quite significantly from around 6 billion dollars in 2002 to 13.7 billion dollars in 2018, and the total interest payment between 2002 and 2018 has been 157 billion dollars (Özyıldız 2019). It must be noted that although most of the foreign debt is borrowed by the private sector, they are under the state guarantee and thus in case of default by the private sector the burden belongs to the state.

External borrowing necessitated by the inadequacy of savings and domestic capital formation was maintained together with low foreign currency and high interest rates policy (Özsan, Özsan and Ata 2018). In order to come out of the often recurring economic crises, it has become an inevitable necessity to recourse to further borrowing and debt restructuring. The working class has carried the main burden of the crises due to increasingly skewed income distribution worsened by growth policies dependent on the inflow of foreign capital.

While foreign debt has increased by leaps and bounds, the level of unemployment has kept pace with it, showing an incredible increase from 8.38 % in 2001 to 10.3 in




2003 and to 14.7 in January 2019 (TUIK). In other words, debt driven economy has not been capable of generating sufficient employment in the country (Özdemir 2017). The JDP policy of trying to cheapen imports by having over-valued Turkish Lira to reduce inflation through cheap imported goods and meet the foreign currency requirements through borrowing and attracting hot money has not worked (Koç 2019). By selling public assets to foreign companies through privatisation policies, the JDP governments have been able to find some money for supporting crony capitalism, but there is not much left to sell. The credit card mania and cheap credits to construction sector have generated a debt culture in the country, which has generated serious problems for many people (Koç 2019). Despite having sold almost all income generating state economic enterprises, the JDP has not been able to generate sustainable economic growth in the country. The ever increasing balance of payments problems due to the mismanagement of the resources has led the JDP to increase the number and levels of the taxes, which has been a source of disenchantment (Pamuk 2018).

While the government managed to prevent working class from demanding higher wages through weakening their organisational capacity by legalising flexible and part time work, it at the same managed to keep consumption levels by financialising poor households via the availability of credit cards and bank lending (Güngen, 2018 ; Karaçimen 2016; Marois and Güngen 2018: 150). Financialisation in Turkey was initiated with the liberalisation of the capital account in the 1990s but in the 2000s penetrated into every sphere of the economy including households who were pushed into debts through the proliferation of credit cards (Marois and Güngen 2018: 10; Karaçimen 2016). The market orientation and dependence of the labouring classes and the poor not only helped create a new outlet for the crisis prone neoliberal capitalist financial system but also individualised the survival of the poor.

#### **5.3.1.2.2 Currency Crisis**


One of the best indication of the causes of rationality crisis is the sorry state of the Turkish currency and the Central Bank reserves. Since 2018 the Turkish currency has lost considerable value against all major currencies. The meltdown, which emerged in two bouts in 2018 and 2020, has speeded up unprecedentedly since August 2020. Highly dollarized nature of the economy and its mismanagement are mainly responsible for the currency crisis. Tempted by dollarization the domestic savers increasingly have kept their savings in foreign currency accounts which has exceeded fifty percent of all deposits in recent months, which in turn has contributed to the economy's foreign currency needs (Akyüz 2020). The JDP government has been at pains to stabilise the Turkish Lira, yet recent its attempts to raise interest rates and to deploy Central Bank reserves for stabilising the Turkish currency as well as meeting its foreign debt obligations have not produced the expected results (Akyüz 2020). The following table show the seriousness of the problems as the magnitude of reserve loss is huge, and the Turkish currency has lost about fifty percent of its value against the US dollar in the last two years.

Table 5.3 The Erosion of Turkish Foreign Exchange Reserves



According to Sözcü (2020, 3 November) the Turkish Lira was the worst currency in the world in 2020 in terms of losing its value. As of 3rd November 2020 it lost 30 percent of its value since the beginning of 2020 against major currencies. The dollar rose from 5.95 to 8.54 to the Lira between January and November 2020. The table below shows the average USD –TRY rates and it is clear that since 2017 the Turkish Lira has lost about 88 percent of its value against the USD.

Table 5.4 US Dollar Turkish Lira Average Yearly Rate



Source: netciols.com ( November 2020)

Akyüz (2020) is quite pessimistic about the possibility of economic recovery in the near future and predicts that a debt crisis and default is looming in the future. For him there does not seem to be a possibility of Turkey applying to the IMF for funds in the near future. For an IMF application the possibility of obtaining foreign capital must be almost none. At the moment Turkey has not entirely lost its credibility in international financial markets and it is difficult to foresee at what point international financial markets would entirely dismiss Turkey. For Akyüz (2020) currently international financial markets do not see any default risk that would endanger their assets in Turkey and thus still might continue to lend money to Turkey. However if default possibility emerges then the country might need to apply to the IMF for fresh loans which might arrive with fresh conditionalities imposing austerity measures. Considering that in the past IMF austerity measures had meant further hardship for citizens the possibility of new IMF lending with conditionalities implicating further impoverishment may further contribute to the erosion of the JDP legitimacy.

#### **5.3.1.2.3 Income Distribution**

The table 4.5 shows the trajectory of income distribution in Turkey. It appears that between 2006 and 2019 income distribution has not changed very significantly but it still is very unequal. There are concerns about the reliability of the TUIK figures. Media is full of stories that people cannot make the ends meet. Regardless of this reliability question it is clear from the table 4.5 the poorest 20 percent of population has only 5.1 percent while the richest 20 percent has 49.1 percent of the national income. The situation looks even worse when the 14.9 percent share of the poorest 40 percent is compared with the 70.5 percent share of the top 40 percent of the population.

Table 5.5 Distribution of Annual Equalized Household Disposable Income Quintiles 2006-2019 (Horizontal Percent)

Years	Total	First Quintile	Second Quintile	Third quintile	Fourth Quintile	Fifth Quintile
2006	100	4.1	8.9	14.0	21.5	51.4
2007	100	4.8	8.9	14.4	21.0	50.3
2008	100	4.8	9.4	14.5	21.6	49.8
2009	100	4.5	9.3	14.3	21.0	51.1
2010	100	4.7	9.5	14.5	21.4	49.8
2011	100	4.8	9.5	14.2	21.1	50.1
2012	100	4.8	9.5	14.3	21.3	50.5
2013	100	5.0	9,6	14.5	21.3	49.7
2014	100	5.0	9.7	14.6	21.6	49.1
2015	100	5.0	9.6	14.4	21.3	49.8
2016	100	5.1	9.5	14.3	21.7	50.4
2017	100	5.1	9.4	13.9	21.6	50.9
2018	100	5.1	9.5	14.1	21.6	50.6
2019	100	5.1	9.8	14.6	21.4	49.9

Source: TUIK

According to the European Statistical Office (Eurostat 2018) after Serbia, Turkey has got the second worst income distribution among 34 European countries in 2017. The Eurostat bases its comparison to P80/P20 figures which are calculated by

comparing the incomes of the poorest 20 percent with that of the richest 20 percent of the population. The lower the figure the better the income distribution. In 2017 the average P80/P20 figure was 5.1 while Turkey's score was 8.7 just before the highest 9.4 for Serbia. TUIK had declared P80/P20 figure as 7.5 for 2017, different to the figure provided by the Eurostat for the same year. However considering that the TUIK's figure has increased to 7.8 in 2018 we can assume that income distribution has worsened between 2017 and 2018 in Turkey. According to TUIK figures great majority of people are indebted. The percentage of indebted people had increased from 65.4 percent in 2013 to 71.1 percent in 2019 (TUIK). All these figures are indicative of the rising hardship in the country for the majority of the people.

#### **5.3.1.2.4 JDP's Rationality Crisis**

The JDP's loss of the control of the economy has speeded up since the 2008 world financial crisis and reached a level of a 'rationality crisis' in Habermasian sense. JDP's economic policies have led to sharp movements in interest rates, foreign exchange and inflation and the ensuing crisis generated not only a sharp drop in growth rates but also a huge employment problem which has put the JDP in a very difficult position (Cömert and Yeldan 2019). The fact that the support given to the JDP is in decline in recent years is a reflection of a rationality crisis which emerges when the political administrative system intervenes in the economic system to overcome the economic crisis. When the political administrative system fails to succeed in this attempt, then a rationality crisis emerges in the form of deficiency in state management. What Habermas (1988: 47) calls a rationality crisis refers to the significant negative impacts of the failure of the politico-administrative actions to deliver what is intended. Inevitably an insufficient 'requisite quantity' of rational decision on the part of the JDP has contributed to the erosion of JDP legitimacy.

The JDP came to power by a strong claim that it represented a synthesis of conservatism and liberalism, which would pursue the interests of large segments of society including those of small to medium size enterprises and big businesses. Achieving equity and social justice, religious and ethnic freedoms and alleviating poverty. However, the arguments provided above indicate that conservative liberalism linked to the global system has been far from delivering what it promised to do.

People are well aware of the negative consequences of government's economic, social and political decisions. A recent research conducted by ADAMOR in September 2020 has shown that people are aware of the failings of the JDP. According to ADAMOR Turkey Index September 2020, 67.4 percent of people in Turkey does not trust the Justice System (Milli Gazete 24 September 2020). A survey carried out in 78 provinces by ADAMOR also reveals that 52 percent of the people was unhappy, 46 percent was happy, while 2.4 percent was undeceive about the Presidential system. It was mainly the supporters of the JDP (98.8 percent) and the National Movement Party (89 percent) who were happy about the Presidential system. Those who were not happy with it were mainly the supporters of the opposition parties (Milli Gazete 2020, citing ADAMOR 2020). The following table indicates that a mass loyalty necessary for legitimacy does not exist anymore, as more than 50 percent of people think that many things have worsened in the last ten years.



Table 5.6 Public Opinion about Changes in the Last 10 Years in Turkey

	Improved %	Remained the Same %	Deteriorated %
Democracy	43.3	6.3	50.3
Freedoms	45.4	4.9	49.7
Corruption	54.4	12.6	33
Equality	35.3	9.7	55
Human Rights	39.5	7.9	52.5
Justice	39.6	12.5	56.9
Social Morality	9.7	6.9	83.4
Civil Society and Participation	34.1	16.6	49.2
Meritocracy	25.5	17	57.5
Welfare	40.6	6.2	53.2

Source: ADAMOR (2020)

The observation made by Habermas about the dashing off the collective expectations of many people ending with personal frustrations coupled with the weakening of work ethic have been the case under the JDP rule in Turkey. This has led to weakening of social integration and rationality crisis that feeds legitimization crisis.

### 5.3.1.2.5 Labour and the JDP Promises

One of the aims of the party programme was to resolve the chronic problems that the country had been suffering from. This was going to be achieved through the mobilisation of human capital and physical resources to ensure a productive and growing economy. The transformations that the agricultural and industrial sectors

have experienced during the JDP rule indicate the contrary. Neoliberal agricultural policies of severe reduction of state support for agriculture has forced a large number of farmers to leave agriculture altogether. According to TUIK statistics the number of people employed in agriculture declined by 44 percent from 7.4 million in 2002 to 4.1 million in February 2020. The dissolution of the agrarian structures dominated by small scale commodity producers was speeded up by the internationalisation, liberalisation and financialisation. (Aydın 2010, 2018; Buğra and Keyder 2006). Rural areas are no longer able to provide the safety nets that the urban migrants relied on in times of difficulties. People who had migrated into urban areas mainly have been pushed into the informal sector of the economy as industry is not capable of sufficient employment creation. When this couples with the post-Fordist transformation of the economy, the severity of the situation for labouring classes become quite evident.

The informalisation of the economy has left the working class quite vulnerable in Turkey. The JDP's response to the recurring crisis was to move to a new accumulation regime which necessitated extensive privatisation. Large number of workers shed form the privatised institutions, along with the domestic and foreign migrants, were pushed to accept low payments without any job security. The JDP's labour market reforms, that have encouraged and legalised flexible work, have led to what is called 'flexicurity' labour regime that uses subcontracting to obtain the services of poorly trained, young workers who are ready to accept low pay due to their helplessness and destitution (Özden and Bekmen 2015). The measures to ensure insecuritisation and flexibility of labour were accompanied by strict rules that discouraged unionisation were extremely useful for entrenchment of the JDP's authoritarian rule. The atmosphere of fear and the changing composition of the working class contributed significantly to the creation of a highly docile working class who could not take a collective action (Özden and Bekmen 2015; Doğan 2020).

During the JDP rule, trade union rights have been seriously undermined. With the support of the government, new trade unions close to the JDP have gained ascendancy at the expense of proper trade unions. In disputes between capital and

labour, the government has sided with capital by prohibiting strikes by 200 thousand workers (Özdemir 2020). Another evidence of the government siding with employers is its efforts to legalise insecure work leading to the expansion of subcontracting in employment (DISKAR 2018: 2). According to DISK-AR (Research Unit of the Revolutionary Workers Union) 2018 report on the position of labour during the JDP's reign, the JDP governments have trimmed social security rights, increased pension age and reduced the amount of pensions by introducing new calculation formulas. While income distribution worsened, increases in national income have not been reflected in minimal wage. In direct contradiction to its declarations to reduce the level of unemployment, employment creation has not been on par with the rapidly increasing unemployment rate. Another significant feature of the JDP period is the level of indebtedness of households who have been pulled into the cycle of financialisation through credit cards and easily available banking credits. Through indirect taxes, not only the burden of taxes have been put on the shoulders of consumers, but also the loss of state income from the privatised state economic enterprises have been attempted to be compensated (DISKAR 2018). The state of emergency, declared after the coup attempt by the FETO organisation in 2016, was misused in violation of the right to work by the JDP to expel unlawfully about 140 thousand public employees.

The JDP in power for the last 18 years managed to erode the workers' rights through legal arrangements and politics. The first thing they did was in 2003 to change labour law to ensure insecuritisation and flexibilisation of work. In its early years of power when the JDP failed to end secure employment in public sector through legislation, it used regulations to make it possible the use of contract labour in public sector (DISKAR 2018: 3). Furthermore, with the passing of the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law number 5510 retirement age was increased and pensions were decreased through a new pension calculation formula. It is important to notice that the rate of trade unionisation declined significantly due to JDP's anti-trade union policies (DISKAR 2018: 3-4). The most recent the JDP attack on workers' rights on behalf of capital is the law about severance payments of workers. In November 2020

(during revising this chapter) the omnibus bill attempted to be passed by the government has so many punitive clauses for workers under the age of 25 and above 50. If this law opposed by all trade union confederations and opposition parties passes, many workers would be deprived of their severance payments and in worse scenario of their pensions.

According to 2017 data only 457 thousand trade union workers out of the total 1.546 thousand are able to benefit from collective bargaining (DISK-AR 2018:.7). Despite its promise to enlarge the coverage of trade unionisation and collective bargaining, the JDP has in fact consolidated the existing anti-democratic regulations on trade unionism and collective bargaining by the 2012 Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Law Number 6356. The JDP prevented more than 15 strikes by trade unions using special Decrees in the Power of Law (KHK) during the state of emergency. It used the pretext of national security in many of the strikes most of which were not in national security related sectors (DISK-AR 2018:.8). In the 12 July 2017 meeting of the International Investors Association (YASED), President Erdoğan openly stated that 'now we are instantly intervening in places where there is a threat of a strike. We say no, we will not allow a strike here' (DISK-AR 2018: 9). This statement is a very clear indication of the misuse of the state of emergency on behalf of capital to the detriment of labour.

Table 5.7 The Proportion the Real Minimum Wage to Real GDP (2004 = 100)

Year	Real Minimum Wage Index (2004 = 100)	Real GDP Index (2004=100)	Proportion of Real Minimum Wage/ Real GDP (%)
2004	100	100	100.1
2005	99	109	91.3
2006	99	117	84.5
2007	100	123	81.8
2008	100	124	80.5
2009	101	118	86.0
2010	104	128	81.7
2011	104	142	73.3
2012	110	149	74.1
2013	112	161	69.1
2014	114	170	67.4
2015	118	180	65.7
2016	141	186	75.7
2017	136	195	69.5

Source: DISK-AR (2018) Table 3 P.10

It is clear from the table above that minimum wage had increased by 36 percent between 2004 and 2017 while national income had increased by 95 percent in the same period. It is evident that during this period minimum wage in reality had declined by 30.5 percent compared with the national income. Given the dollarization of the economy, it is pertinent to try and see the amount of erosion in the purchasing power of the minimum wage. At the time of the 2008 crisis the minimum wage of 503, 26 TL was equal to 409.15 dollars (1 dollar = 1.23 TL.). At the time of writing this chapter (7th of August 2020) US dollar had hit a record of 7.37 TL. A minimum wage earner with 2324.7 TL in 2020 could only get 315.4 dollars. In other words minimum wage has lost around 33 percent of its value in US dollars. In other words,

the JDP has not been able to keep its promise of increasing the standards of living for the working classes.

In February 2019 about one month before the local elections the JDP opened cheap vegetables and fruits markets in many cities, particularly in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara. The move came as a reaction to rising food prices by about 31 percent in January 2019 triggered by 30 percent loss of the value of Turkish Lira against the US dollar in 2018 (Fresh Plaza 2019, 14 Feb). The opening of the cheap food markets which caused huge queues was considered to be an election investment. The scheme did not produce the expected results in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir where the JDP lost the metropolitan municipalities to the opposition party, the Republican People's Party in March 2019. Despite using all state resources and the media JDP's loss of many big city municipalities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Mersin, Antalya, Ardahan, Artvin, Bolu and Kırşehir in the 2019 local elections is a significant indication of legitimacy erosion.

Employment creation was another important promise of the JDP when they came to power. In recent years, by using the TUIK figures, the JDP has underplayed the significance of unemployment levels in Turkey. DISK challenges the reliability of unemployment figure calculated by TUIK (DISKAR 2018).

Table 5.8 Unemployment Figures During the JDP

Year	Work Force (in thousands)	No of Unemployed	Rate of Unemployment
2002	23 818	2 644	10.3
2003	23 818	2 493	10.5
2004	22 016	2 385	10.8
2005	22 454	2 388	10.6
2006	22 751	2 328	10.2
2007	23 114	2 377	10.3
2008	23 805	2 611	11.0
2009	24 738	3 471	14.0
2010	25 461	3 046	11.9
2011	26 725	2 615	9.8
2012	24 821	2 518	9.2
2013	25 524	2 747	9.7
2014	28 786	2 583	9.9
2015	29 678	3 057	10.3
2016	30 535	3 330	10.9
2017	31 643	3 454	10.9
2018	32 724	3 537	11.0
2019	33 006	4 566	13.8
2020 (September)	31 724	4 016	12.7

Source: TUIK

During the JDP reign unemployment rates have remained more or less steady around 10.5 percent despite some fluctuations 9.2 percent and 14 percent. There are serious reservations about the accuracy of TUIK figures (DISKAR 2018, 2020). The declaration by TUIK in 2020 that the rate of unemployment declined from 13.8 to 12.7 percent between 2019 and 2020 September seems to be highly problematic. When the figures about the number of workforce for 2019 and 2020 are compared a serious paradox becomes apparent. According to TUIK figures the work force has declined from 33.006 million to 31.724 million between 2019 and 2020. In other words there is a loss of 1.252 million jobs. If that is the case the how come the rate of unemployment drops from 13.8 to 12.7 percent. This paradox arises from the deliberate way TUIK considers unemployment in order to give a good impression.

DISK explains how this distortion is achieved by TUIK who uses a restricted definition of unemployment which does not reflect the reality. Instead of changing the question set used in the Household Survey using the ILO definition of unemployment, TUIK considers only those who had been actively seeking a job in the last four weeks as unemployed. Those who had been unemployed and lost any hope of finding employment and thus not actively seeking a job and those are ready for work but had not been registered with the unemployment office are not taken into consideration by TUIK. Likewise people part-time, seasonal and casual workers are also excluded from the unemployment statistics. DISKAR made a calculation by using the ILO definition of unemployment for 2017 to highlight the problematic nature of the TUIK's unemployment figures.

Table 5.9 The Number of Unemployed According to Revised ILO Comprehensive Criteria

Years	2014	2015	2016	2017
Unemployed in terms of restricted definition	2,853	3,057	3,330	3,454
Unemployed without hope	615	676	658	637
Not looking for job but ready to work	1,762	1,726	1,762	1,627
Part time and casual work	608	477	462	420
Seasonal work	94	94	89	85
Total	5,932	6,030	6,301	6,223

Source: DISK-AR (2018)

DISK-AR used the ILO's revised comprehensive definition (referred as labour underutilisation) and arrived at a totally different and more realistic unemployment figures between 2014 and 2017. Accordingly, while the number of unemployed was 3,454 thousand using the official restricted definition, this number increases to 6,233 thousand using the ILO's revised comprehensive definition of unemployment



(DISK-AR 2018). In other words the figures provided by the TUIK are highly misleading.

### **5.3.1.3 Corruption**

JDP was quite adamant in its party programme that politics would be free from rent-seeking, the party would treat all citizens equally, and any member of parliament would declare their wealth publicly when elected. In all these counts the JDP has failed on its promises. For instance, through legislation in 2004 the JDP has managed to use TOKI, originally established in 1984 to provide social housing for low and medium income people, as a mechanism of rent distribution as well as building political support and legitimacy. The project that was put into action under then TOKI law No.5162/2 transformed shanty town areas into luxurious houses and services in cooperation with the private sector (Lord 2018: 263) and the contracts were given to the JDP supporters. In January 2004 TOKI's administration was passed to the jurisdiction of the Prime Ministry. In preparation to allow TOKI to control vast amount of urban land for its projects, in December 2004 the administration of the Urban Land Office, which controlled 65.5 million square meters of land, was passed to the authority of TOKI (Çeviker Gürakar 2016: 95-6). Having had a huge amount of land at its disposal, TOKI cooperated with the private sector by establishing joint projects. TOKI was given almost a free hand in its operations as it was exempted from land tax, allowed to produce urban transformation projects, to establish profit oriented subsidiary firms in cooperation with the private sector (Çeviker Gürakar 2016).

The auditing laws were changed with the introduction of the Law on Court of Accounts (Law No. 6085) in 2010, which enabled TOKI to escape from any auditing which is the case for all other uses of public resources (Çeviker Gürakar 2016). TOKI's freedom from the restrictions of the Public Procurement Law enabled the JDP's freedom to use TOKI not only as a tool of legitimacy building activities but also for crony capitalism.

Erdoğan's ambition to become an extremely powerful executive president became reality after his election as the president in 2018 that allowed him to put into action the 16 April 2017 constitutional amendments accepted by a referendum. The most significant article of the new constitution is that it allows the elected president to be a member of a political party (by implication the president does not have to be neutral). The constitution also allows a person to be elected as a president for two five years term. (Lord 2018: 280). The article 105 of the constitution makes president's accountability very difficult. The impeachment of the president became conditional upon at least 51 percent of parliamentary votes and approval of the two-third of the Constitutional Court members has made it very difficult to hold the president responsible for his actions. Considering that 80 percent of the members of the Constitutional Court are appointed directly by the president, holding him responsible for his actions through investigations is very difficult.

Public procurement is another important area the JDP has used to build its political support. The Public Procurement Law (PPL Law No.4734)), passed in 2003 with the encouragement of the EU, IMF and the WB and amended more than 150 times to increase the sphere of political influence by the JDP, has been amenable to corruption and favouritism (Çeviker Gürakar 2016: 1). Designed to promote small and medium size enterprises in the efforts to industrialise the PPL in Turkey has been a strong instrument to solidify the relations between the state and private capital to such an extent that the term 'crony capitalism' has been used for these transactions. PPL was introduced by the state as a part of the political conditionality to improve the institutional structure of the society. Contrary to the expectations to end rent-seeking and favourable distribution of public funds, the PPL has led to increasing favouritism (Çeviker Gürakar 2016: 4).

The JDP bowed to the wishes of its Anatolian business clientele who were keen to replace the pre-2002 business circles as the main recipients of rents distributed by the state. The extensive networks developed by this class has generated mutual interest between them. The ways in which the people who are in the higher echelons of the JDP have been engaged in establishing networks and personal ties with

economic power holders, using the state power to enrich themselves, and thus becoming a constitutive part of the economic power elite, have been vital for the JDP to remain in power such a long time. They have used the state power to build bridges that would ensure similarities between the state ideology and the social and economic elites. They have used every means to acquiesce the subordinate classes for the maintenance and stability of the existing class structures. Behind the erosion of regulations, judicial system and transparent politics is largely the extensive state-business relations that have taken a particular tone and direction in the JDP era (Çeviker Gürakar 2016: 5-6). Islamic business associations like MÜSİAD, TUSKON, ASKON, and TÜMSİAD, which developed in the 1990s, thrived during the JDP era in which they could influence politics through the parliamentary seats the JDP allowed them to have. By becoming members of the local JDP administration and acting actively in local politics, many of the members of the Islamic business associations were able to develop strong ties with the party that could be utilised in rent distribution. Çeviker Gürakar (2016: 8) Analysed a data set of 49,355 high value public procurement contracts to test whether or not 'politically connected/affiliated firms obtain rents in the form of preferential procurement. By looking at the contracts received by the members 'of four national business associations and two business confederations (TURKONFED and TUSKON) representing around 400 other local or sectoral business associations', the author concludes that the JDP has widely used its political incumbency to politicise tenders to favour its supporters in the distribution of state resources (Çeviker Gürakar (2016: 67-106). The case of Çakırtaş family is a case in point. The management of six business enterprises within the city hospitals in Başakşehir, Elazığ ve Bursa were given for ten years to Göksal Çakırtaş, the brother of Mehmet Çakırtaş - the private secretary of the Minister of Health. Most favoured companies are construction companies politically affiliated to the JDP as construction has been the motor force for economic growth during the JDP's reign. With 150 billion US dollars' worth state tenders Makyol, Kalyon, Cengiz İnşaat, and Limak construction firms are amongst the highest number of state tenders obtaining firms in the world known for

their close connections with the JDP the amount of state procurement money is bigger than Turkey's 2020 budget spending (Bianet 2020, 7 September). These five politically connected firms have received 24 percent of the total 330.5 billion TL worth state procurement tenders in the last five years (Anka Haber 2020 27 September). The JDP's has not hesitated to misuse state resources to enrich the firms politically allied to them. A case in point is the case of Çalık Holding. The JDP government asked two state banks, Halkbank and Vakıfbank, to lend 750 million US dollars to Çalık Holding for buying Sabah-ATV media group (Çeviker Gürakar 2018: 77).

Corruption has always existed in governments in Turkey in varying degrees. As opposed to previous periods, during the JDP time corruption has become systematic rather than being an individual affair. The loyal business class with which the JDP established dependency relationships were mainly amongst devout Muslims (Çeviker Gürakar 2016:107-108). The level of corruption within the state has increased quite considerably in recent years. Embezzling state funds and using the legislative and judiciary to enhance economic and political power of party members or supporters has become quite common.

Corruption which has become quite chronic in Turkey during the last ten year of the JDP reign has led to the loss of faith in the politico-administrative system. The cohesive social integration built in the first decade of the JDP regime is no longer sustainable as their previous discourse on civil rights, democracy and the rule of law has gradually been made meaningless by the rise of nepotism, cronyism, corruption and authoritarianism.

### **5.3.2 Socio-cultural sub-system**

In this section we will look at how the decisions made by politico-administrative system has had an impact of motivation crisis in society. Habermas argues that deliberate efforts of the state to change the normative structures of society (the

notions of what is correct and appropriate) may not always be accepted by everybody. He specifically refers to living standards, education, freedom, equity and so on and maintains that if and when people start being dissatisfied with what is delivered by the politico-administrative system, a motivation crisis tendency emerges in society. When this leads to the withdrawal of support for the power holders, a legitimization crisis may emerge.

This is what has been happening with the JDP legitimacy. Its rule has not been able to deliver the requisite quantities of what people expected. Apart from a rigid supporter group there is a tendency among people that the JDP has not been able to achieve what it had promised. Big claims that Turkey was going to be the 10th biggest economy has not materialised. Strong Ottomanist discourse has not been able to unify the countries previously under the Ottoman rule. In fact countries like Greece, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Syria have openly challenged the JPP's imperial Ottomanist ambitions.

The point made by Habermas about the failure of state's efforts to run the economy leading to a legitimization deficit is very helpful in the analysis of the legitimization crisis in Turkey. Habermas argues that the state makes conscious manipulation efforts to 'compensate for legitimization deficit' created by its administrative decisions (Habermas 1988: 71).

His contention about the state's deliberate attempt to change the system of education for the purpose of generating new boundary conditions for the maintenance of the political system is directly applicable to the JDP's policies of Islamisation of education. Habermas' idea that the educational planning used for the purpose of consensus and motivation formation may generate unintended consequences (Habermas 1988: 71-20) is very clear in the case of the JDP's project of the Islamisation of the curriculum. A substantial proportion of the society have been against the JDP's Islamic education project (Özdalga 2018). Özdalga's work highlights what Habermas (1988:72) calls as the 'threshold of acceptability' of the manipulations made by administrative planning to change the socio-cultural system.

Not all people in Turkey have accepted willingly the transformative changes to the 'deep-seated' secularist norms and values and protested by not accepting and participating in the JDP's normative impositions. Nothing could be more apt for the JDP's Islamisation of the education project than what Habermas stated: the more planners place themselves under the pressure of consensus-formation in the planning process, the more likely is a strain that goes back to the contrary motives' (Habermas 1988: 72). The JDP has faced, in the words of Habermas, some 'unintended consequences' of its decisions taking in its administrative planning. The JDP's administrative decisions to Islamise society has been welcomed by a section of society but at the same time it has generated strong reactions from the secularists who have considered the JDP policies as an attack on private domain. In parallel to Habermas, the secularists in Turkey have considered the JDP's 'ideology planning' as action aiming to undermine society's existing cultural tradition, or What Habermas call as peoples' 'life-world'.

The strength of the reactions to the decisions of the politico-administrative system is an indication of legitimation difficulties which may or may not lead to a legitimation crisis. Social integration in a society depends on what signs socio-cultural sub-system sends to the political system. These signs in turn supply motivation to the political system 'in the form of legitimation' (Habermas 1988: 48). For Habermas legitimation crisis is 'based on a motivation crisis' (Habermas 1988: 75). When the normative bases of society loses its meaning for people legitimation crisis appears as its manifestation. This point made by Habermas fits well with the explanation of the JDP's eradication of mass support.

The combined impacts of the JDP authoritarianism, the 2018 and the 2020 currency crises and the ensuing serious economic downturn contributed to the emergence of a motivation crisis leading to a process of gradual weakening of party's political support. The loss of the mayors of the three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in the 2019 local elections provides us with strong evidence about the erosion of the JDP legitimacy.

The loss of motivation to support the political power holders, in other words dwindling ‘mass loyalty’, is a criterion for the existence of a legitimization crisis. Social movements in the form of protests and rallies are indicative of strong disagreement with the decisions of the politico-administrative system generating a rationality crisis tendency which finds expression in socio-cultural system in the form of motivation crisis tendency. The following section provides some examples of motivation crisis tendency in the socio-cultural system.

### **5.3.2.1 Protest as an Expression of Motivation Crisis Tendency**

Although the early reactions of some sections of society remained ineffective, like the ones in Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republic Rallies) in 2007 the justification provided for those meeting were indicative enough of emerging disenchantments with the JDP rule. Professor Necla Arat, the head of the meeting organising committee declared the aim of the meetings as to stop reactionary, religious and racist fascism, to protect full independence of Turkey against imperialism (Milliyet 24 Nisan 2007

With increasing economic difficulties the JDP’s tendency to resort to oppression and moving away from the main tenets of the Republic led to the revival of Cumhuriyet Mitingleri, with the same aims of those of the 2007 meetings, in 2012 in Ankara. The government called the rally, attended by fifty thousand people despite a government banning order, as a provocation by radical groups and used force and pepper gas to disperse the people (GazeteA24 29 October 2012).

The increasing economic, political and social problems emerging from the JDP policies have been matched with an increasing protest actions in the last decade. The TEKEL resistance of the 2009-2010 is one of the earlier examples of people’s reaction to JDP policies.

The TEKEL resistance which took various forms ranging from late start to work, long distance rallies from cities like Adana, Diyarbakir, Malatya and Samsun to full-

blown strikes by trade unions was the consequence of 8,247 of 10,818 TEKEL workers being made redundant by the British American Tobacco Company which bought the state owned cigarette factories in Adana, Balıca, Bitlis, Malatya, Samsun and Tokat ([www.tekeldirenisi.org](http://www.tekeldirenisi.org)). The JDP's decision to transfer these workers to 4/C category rather than transferring them to other state enterprises as had been the case previously triggered the resistance. The 4/C category refers to temporary workers who can only be employed for maximum ten months only. Such category workers do not have either job security or a pension scheme. Furthermore, according to this arrangement the workers would only get 630 TL instead of around 1200 TL they would have had if they had not been made redundant.

Yalman and Topal (2017) argue that despite its class nature the TEKEL resistance has not been able to make an effective influence in challenging the JDP hegemony. The restrictive labour laws inherited from the military regime and strengthened by the JDP have been very powerful to prevent the working class to unify and pursue their class interest more strongly. Yalman and Topal arrive at a diametrically opposed optimistic view expressed by Özügür (2011) that precariousness promoted by the JDP labour policies might have a serious potential to unify the working class against hegemony.

However regardless of its ineffectiveness to unify the working class the TEKEL resistance has been an important stepping stone in the building of oppositional activities that have contributed to the erosion of the JDP legitimacy. The Akkuyu protests that have been continuing since 2011 is one of those activities representing opposition to JDP policies and thus a Habermasian rationality crisis.

The 17th April 2011 protest against the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power formed a 159 kms long human chains starting from 30 different points (Evrensel Gazete 17 April 2011). The sitting protests organised in Artvin Cerratepe which started on 21 June 2015 to prevent mining activities in a prime forest area was raided by the police and the military on 16 February 2016. They ended the 250 days long



picketing by the people and allowed Cengiz Holding's construction machinery to destroy a forest area for copper mining (Sol Gazete 16 February 2016).

One of the most important protest activity has been the Occupy Gezi Park movement as it has not only exposed the JDP's intolerance to any opposition but also has awoken many people that the state's anti-democratic activities should be resisted. The brutal treatment of a small number of environmentalist protestors by the police on 28 May 2013 gradually turned into a massive social justice movement throughout the country. The fact that two and a half million people in 79 provinces had participated in Gezi Park Protests in 2013 (Onedio 31 May 2016) was an important indication of erosion of legitimacy for the government. The Gezi Park protests were sparked by the JDP government's attempt to pull down Gezi Park and built Topçu Barracks as part of an urban development project. The harsh treatment of the protesters by the police and insulting behaviour of the Prime Minister Erdoğan (calling protestors as a bunch of looters – çapulcular) had led to the escalation of the protest movement country wide (except Bingöl and Bayburt). In the events, eight civilians and two policemen lost their lives, 8,163 people got injured and 3000 people were arrested (Radikal 11 March 2014). The ruthless attitude of the police force was exemplified by the use of 150,000 chemical gas bombs including OC, CS and CR gasses (Sözcü 14 June and 12 November 2013). The police brutality and the use of disproportional force were internationally condemned. Those who criticised the oppressive brutal measures included the USA, European Commission, European Parliament, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, United Nations and the Amnesty International (Hürriyet 25 April 2014).

The sudden eruption of Gezi Protests should not be interpreted as something happening haphazardly. Authors like Dedeoğlu and Aksakal (2015) and Unsar (2015) contend that neo-liberal, Islamist and authoritarian policies of the JDP were the primary precursors of the Gezi protests. The fact that Gezi Park Movement emerged spontaneously as a reaction to the JDP's decision to destroy the trees for building a shopping mall in the park is indicative of people's disenchantments with the JDP policies. The reality that the people who participated in the 'Occupy Gezi

Park Movement' came from all categories of the population is reflective of the erosion of the JDP's 'mass loyalty'. The building of a shopping mall in Gezi Park would have ruined one of the remaining few green areas at the heart of Istanbul. Homeless people, migrant children, elderly people and the public as a whole use Gezi Park as a recreational area. The attempt by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality to cut down the centenarian trees in the park was a contempt of a court decision that ruled the suspension the construction project until a final decision was made (Aksümer and Ezme 2015). The harshness of the state's reaction to Gezi Movement has to be seen in terms of the government's serious worries that it has not been able to satisfy people's demands. The spontaneity of the Gezi Protests and the nature of the participants reveal that the movement was not simply the result of an environmental concern but of a more comprehensive social dissatisfaction with the JDP's Islamisation, Ottomanization and crony capitalism that have been accompanied by authoritarianisation and polarisation.

The protests against HES are also indications of disenchantment with the JDP regime. The fact that HES' are conducive to the loss of people's sources of livelihoods is a good justification for the emergence of organisations like The Black Sea Rebels (Karadeniz İsyandadır). In the last decade many HES protests have taken place in places like Tokat Zile, Rize İkizdere, and Adıyaman Yaylakonak (Göztepe 2018). Muğla-Yuvarlakçay, Kastamonu-Cide Loç Valley, Erzurum Aksu Valley HES protests and Hopa protest against Sinop-Gerze Thermal Plant are other significant protests by local people for the defence of their environments and sources of livelihoods (Erensü 2013). In the last few years HES protests became quite widespread in places like Antalya Gazipaşa, Ordu, Osmaniye, Giresun, Artvin and Bursa where dams are built.

The 15th July 2016 coup attempt is also another important indicator of the erosion of the JDP legitimacy. The suppressed coup attempt organised by the supporters of Gülenist army officers clearly show a strong cleavage between the JDP and one of its strongest supporter groups in earlier periods. Whatever may be the reason for this confrontation between the JDP regime and the Gülenists we could easily claim that

the JDP legitimacy received a setback from the coup attempt. Since Gezi protests, people have been much more vociferous about defending their socio-economic rights and resisting government actions all over the country. The protests by local people in many places including Artvin, Ordu, Giresun and Bursa the building of dams and hydroelectric power plants, urban transformation projects in poor neighbourhoods, construction of the third Bosphorus Bridge and Canal Istanbul Project, violence towards women and discrimination against LGBTI members are all different forms of social reactions indicative of the erosion of mass loyalty for the JDP government.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

As a conclusion to this chapter, we can safely argue that in its 18 years of rule the JDP has failed to deliver the requisite quantities and has been losing its support base. By the implementation of ‘neoliberalism a la Turkey’, the party has simply brought the economy to the verge of a breakdown. We have called the JDP’s experience of capitalism as neo-liberalism a la Turkey for the reason that the state has been extremely interventionist in the last decade. The JDP needed the global financial system for its own development, yet it has not been able to maintain a crisis free economy. As an Islamic party, the JDP right from the beginning wanted to use the global system for its own flourishing. This has meant the consolidation of financialisation and Turkey’s over-dependence on the global financial system. The fragility generated by this dependence has made the country quite vulnerable to the fluctuations in the global economic system. In the crisis atmosphere of the world capitalist system, the JDP has considerably diverted from the main principles of neo-liberalism by strongly interfering in the so-called free market. In order to regulate severe inequalities generated by its own policies and ensure its own reproduction, the JDP has used the state power constantly. A particular fraction of capital represented by MUSIAD has been favoured in recent years for the reproduction of a crony capitalism. Now there is a state cantered economy in which the state actors are

shaping the market for the interest of a particular group of people faithful to the JDP (Öniş 2019).

Another unmet promise is about democracy and democratisation. Let alone consolidating democracy, the party has simply created an authoritarian liberalism and a single party system. Human rights violations, increasing inequalities, extreme inequalities, rampant poverty, nepotism and corruption have become the main characteristics of the JDP rule which has generated mistrust and hopelessness among some sections of society. Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV) published a report in May 2020 entitled Turkey's Youth Report (SODEV 2020) which emphasized the fact that the youth in Turkey is longing for freedom, freedom of speech, justice and meritocracy. It is striking that 70.3 percent of the young people interviewed believed that people with strong connections would eliminate a talented and competent individual in obtaining a job. 32 percent of the interviewed were unemployed and not students. 61.7 percent of the respondent were students and 19 percent employed. While 10.7 percent was actively looking for a job, 7.3 percent had lost any hope of finding any employment and thus not looking for a job. It is rather saddening that 62.5 percent of the young people would want to move abroad and continue their lives there if possible. If a very high percentage of country's young people cannot identify themselves with their own country, there is a serious problem there.

Furthermore, by attempting to create an Islamic and Ottomanist culture, the JDP has attempted to transform societal norms and boundary conditions. While such an ideological orientation has been fairly effective for a long time in terms of political support for the party, the face to face, house visiting methods of network building have raised the expectations of the JDP clients as well as creating disenchantment among the non JDP supporters. This has been mainly for two reasons: the Islamist inflexible normative structures pushed by the JDP regime have not appealed to the secularist section of society and the resentment created by discriminative distribution of state resources has intensified the cleavages in society. Likewise, the severity of the current economic crisis has rendered the rewards distributed to the poorer sections of society by the JDP quite ineffective to maintain an acceptable standard

of living. This may have also led to the erosion of support for the JDP by some of its clientele.

The analysis provided so far show the existence of huge discrepancies between what has been promised at the beginning of the JDP and what has been achieved now. The discrepancies generated by the decisions of the power holders inevitably produce some form of societal disintegration. The main discrepancies between what the JDP promised and what it delivered in terms of Habermasian requisite quantities can be summarised as follows: It promised economic stability but delivered economic crisis, debt-based, consumption and construction led growth and clientalism. It promised to eliminate inequalities generated by their pre-descendants. What the JDP delivered was benefits mainly to its main supporters and further weakening of the working classes. They ignored the universalist social welfarism, instead followed a system of rewarding politically close categories of people. The party promised fundamental human rights and freedom but instead established an authoritarian system subservient to the needs of supporters and a well-established conservative elite supporting the JDP. It promised to speed up democratisation by improving the relations with the EU. What they delivered was marginalisation of the military and the judiciary in public affairs and a serious shift away from the EU. These indicators constitute the objective criteria of legitimacy tendency.

Table 5.10 Promises and Discrepancies

Promises	Discrepancies
Economic stability, consumption	Economic crisis, debt-based and construction led growth, clientelism
Elimination of inequalities	Welfare and economic benefits to supporters, exacerbation of inequalities, discrimination, cleavages
Universal welfarism	Particularistic welfarism rewarding supporters through charity like schemes
Fundamental human rights, individual freedoms, press freedom and freedom for opposition	Authoritarian system subservient to JDP supporters and conservative elite, monopolisation of media, censorship, suppression of opposition
Democratisation, rule of law, improved EU relations	Marginalisation of judiciary, executive and military, constitutional violations, worsened EU relations

However, according to Habermas, for the emergency of legitimation crisis what is crucial is people's awareness and personal interpretation of it. The dialectical relationship between subjective and objective aspects of the crisis is vital for the emergence of the legitimation crisis (Habermas 1988: 2-3). The intensity and robustness of the objective indicators have to be more effective than the people's vested interests in the system to withdraw their support for the political authority. In the mass loyalty of the JDP, both its 'ideology building' and more importantly the material benefits it has provided for the supporters have played a vital role.

In its attempts to diffuse mass loyalty, the JDP has avoided political participation, but has established a system of loyalty based on rewards distributed by the state. Appointments to state posts and getting lucrative state tenders have been all part and parcel of the process of the legitimacy building activities of the JDP. The expense of the JDP's legitimacy building has not been very sustainable throughout its rule due to the nature of its economic policies outlined in the previous chapters. Discriminate use of state resources, abandonment of meritocracy and unequal treatment of non - JDP supporters have generated huge resentment of those people who have been marginalised by the system. The observation made by Habermas about the dashing

off the collective expectations of many people ending with personal frustrations coupled with the weakening of work ethic have been the case under the JDP rule in Turkey. This has led to weakening of social integration and socio-cultural crisis that feeds the legitimation crisis.

What we have presented in this chapter confirms Habermas' conviction that the existence of an economic crisis may threaten society's capacity to consider itself as a unified and coherent entity. This seems to be the case in Turkey in the last few years, as there are a number of cleavages that has eroded the unity of the country. Bermek (2019) provides a structural analysis of cleavages in Turkey and shows how the JDP policies have intensified cleavages in Turkey along the secularist - Islamist, Turkish -Kurdish and Sunni - Alevite lines. In other words, instead of ensuring societal integration the JDP's failures in economic and politico-administrative sub-systems have triggered a motivation crisis in the socio-cultural system.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The main concern of this work has been to analyse critically the question of how and why the JDP has come to power and maintained it for a long time. Considering the evidence that in recent years the JDP hegemony is dwindling the thesis aimed to explain the main determinants of the weakening of the JDP power. The main purpose of the thesis has been first to discover and highlight the economic, social and political processes the JDP has used in forming its long-term legitimacy. The second has been research problem linked to the first one tackled in the thesis question of what factors have become effective in the erosion of the long-established JDP legitimacy. Taking into consideration that the JDP came to power at a particular point of Turkey's further integration into the global system, the thesis aimed at situating the JDP's rise within the context of neoliberalism. This necessitated to gain an insight into the relationships between the saga of Turkey, the JDP policies and the 2008 financial crisis and its long-lasting effects.

The thesis contends that Habermas' theoretical approach to legitimation crisis provides a good analytical tool in understanding the erosion of the JDP legitimacy. By applying Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis to explain the rise and erosion of the JDP legitimacy the thesis goes beyond the general belief that Habermas' legitimation crisis theory was only applicable to advanced industrial societies. Although there has been few attempts such as Jacobson and Storey (2004), Tond- Dao (2001) and Reyes (2010) to apply some elements of Habermas' work to developing countries, the analysis has mainly been partial as none of them had used Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis in its totality. This thesis attempted to go beyond this and used the legitimation crisis theory to contribute to the understanding of the saga of the Turkish socio-economic development since the 1980s. In previous



chapters we saw that Habermas uses a variety of criteria for the existence of legitimation crisis. The first criterion he proposes is the use of oppressive measures by the state. The second criterion he uses is the gradual loss of mass loyalty due to disenchantment with the state policies. Such policies may generate a social integration crisis which would show itself in the forms of socio-economic inequalities and declining standards of living. For Habermas the supremacy of the rule of law and the abidance to the law by the rulers is another main feature of legitimacy. The process of authoritarianisation is a powerful indicator of legitimacy. By linking the JDP experience to the ideas of Habermas that capitalism has strong tendencies to face economic, rationality, legitimation and motivation crises, we have attempted to show that the JDP has not been able to produce requisite quantities of consumable values, rational decision and motivation actions. The way the JDP rule has managed the economy coupled with the world economic crisis since 2008 has generated conditions for the emergence of legitimation crisis. Habermas' contention that a rationality crisis, which emerges as a consequence of inappropriate economic policies, may lead to a legitimacy crisis is quite evident in Turkey. The criteria he uses to explain the rise of rationality crisis is the inability of the state to resolve the economic crisis. The evidence we provided in previous chapters clearly shows that the 2008 crisis initially has had a minimal impact on Turkey which showed high economic growth in 2010 and 2011, then increasingly become intensified and reached a disastrous levels in recent years leading to an overall crisis in society.

The JDP rhetoric from its establishment onwards and the reality have differed so significantly that since 2013 the party has not been able to reproduce a strong legitimacy for its survival. The party and its leader Erdoğan have been using every means available to them to remain in power. In Gramscian (Gramsci 1971) and Poulantzian (Poulantzas 1973, 1975, 1978) sense the dominant class or the power block in control of the state in Turkey has used all its instruments to ensure the consent of subaltern classes by creating some form of false-consciousness. What is crucial here is the fact that as long as subordinate classes believe that power holders are pursuing everyone's interest there appears hegemony. Manipulation of society's

value system is crucial in persuading the subordinate classes to believe the universality of the views of the dominant classes. The maintenance and continuity of what Gramsci calls as 'common sense' and Habermas calls 'moral identity' has been very vital for the dominant class who has attempted to establish a cultural hegemony as an important source of legitimacy. Cultural hegemony differs from authoritarianism in that, here the subordinate classes also believe and defend what the powerholders present as a common sense. For Habermas the state achieve this by interfering into the 'lifeworld' of people. By creating a new moral identity which guide subordinate classes to act in a way that may not be compatible with their own class interests, but also may not be aware of this detrimental impact. This has been the case with the Anatolian businesses within which the working class has been persuaded to work under the conditions of flexible specialisation. The severe exploitative nature of this system has not been challenged by the workers who have been led to believe that they share the same culture and interest with the employers. The use of cliental and communal ties had worked very well in preventing the working classes to gain class consciousness as the state used its tremendous powers to instil false consciousness in the minds of the majority of people. What Habermas calls the creation of 'meaning' (ideological planning) has a function of ensuring the perception of the values of the dominant classes by the majority as their own societal values. The JDP managed this for a long time, but the severity of the current crisis has eroded the power of cultural elements such as Islamism and Ottomanism. As shown in chapter five when the consent starts to dwindle, then the legitimacy gained from it starts to shy away leading to the erosion of 'mass loyalty' which the JDP's managed to maintain some form of until recently.

The inability of the JDP to find solutions to fiscal and monetary problems, its intolerance to any opposition, highlighted in the Gezi Protests in 2013, have led it increasingly to resort to authoritarian policies, rather than just using the its hegemony through what Habermas calls as the 'ideology planning'. There is no longer a strong consensus on the legality of the JDP rule as the majority of the ruled do not have faith in the way the JDP has been using its authority. Despite the fact the power of

the JDP rests upon legal elections, in recent years the way it has used its power has corroded people's faith in the system. Recent public opinion polls have indicated that the ruled is no longer ready to offer their compliance voluntarily. The JDP's use of threats, persecutions, oppressions, bans, punishments, censorships etc. have not been sufficient to prevent snowballing opposition to the JDP regime. The JDP's strong conviction to ensure obedience through the use of oppression is a clear indication of legitimacy crisis in Habermasian sense. Likewise the use of oppression is a strong indication of the failure of the JDP project to create a new 'moral identity'. The moral identity that the JDP has strived hard to construct through its notions of Islamism, Ottomanism, equity, social justice etc. does not have the power of cohesiveness and persuasiveness any more. The long lasting JDP rule has gradually undermined the cultural attitudes that had contributed significantly for its legitimacy. What Habermas calls as 'shared meaning' that ensures social integration no longer fully exists today in Turkey.

The JDP's attempt to engrain Islamism and Ottomanism is a good example of what Habermas (1988) calls as the manipulation of the cultural system which creates new boundary conditions to serve its own needs of maintaining its rule. However, it is clear from the previous chapters that, despite the use of the ideological tools of Islam and Ottomanism to construct a set of shared values and cultural attitudes (moral identity), the JDP regime has not been able to keep its promises of equity, justice and welfare. This in turn has had implications about people's 'mass loyalty'. The JDP's attempts to develop myths about Turkey's global power, the strength of the president to be a world leader who would be capable of bringing prosperity to everyone and the Ottomanism and Islamic community spirit ensuring a harmonious and integrated society, have not been able to maintain strong belief in by people about its legitimacy.. The myth building activity of the JDP by using the government officials and facilities, the media, public relations activities and marketing is no longer capable of influencing people's perceptions.

The rising prices, increasing taxes, high levels of unemployment, lack of personal freedom, freedom of speech, erosion of labour rights etc. in the country have

generated a certain level of disenchantment with the regime. The attempts by the regime to divert attention to other issues like the question of ‘survival’ (beka sorunu), news of discovery of natural gas and to generate imagined enemies like the Kurds in Syria and Iraq have not been able to maintain a full support for the regime. Since 2008, the JDP has simply lost the control of the economy, which in turn has caused what Habermas calls a ‘rationality crisis’. The impact of the 2008 global financial crisis was not felt very severely in Turkey in those years. However, the relative strength of the economy started to dwindle from 2012 and economic growth declined by 3.4 percent on average between 2012 and 2016 (Akçay 2018: 20)

The measures taken by JDP administration to overcome the economic crisis are the main reason to call them as the bricks of the rationality crisis. Oppressive measures used by the JDP regime to quieten the populace in general and any opposition in particular has exacerbated the rationality crisis to such extent that a ‘legitimation crisis tendency’ has emerged. As a consequence, many people have lost trust and withdrawn their support from the regime as indicated by the recent public opinion polls referred to above. This is a strong indication of Habermasian legitimation crisis. The populace is no longer ready to provide full support for the political and administrative system. The disequilibrium which has emerged between the economic and socio-cultural systems has generated a rationality crisis which has ‘converted into withdrawal of legitimation by way of a disorganization of the state apparatus’ (Habermas 1988: 46). The legitimation crisis has emerged as a result of a significant change in the socio-cultural system in the form of peoples’ reactions to the consequences of JDP decisions that have brought about ‘lawlessness’, disrespect to the ‘rule of law’ and economic hardships. The emergent ineffective and unjust system no longer reflects the will of the people who are increasingly becoming frustrated by the recalcitrant and unresponsive attitude of the regime. Thus, what we are witnessing is a transition from a robust legitimation to a legitimation crisis in the life of the JDP.

Socio-economic crisis that has been haunting Turkey for a long time is not just a product of the JDP’s making. In fact, the JDP has done very well for itself to remain

in power for a long time within the context of global capitalism that is prone to a systemic crisis that emerges and re-emerges in a cyclical fashion. In capitalist economies, capital formation and accumulation is the motor of economic growth and development (Mandel 1975, Uneze 2013). In the absence of domestic capital formation, either borrowing or foreign investments are expected to maintain economic, social and cultural development. In boom periods, financialisation and international movement of capital within the global economy has eased up the process of economic growth in peripheral countries like Turkey through the flow of foreign capital. However, the ways the money borrowed and inflowing capital are utilised is crucial in whether the expected results can be obtained (Özsan, Özsan and Ata 2018). The Turkish experience has shown that incoming foreign money has created significant fragilities in the economy as the money has been mainly used either for financing budget deficits or invested mainly in speculative activities rather than in the real sector. Incoming foreign capital has been mainly of short-term nature and portfolio investment that would leave the country rapidly and exacerbate the fragility of the economy. Global dominance of finance capital has had reverberations in the way Turkey's integration into the global financial system has been transformed. The JDP's preference to rely on international financial flows for economic development and thus restructuring the institutional make up has been determinant in the emergence of the current economic crisis. The restructuring of the state-capital relations in favour of finance capital has been detrimental 'to the interest of the poor, and wage earners in Turkey' (Yalman, Marois and Güngen 2018: 2).

Since 2013 the JDP regime gradually has lost its grip on the economy due to a combination of the negative conditions of world capitalism and its own policies of pursuing debt dependent crony capitalism. Unlike the 2002-2010 period since 2013 the JDP no longer has the resources available to maintain its legitimacy boosting reformed social security system and expand community networks for philanthropic activities involving the state, business organisations, local and municipal organisations in a web clientele (Bozkurt 2013; Özdemir 2020).

In its gradual move towards authoritarianism, the JDP had capitalised on the popular support it built during its early years in power. The long sufferings of the masses in previous decades had made the economically weak and vulnerable people to develop a liking towards the JDP who managed to improve government services in health care, education, welfare and employment. However, the JDP implemented its welfare policies along with the recommendations of the IMF and the WB, to such an extent that Bozkurt (2013) called them as 'neoliberalism with a human face'. Furthermore, conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, the resurgence of the war with the PKK domestically gave Erdoğan a good excuse to tighten up his rule. The Kurds' refusal to support Erdoğan's burning desire to become a one man ruler through a presidential system also was effective in the movement towards authoritarianism. Erdoğan's presidential election victory in 2014 with the support of ultra-right-wing NMP came at a time of upheavals in Syria and in the Southeast Turkey. Involvement in the Syrian internal war, the renewed fight with the PKK inside and outside Turkey, political and economic rivalry with the Fethullah Gülen organisation and the global recession had negative impacts on the economy since 2012 (Pamuk 2018: 283).

The government has a strong tendency not only to deny the existence of a serious economic crisis, but also presenting a rosy picture. For the government the alleged crisis is in fact fabricated by foreign conspirators, enemies and interest lobbies. The JDP power reached its peak in 2011 elections when it pooled more than 49 percent of the votes. Since then, internal conflicts that came out openly with corruption allegations towards high level party officials and cabinet members including the Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2013. Authoritarianism which had already been in ascendancy took a new turn with the Gezi Park protests. Many journalists and protestors were arrested and held under custody for a long time without trial. Out of 180 countries, Turkey's position in the Word Press Freedom Index declined from 99th in 2008 to 154 in 2020 (Subasat 2020).

Ayers and Saad-Filho (2015) maintain that, when it feels that the reproduction of capital is being challenged, the capitalist state does not hesitate to use economic

political and legal power to keep the avenues of capital accumulation open. For the JDP, to remain in power to continue to benefit from the system, the party has used every means available to them including the changes in the legal system. Turkey has witnessed what Poulantzas states in analysing the relationship between the state and the power block: ‘intensified state control over every sphere of social life ... (and) draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called “formal” liberties’ (Poulantzas 1978: 203–204). Unlike the claims that neoliberalism is determined to get rid of the influence of the state, based on the analysis of the JDP in Turkey, we believe that in times of crises capital accumulation needs the state more than ever to ensure the acquiescence of society (Boratav 2019; Öniş 2019). The state interference become a vital element of authoritarian neoliberalism as the last ten years has witnessed in Turkey. Authoritarian neoliberal state makes sure that the future of capital accumulation will not be in danger by taking pre-emptive measures in state society relations and institutions of governance. In recent years the intensity of the state intervention in Turkey has reached such a level that one could argue that this has invalidated the main principle of neo-liberalism: the superiority of the free market. It seems that the JDP has mobilised all at its disposal to ensure its own re-production rather than operating within the parameters of neo-liberalism.

This paradoxical situation has led the JDP to use the state resources and power to discipline any opposition without considering that it is the state policies which are responsible for the socio-economic problems that generate oppositional forces. While problems like enormous income inequalities, unemployment, housing shortages, inefficient education and health services are not resolved by the working of neo-liberal economy, the liberal authoritarian state endeavours to secure the conditions of capital accumulation. The JDP's trajectory to authoritarianism has to be understood within the context of Turkey's deepening integration into globalised capitalism. The rise and fall of the JDP's legitimacy is directly related to the specific tensions and conflicts created by this integration.

As we explained in the introductory chapter, for Habermas (1984 b, 1988) if it is left to its own devices, the capitalist system would generate crises. By addressing the

issues of infrastructure building, national security, legal system and class conflict, the state simply plays the supreme role of 'crisis displacement'. Without state intervention, capitalism would not be able to resolve its crises. However, in peripheral social formations the means and power of the state may not be sufficient to resolve the problems generated by the capitalist system. Therefore, the holders of the state power would have the mammoth task of maintaining their own survival as well as sustaining the economic system. The magnitude of the global crises would force the holders of the state to find ways of keeping the people under control. The best thing is to be able to find mechanisms of ensuring social integration. However, in countries like Turkey where the working of capitalism generates high levels of marginalisation in society, it may not be possible to ensure integration in social, economic and political spheres.

Not being able to sustain a smooth and crisis free economic development within the financialised economic system, the JDP has used politico-organisational and socio-cultural sub-systems to avoid, or at best to postpone the legitimisation crisis which would have endangered its own survival. The JDP has attempted to compensate its inability to control the market forces by manipulating the socio-cultural sub-system through the use of Islam and Ottoman nationalism which has simply delayed the day of reckoning. Its social welfare policies, use of Islamic orders (tarikats) as a mechanism of recruitment into Islamic businesses and state institutions has been able to postpone the motivation crisis until recently.

The poverty reduction programme, and the creation of a fairly large and loyal clientele through distribution of state resources to a large extent have protected a sizeable proportion of the people from the consequences of global processes. However, the maintenance of a distributive social policy and a crony capitalism necessitate strong economic resources. The JDP found these resources through international borrowing and plundering state resources for a long time. The limits of both borrowing and the state resources, due to both the current global financial crisis and Turkey's inability to maintain debt-dependent growth, coupling with the devastating impact of the Covid-19 has led to a motivation crisis in society. Through



its discriminatory politics, the JDP has generated what Habermas calls as a ‘cultural crisis tendency’ which in turn has implications for legitimacy. In transforming the normative structures of society (the notions of what is correct and what is appropriate) the JDP has also changed the expectations in the society. Although development of capitalism establishes the notions of individual freedom, rationality and meritocracy, the JDP policies on the contrary have emphasizes obedience, loyalty and nepotism. This has simply been against the expectations of a considerable number of people in society and thus has generated a motivation crisis tendency in the socio-cultural sub system. The results of public opinion polls like METROPOLL, MAK Danşmanlık and incessant protests such as Gezi, HES, Cerratepe etc. are certainly indicative of the erosion of the JDP's legitimacy. The possibility of the rigid JDP supporters to turn their back to the party seems to be fairly unlikely in that they may fear to be also held responsible for the irregular distribution of resources as receivers of benefits (Sondakika Türk 2019). Time will show whether this loss of support for the JDP would generate a full scale crisis of legitimacy leading to the JDP's downfall.

The loss of confidence in the power holders and in the institutions controlled by them is a significant criteria for thinking about at least a legitimacy crisis tendency. In recent public opinion polls, about 70 percent of the people declared their mistrust in the JDP (ADAMOR 2020). Habermas does not specify exactly at what particular point the legitimation crisis tendency would become a fully-fledged legitimation crisis. However, he indicates that it can come out as a result of systemic shocks that are produced by long-term structural factors. Considering that the JDP regime has lost the control of the economy due to the specific ways they intensified Turkey's financialisation, which had been in place since the 1980s, and the severity of the world economic crisis, we can argue that legitimation crisis is in the making. Considering the possible devastating impact of the Covid-19 on every sphere of life the possibility of the crisis reaching a devastating level is on the horizon. High number of business closure accompanied by rampant unemployment both in the

formal and informal sectors as well as the self-employment could take the overall societal crisis to an unprecedented level.

The 2008 financial crisis can be construed as a sudden systemic crisis with an impact of having negative effects on the administrative system. As in the case of the JDP, the financial economic crisis has forced it to take certain politico-administrative decisions that have not been able to eliminate the crisis, instead it has led to more hardship in society. The JDP managed to overcome the negative consequences of the 2008 financial crises within couple of years by resorting to further foreign borrowing and intervening into the affairs of the Central Bank. This has had the result of alleviating the impacts of the crisis for a short period but at the same time it overburdened the state finances. However, the specific growth policies followed by the JDP enhanced its inability to maintain its debt- driven growth and legitimacy.

The shocks of the recent global crisis have also found reverberations in Turkey where the JDP government has not been able to maintain economic stability, which has led to the emergence of a rationality crisis and disenchantment in society. In addition to the global pressures on the government, the ways the JDP has transformed the economy and society have also contributed to the societal disenchantment. The societal cleavages generated by the JDP regime have contributed to the erosion of its legitimacy. The crisis tendency generated in the cultural system has been exacerbated by the inability of the JDP to sustain its version of capitalist neoliberalism which has been threatening its legitimacy. The JDP has been experiencing a crisis in both economic and political spheres and these in turn generate a crisis of social integration in society. The socio-cultural system promoted by the JDP has not been able to provide boundary conditions for an integrated society. Instead it has led to significant ruptures and cleavages as exemplified by the Gezi Movement, attacks on women in public places for wearing clothes frowned upon by Islamists, protests by lawyers for changes about bar associations and so on. Labelling anyone who poses a challenge to the JDP rule as a terrorist is another example of cleavage generating attitude of the Party. The existence of a motivation crisis in the socio-cultural system is an indication of the erosion of social integration which would show itself in the forms

of societal cleavages, socio-economic inequalities and worsening of living standards. In the process of implementing the steering imperatives of the economic system, the failure of the administrative decisions to maintain 'the requisite level of mass loyalty' may lead to a legitimization crisis (Habermas 1988: 46).

The attempt of the JDP to enhance what Habermas calls the boundary conditions, that may be helpful to maintain legitimacy, in other words attempts to Islamise society with a Ottomanist cultural tint, is no longer capable of preventing its legitimacy erosion. The JDP rule has not been able to deliver the requisite quantities of what people expected. Apart from a rigid supporter group there is a tendency among people that the JDP has not been able to achieve what it had promised. This was clear in the reactions of university student when they raised their voice in the 'size oy moy yok' (no more votes for you) movement in 2020. Also public opinion polls indicate a serious slide in the JDP support. Big claims that Turkey was going to be the 10th biggest economy has not materialised. Strong Ottomanist discourse has not been able to unify the countries (previously had been under the Ottoman rule) under the JDP leadership. In fact countries like Greece, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Syria have openly challenged the JDP's imperial Ottomanist ambitions. The myth of a powerful leader who would make the country a leading country in the world has gradually waned in a Weberian sense.

The loss of the JPD's power of persuasion stemming from its legitimacy erosion is strongly related to the party's diversion from the multi dimensionality principle of legitimacy. We saw in the previous chapters that the JDP has violated one of the main criteria of legitimacy, the rule of law. When the ruler does not comply with the existing constitutional rules, laws and regulations, we can no longer talk about the 'rightness' of its rule. The fact that the JDP has not obeyed the decisions of courts many times is another indication of legitimacy deficit. The second condition of legitimacy is strongly related to the first one in that not only the ruler but also the ruled have to be in agreement on the rules. The quick over-night omnibus laws, the presidential decrees and the decrees in the power of laws (kanun KHKs) have been put into effect without any discussion in the parliament is a case in point here. Thirdly

public rallies, protests such as Gezi Park movement, TEKEL resistance, protests against HES buildings and public opinion polls like that of METROPOLL are actions indicative of the loss of consent by the ruled. The deficits in any of these three areas are sufficient to question the legitimacy of a government.

In Habermas' view, economic, social and political integration is very vital for legitimacy. Such an integration since the 2008 crisis has cracked up. In Habermasian sense, the existence of severe socio-economic inequalities, worsened levels of economic growth and living standards are strong signs of social integration crisis which in turn leads to loss of people's motivation to support the government. Given the widespread disenchantment in society in the forms of Cumhuriyet Meetings, Gezi Protests, university students 'oy moy yok' reactions, TEKEL, Cerrattepe HES and Soma protests it is possible to claim Habermasian motivation crisis is becoming generalised and leading to a legitimation crisis. The JDP's use of populism has not been sufficient to ensure the continuity of its support and consequently it has increasingly resorted to authoritarianism. As far as the economic system is concerned, there are vital limitations in the system. The steady rise in unemployment and underemployment levels is a serious indication of the rupture in economic system integration. Informal sector employment constitutes a significant part of the employment figures. The reality of a good number of people are engaged in marginal informal employment and does not have access to permanent employment in the formal system is an indication of dwindling economic integration. Turkey displays a highly skewed income distribution. According to TUIK figures for 2018 the top 20 percent has 47.6 percent of the national income while the bottom 20 percent has only 6.1 percent. According to EUROSTAT this represents the second worst income distribution after Serbia in Europe.

Crony capitalism maintained under neoliberal authoritarianism in Turkey does not generate sufficient wealth to tackle the problems of poverty and inequalities. In Habermasian discourse, the economic system under the JDP rule has not produced 'the requisite quantity of consumable values' (Habermas 1988: 49). This at the same time is tantamount to the inability of the politico-administrative system to 'produce

the requisite quantity of rational decisions' (Habermas 1988:49). The version of the Marxist state theories that sees 'the state as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself' (Sweezy 1942: 243) seems to be quite pertinent in understanding the JDP rule. Any serious reaction to the JDP mismanagement would attract the wrath of the state as was the case in Gezi Movement and the accusation corruption in 2013. Yet as we argued in chapter five, a range of protest movements, rallies and meetings have emerged in the country, especially since 2013. This is a clear indication of what Habermas calls the failure of 'the legitimation system' to 'provide the requisite quantity of generalized motivations' (Habermas 1988:49). Furthermore the fact that a good proportion of the populace has shown strong reactions to the JDP's attempts to Islamise the society also means that 'the socio-cultural system' has not generated 'the requisite quantity of action-motivating meaning' (Habermas 1988: 49). In short the four crisis tendencies Habermas considers to be the main components of legitimation crisis have emerged in Turkey under the JDP rule.



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